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ABSTRACT 
Through a study of the Royal Small Arms Factory (Enfield Lock) 
and its influence upon product design and development, we examine 
an apparent anomaly. While accepting that Britain was the seat of 
the industrial revolution, several historians have claimed that 
American engineers held the technological advantage in the 
manufacture of small arms in the first half of the 19th century. 
Accounts of this disparity in the main have sought economic 
answers but this thesis examines technological change in relation 
to the weapons procurement system for the British armed forces 
operated by the Board of Ordnance. Attention is focussed upon the 
political interplay between the public and private sectors of the 
gun trade, which was particularly influential in delaying the 
progress of the British military small arms industry towards the 
standardisation of weapons through a mechanised system of 
manufacture. As a result, reliance by the private sector upon 
traditional labour intensive methods of production remained 
perhaps longer than would otherwise have been the case. 
In addressing these issues it is argued that Britain's seeming 
hesitancy in maintaining her earlier rate of technological 
progress was the result of a veritable cocktail of events, with 
several factors at play. The investigation draws on primary 
documents and secondary accounts complemented by interviews with 
representatives of established small arms manufacturers, skilled 
craftsmen, weapons and machine tool experts and an examination 
of relevant artefacts, the results of which have cast doubt on 
some aspects of received interpretations of early part 
interchangeability. 
This study re-appraises the important role and character of one 
of the most influential and controversial "Ordnance" figures of 
the period, George Lovell. It sets the Board of Ordnance method 
of weapon procurement against the methods of other purchasing 
agencies, notably the East India Company. The results of the 
inquiry indicate that Britain's seeming technological pause in 
the field of small arms manufacture was more due to political 
influence and the administrative structures than to a lack of 
technical expertise on the part of its engineers, entrepreneurs 
and craftsmen. 
INTRODUCTION 
Reading the many standard works which attempt to trace the 
history and development of the manufacture of small arms it would 
be a simple matter to gain the impression that the 
entrepreneurship, manufacturing technology and inventiveness 
which arose out of the industrial revolution had stagnated in 
Britain by the early part of the 19th century. Commentators such 
as Ames and Rosenberg have suggested that "Americans clearly led 
the British in the adoption of many machine methods of 
production",, which seems to imply that somehow the manufacturing 
technology transferred to America early in the century where it 
grew and flourished. . 1. While there is undeniable evidence to 
show that American manufacturers and entrepreneurs had embraced 
and developed this new technology, initially concentrating their 
efforts on solving the difficult problems which were associated 
with the methods and procedures of standardised manufacturing in 
the production of small arms, the main thrust of this thesis will 
be to examine-the basis for Ames and Rosenberg's assertion that 
America was either moving faster or Britain's early technological 
progress had paused. It is intended to discover why it was that 
engineers and industrialists in Britain had apparently not 
followed a more rigorous approach to producing weapons by 
machinery after having the technological initiative of the 
industrial revolution, seeming to prefer traditional labour 
intensive methods of manufacture. We will also attempt to 
discover how Government r eacted to this apparent loss of 
technical advantage. In addressing these issues, the following 
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question will be asked: - were there people in Britain with the 
requisite vision and engineering skills to have taken forward the 
manufacturing technology into the area of small arms production? 
If it is found that such people existed, then it will be 
necessary to ascertain what were the factors which apparently 
held them back. For example, was there the possibility that in 
Britain, little demand for small arms existed at the time? 
Although the-investigation will concentrate on issues this side 
of the Atlantic, the opportunity will be taken to discover 
through comparison with the-work of American scholars, parallels 
with the reasons why small arms manufacturing technology 
developed within the United States national armouries, 
particularly with the progression towards production by the 
system of interchangeable parts. This will be contrasted with 
what seemingly delayed progress towards a mechanised system of 
manufacture for the production of military firearms in Britain. 
The action of putting these issues under the microscope for the 
purpose of investigation is not to make claims for British or 
American engineering skills by trying to decide in which country 
a product or manufacturing process was developed or invented. 
Claims are often made on the basis of commercialism when kudos 
can be gained for a country by suggesting that ideas or processes 
invented or developed by a particular individual or group was an 
"industrial first". Pursuing an investigation into such claims 
would nbt be helpful to the inquiry in hand and would only prove 
distracting to the research. For example, it can be argued that 
Marconi did not invent wireless, as many people like Hertz, Lodge 
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and Faraday had worked for years before him on the development of 
the technology which made the medium possible. Wevertheless, what 
Marconi did was to exploit the available embryonic technology and 
develop a system which required a commercially viable product to 
promote it, in this case, the wireless transmitter and receiver. 
Similarly, the manufacturing system of interchangeable parts did 
not occur from a single stroke of inventive genius but had many 
different contributors. Of course, like wireless, the system 
required a commercially viable product to promote it, initially 
this was the small arm. The important issue for our investigation 
is, what were the factors which encouraged, or in the case of the 
British small arms industry, delayed the mechanised manufacture 
of military small arms? 
on the path to mechanised military small arms manufacture, the 
relationship between George Lovell (Storekeeper at the Enfield 
small arms factory), and the private "Ordnance" contractors will 
be addressed. The period of particular interest is after Lovell's 
promotion to Inspector of Small Arms in 1840, reporting directly 
to the Master General of Ordnance. Here we are provided with some 
of the most important clues which help to explain why the British 
small arms industry during the first half of the 19th century 
took a quite different approach to the production of military 
weapons in comparison to that of the United States of America. 
While the evidence shows that the British small arms industry 
retained labour intensive manufacturing much longer than America, 
being slow to adopt mechanised methods of production, 
particularly in the area of locks and stocks, the greatest 
drawback to technological progress came from*the method of 
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"Ordnance" arms procurement. 
By making a detailed examination of the evidence taken from 
Government Select Committee Reports and official "Ordnance" 
correspondence, it has been possible to assemble a comprehensive 
picture of the "Ordnance" contract system of arms procurement. 
This has helped to reinforce the conclusion that the "Ordnance" 
method of weapon procurement was one of the more crucial elements 
in a number of influencing factors which led to delaying the 
introduction of machine tools for the mass production of small 
ýLrms in Britain. 
In examining George Lovell's multi-faceted role in small arms 
manufacture and weapon development it will become clear that he 
was one of the most influential and controversial figures within 
the British small arms industry. Although Lovell has been 
acknowledged by writers and arms experts like De Witt Bailey for 
his innovation and weapon design skill, this is the first study 
in which his dealings with the "Ordnance" private contractors has 
been fully assessed. In moving towards an improved product 
standard, Lovell was responsible for increasing the strictness of 
t he "Ordnance" "view" (quality control and inspection). By 
analysing the consequences of these stricter inspection standards 
it will be shown how they had a marked effect upon the British 
small arms industry, causing considerable problems and hardship 
for the private sector. The episode allows a closer study of a 
complex game played by the Inspector of Small Arms in his quest 
to manoeuvre a reluctant "Ordnance" into taking control of weapon 
manufacture. By contrasting the "Ordnance" methods of view with 
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the strategy employed by officers of the East India Company when 
procuring arms from the same private contractors as the British 
Government, we question the criteria of the "Ordnance" weapon 
inspection system, especially the insistence on high levels of 
finish, which to a certain extent can be seen as a hang-over from 
the traditional labour intensive methods and artistic 
embellishments employed in the manufacture of sporting guns. 
Such weapons were often crafted individually, which meant they 
were aimed at a quite different customer base than the mass 
markets of the military. 
This comparison puts in perspective the continuing criticism of 
"Ordnance" by the private contractors throughout the first half 
of the 19th century, much of which became personalised against 
Lovell. Conversely criticisms were levelled against the 
independent gun trade by "Ordnance" who accused the contractors 
of deliberately setting out to extract the highest possible 
prices for weapons and falling behind in their contractual 
obligations. The reasons for these beliefs will be examined and 
it will be suggested that "Ordnance" could have considered other 
methods of obtaining arms supplies from the private sector., To 
counterbalance the "Ordnance" accusations against the 
contractors, an examination of the "Ordnance" system of open 
tendering will be taken, which had high standards for low prices 
within its weapon procurement criteria. After the new system of 
open tendering was introduced in the late 1840s it will be shown 
how its effect upon the private sector further increased weapon 
supply problems. 
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Examining how George Lovell dealt with "bottle necks" in the 
weapon manufacturing process created by the scarce supply of 
seasoned walnut allows a new insight not only into the way 
production problems were solved but, perhaps more importantly, in 
the way Lovell thought and behaved in the'political arena. 
Through this episode we are permitted a glimpse of the different 
pressures which were at play, both bureaucratic and political, 
which helped to delay the progresses of innovative techniques in 
the British small arms industry,. By examining the method 
employed to increase the supply of walnut for use in the 
manufacture of military gun stocks, we are allowed through a 
serious, although somewhat naive miscalculation by Lovell's son, 
the Assistant Inspector of Small Armst to witness how this led 
indirectly to the installation of a new wood desiccating process 
chamber at Enfield Lock. 
Correspondence between the Master General of Ordnance and the 
Superintendent of the Royal Small Arms Factory, Enfield allows 
for the first time a vivid insight into the Master General's 
knowledge of the processes involved in the development and 
manufacture of small arms. This information will be analysed in 
the context of "Ordnance" arms procurement at the time of the 
Crimean War. The opportunity will also be taken to examine the 
impact of this particular war upon the British small arms 
industry, which by the middle of the century had reached a 
critical stage in its development. 
Innovation and manufacture 
In assessing the role of "Ordnance" weapon procurement in the 
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emergence of mass production technology, the aim will be to 
discover the influencing factors affecting the manufacture of 
machine produced small arms. In particular we will ask whether 
considerations of weapon manufacture were purely those of 
military performance, or if cost and engineering efficiency took 
precedence. These questions will be pursued in the study of how 
new weapons were designed, tested and selected for the armed 
forces. 
In modern methods of machine production it is known that the 
product designer will endeavour to use his-knowledge of the 
manufacturing processes, consulting with other members of the 
design and production teams. This ensures that the most cost 
effective and efficient means of factory output is achieved. The 
approach is adopted to make sure that the product can easily be 
accommodated within the current production technology rather than 
having the costly problem of adapting machinery or increasing the 
labour content to facilitate manufacture. For example, paying 
particular attention to such aspects as machine cycle timesf 
achievable component shape, material wastage and ease of assembly 
can all have a beneficial effect on a product's profitability. 
Designing a product with regard to available production processes 
can often have advantages for quality by reducing the complexity 
of inspection. The opportunity will be taken to examine the 
methods of early weapon selection to see how widely the concept 
of integrating design with ease of manufacture was understood or 
even acknowledged. From these discoveries it will be shown that 
although there were some engineers who understood and appreciated 
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the benefits of designing a product for ease of manufacture, the 
"Ordnance" procurement system and the method of new weapon 
selection, was not conducive to incorporating such advantages 
within the manufacturing process. In the case of the private gun 
trade, most were small firms using labour intensive methods of 
manufacture. The scale and short nature of military contracts 
held little advantage for such enterprises. New small arms 
selection was normally by open competition, when weapon 
performance and price were the criteria for acceptance, not ease 
of manufacture. These aspects will be fully discussed within the 
context of the thesis and examples of military weapon trials will 
be investigated to discover what were the specific priorities 
governing acceptance. 
Intertwined with all the various strands of technology, 
development, innovation and diffusion is the use of the artisan's 
skills and how they may have been affected, changed, improved or 
diminished by the advance of machine intensive methods of 
production. These aspects will be addressed within the overall 
framework of the thesis, firstly to understand what if any were. 
the effects of increased amounts of mechanisation upon the 
workforce and secondly to discover if changes occurred in the 
organisational and reporting structure due to the growth in 
machine tool numbers. 
When looking retrospectively from the twentieth century it can be 
seen that the Royal Small Arms Factory (RSAF) played a prominent 
role in the field of small arms development. A considerable 
number of well preserved artefacts remain to support this 
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observation. -Examples can be seen, though not always examined, in 
collections of several museums and within the Pattern Room of the 
Ministry of Defencer Nottingham. These help to further our 
knowledge. 
With a view to learning more about the integration of artisan 
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skills with the coming of the new machine technology, 
negotiations were undertaken with the Ministry of. Defence (MOD), 
Nottingham from which it became possible to examine in detail a 
small number of gun lock tumblers removed from complete weapons 
within the prodigious collection held in the Pattern Room. The 
tumblers were taken from sample small arms which were selected 
by the Custodian who ensured that the parts under examination 
were manufactured before and after the installation of American 
machine tools at Enfield Lock in circa 1856. In this way it was 
hoped that the tumblers, an intricate part of the lock to- 
produce, would provide evidence of early manufacturing 
techniques. While the number of samples was limited to three, it 
was possible to detect variations between the early and later 
examples. With the cooperation of an MOD weapons expert and two 
time-served retired engineers from the Royal Small Arms Factory, 
Enfield Lock, a physical examination of gun lock tumblers was 
undertaken to look for evidence of hand finishing and to 
generally interpret the markings left on the metal. 
Robert Gordon in the United States has carried out an in depth 
physical study of how early and mid 19th century tumblers were 
manufactured. From his study he has been able to conclude from 
the different tool marks found on this key component together 
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with an analytical examination of the documentary evidence from 
the Springfield National Armoury, that the hand skills of 
artisans, rather than becoming diminished with the introduction 
of machine tools as suggested by some contemporary writers like 
Felicia Deyrup, actually remained for much longer than had 
previously been thought. . 2. The evidence obtained from examining 
the British tumblers will be compared with Gordon's work to see 
if the conclusions he reaches in relation to machine finishing 
and hand labour can be supported. Through the independent 
examination of the Nottingham tumblers and discussions with the 
time-served engineers, it will be shown that a better 
understanding has been gained of the production techniques in 
operation at the time the parts were manufactured. 
The expert opinions offered by these men has helped to account 
for differences observed between the samples. These and other 
observations when analysed in the context of British 19th century 
inspection criteria, has called into question the strictness of 
"Ordnance". viewing standards. The physical exercise of examining 
these components has caused the writer to reassess what actually 
passed for mid 19th century weapon part interchangeability, 
-rather than accept at face value the several written accounts. By 
commentators loosely using the term interchangeability, without 
trying to discover if there were or were not acceptable tolerance 
spreads within which the parts could still be effectively used, a 
gap has been left in our knowledge. 
Once "Ordnance" accepted the necessity of mechanising military 
weapon manufacture by the middle of the century and the new 
American machinery was seen to be working successfully at 
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Enfield, the RSAF became a model production facility acting as an 
example for others to follow. This period will be examined for 
evidence of technology transfer which embraces both inward and 
outward technological diffusion; in modern parlance "spin in" and 
"spin out". 
Much of what has been written about the development of the RSAF 
has tended to concentrate on the period post 1850 and the 
dramatic changes to production caused by the installation of the 
American machine tools. Therefore, in concluding the thesis it 
will be necessary to assess the factors which determined the 
direction and route taken by the RSAF, from a position of 
relative obscurity during the early part of the century, to one 
of high profile, achieving a reputation for technical excellence 
by the late 1850s in the world of small arms manufacture. 
However, to understand how the RSAF underwent this major 
transformation and advanced to a position of considerable 
eminence, it will be necessary to probe the mainly neglected 
first half of the century to understand the key determining 
factors. 
Establishing the armoury at Enfield Lock 
At this juncture in the introduction it is intended to set the 
scene for the thesis by firstly familiarising the reader with the 
early beginnings of the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield Lock 
through a "thumb-nail" history, allowing a brief insight into the 
way the site developed during the first half of the century. This 
will be accompanied with an outline of the issues surrounding the 
small arms industry which were occurring as the century 
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progressed. It is believed that this approach will quickly 
establish in the reader's mind the relationship between the 
various themes under discussion in the following chapters and the 
periods to which they relate. 
The construction of the "Ordnance" small arms factory beside the 
River Lea at Enfield Lock, on the Essex and Middlesex borders, 
came about through a British Government initiative. Action to 
proceed with construction had been provoked by what the Board of 
Ordnance regarded as the failure of the private gun trade to 
provide sufficient quantities of weapons for the Army during the 
period of the Napoleonic Wars. By 1816 the factory and houses for 
the workmen and their families had been completed. Also during 
this year the barrel branch from the Royal Manufactory at 
Lewisham was incorporated into the site as water power for the 
south London armoury began to fail. The lock and finishing 
sections from Lewisham were integrated later, adding to the 
site's gradual expansion. However,,. it was not until some forty 
years of relative peace, after commencement of the Crimean War, 
that major building and equipping of the Royal Small Arms Factory 
(as it was later to become known) took place, providing the 
capability of producing large quantities of weapons by 
standardised methods of machine manufacture. Up until the. middle 
of the century the factory acted largely as a research and 
development establishment, a repair facility and a small weapon 
assembly and modification shop. Because of the expertise of the 
workforce, the establishment was also used to monitor the price 
and quality of finished parts and weapons manufactured by the 
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private contractors for "Ordnance". 
Despite the initiative taken by Government to control and secure 
regular supplies of military small arms by constructing the 
factory at Enfield Lock, it was over four decades before the 
armed forces were able to derive real benefit of quality arms in 
quantity from this plant. The circumstances which were 
responsible for this somewhat ironic situation provide an 
interesting study, and form a major part of this thesis. Here the 
reasons will be discussed why the private sector was still 
producing and providing the bulk of military small arms up until 
circa 1857.. We will examine the paths of both the private and 
public sectors of the British military gun trade during this 
period and show how the industry had to go through a prolonged 
and painful evolution before it could be claimed that weapons 
were manufactured in reasonable quantities to a consistent and 
reliable standard. 
Reviewing small arms provision at mid-century 
In October 1853, Mr (later Sir) John Anderson, the chief engineer 
of the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich, was sent to Enfield and 
instructed to find out whether the factory was capable of 
manufacturing bayonets by machinery. Following his visit Anderson 
issued a report to which the official response of "Ordnance" was 
to appoint a Committee to consider the whole question of small 
arms provision for Her Majesty's Service. Lieutenant Colonel 
Alexander Tulloh, Royal Artillery, Inspector of the Royal 
Carriage Factory at Woolwich, and Colonel James Archibald 
Chalmer, R. A., Inspector of Artillery, reported to the Committee 
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making the following observations: - 
It appears that the system hitherto adopted to procure small 
arms is so heterogeneous in its character, that it could not 
fail to produce considerable difficulties. The Government 
establishment at Enfield Lock is comparatively small and of a 
mixed nature, some parts of the work being performed by the 
establishment, some by contractors; many of the lathes and 
tools are the property of the workmen; others belonging to the 
establishment. The men possessing lathes hire them out to 
other men. 
The establishment at Enfield Lock being small, and forming 
part of the heterogeneous system, is unable to hold that 
check or control over the contractors to prevent exorbitant 
demands and serious delays. 
The principal part of the gun trade upon which the Government 
mainly depends for supply in case of emergency, is carried on 
in Birmingham and London, by men working by hand in wretched 
cellars and garrets, and great evil arises from the s. lowness 
of manufacture. . 3. 
It will be gathered from these findings that the Committee had 
reinforced the image, already held by "Ordnance", that the small 
arms industry in Britain was in rather a perilous state. This 
would appear especially true if one considers the imperial role 
of Britain in the 19th century with the need to police her far 
flung Empire. Furthermore, for a nation which had been at the 
heart of the industrial revolution it must have been extremely 
embarrassing for Government to witness senior "Ordnance" officers 
being forced to purchase quantities of arms from continental 
r 
manufacturers in times of conflict. Having to go abroad to find 
ways of bridging the gaps brought about by recurring delays to 
small arms contracts was clearly an unsatisfactory state of 
affairs for a proud nation. 
Further scorn was heaped upon the private gun trade when Sir 
Thomas Hastings, the Ordnance Principal Storekeeper, read out in 
evidence to the Committee some of the written excuses given by 
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contractors for delays. These were: - strikes amongst the workmen, 
accident to machinery, illness of a skilled artisan and 
difficulty in procuring coal. It would seem there was little 
sympathy with the contractor's reasons as Lord Raglan, the Master 
General of Ordnance, and Sir Thomas Hastings had already formed 
the view that "Ordnance" should take control of small arms 
manufacture when they stated: - 
.. * they had been guided in their opinion partly by the report 
of the Commissioners who, during the last year, visited the 
manufactories of the United States, and partly from 
communications with Mr Anderson and other persons conversant 
with machinery. . 4. 
Reading the. report, and considering the evidence from the 
Committee's point of view, it would be difficult to see how they 
could have reached any other conclusion than that the Board of 
Ordnance should assume overall responsibility for military small 
arms manufacture. During the previous three years "Ordnance" had 
complained of worsening arms deliveries and the commencement of 
war'in the Crimea had increased pressure for a radical review of 
procurement. . 5. Again, it was the sad experience of the British 
armed forces to be deprived of sufficient quantities of reliable 
weapons in time of war and once more "Ordnance" had to turn to 
the independent gun trade for supplies. 
The private sector, 
the thesis, had not 
not do so until wel 
until then it still 
particularly in the 
Paradoxically, some 
for reasons which will be explained later in 
modegnised its method of manufacture and did 
1 into the second half of the century. Up 
relied heavily on traditional manual skills 
production of locks and stocks., 
elements of barrel manufacture had been 
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mechanised quite early in the century. This was found necessary 
due to the relatively high reject rate at proof, caused in the 
main by poor quality iron. However, it was not until the 
independent gun trade's hand had been forced by competition from 
the new Government factory at Enfield Lock, that a group of 
private contractors decided to set up the Birmingham Small Arms 
Company (BSA). Further, pressure for radical change was heaped 
upon the private sector when it became "Ordnance" policy to place 
contracts only for weapons manufactured with interchangeable 
parts. 
However, to improve our understanding of the British military gun 
trade in the middle of the century it will be necessary to 
examine the events and influencing factors which occurred during 
the first part. 
The influence of George Lovell 
George Lovell was appointed Storekeeper at Enfield Lock on lst 
April 1816. The date coincided with the barrel branch being moved 
from Lewisham. Most students of the history of the RSAF agree 
that it was Lovell more than any other individual who, with his 
expertise and dedication, laid the foundations and set the bench 
marks for quality. and reliability which were to become synonymous 
with the RSAF in later years. 
Lovell was determined to improve the tolerance standards of 
weapons and piece parts delivered to "Ordnance" by the private 
contractors. In 1833, equipped with a new micrometer he was able 
to ascertain that the instruments used for measuring the bores of 
barrels varied between 0.752 and 0.760 of an inch. He therefore 
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set the standard at 0.754 of an inch, a measurement which would 
be adhered to in the future. . 6. From 20th century experience it 
is known that increased levels of accuracy will call for greater 
standards of skill and improved manufacturing techniques if high 
rejection rates are to be avoided. Refinements of this sort can 
lead to a short term decrease in manufacturing output, accounting 
for a reduction in profit margins. Therefore, it is 
understandable that Lovell's demands for tolerances to a 
thousandth of an inch brought considerable criticism from the 
private "Ordnance" contractors. One anonymous observer, unhappy 
with the neiy imposed standards, called Lovell "a cabinet or 
bedstead maker by trade". Going on, this figure criticized the 
strictness imposed by the "Ordnance" viewers which led "to a 
litigious vexatious nicety of gauging, and finished appearance 
unknown in the highest finished fowling pieces". He described-as 
absurd "the principle of exact jigging, gauging, moulding and 
other fantastic accuracies". . 7. The consequence of "Ordnance"* 
imposing strict inspection and quality standards form part of the 
complex character of the British small arms industry and 
illustrate the somewhat precarious nature of the military gun 
trade. These issues will be fully addressed later in the thesis. 
Lovell's problems did not subside after his appointment to 
Inspector of Small Arms, the most influential position in all 
aspects of military weapon design, manufacture, and procurement 
below that of the Master General of Ordnance. If anything, the 
personal attacks increased and considerable controversy was to 
surround his later years. The reasons for this will be addressed 
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in chapters five and six. 
"Ordnance" dilemma 
It is clear from the many written accounts of the British gun 
trade in the period to the middle of the century that production 
was essentially fragmented, being split mainly between the London 
and Birmingham private gunmakers. The industry suffered from the 
lack of demand for arms after 1815 when military conflict with 
France ceased. Government's apparent reluctance to initiate a 
policy of major intervention into the arms industry was primarily 
due to the private gun trade's successful lobby of Parliament and 
in part due to the strong influence of the Duke of Wellington 
who, as Commander in Chief of the Army, believed that the quality 
of arms themselves needed no improvement. It was only the degree 
and extent of the troop's instruction in their use that needed 
to be improved. . 8. In addition, 'the contract system operated by 
the Board of Ordnance, with its poor technical support and the 
withholding of gauges and patterns to the contractors, had helped 
create supply and price difficulties for military weapons, 
deepening the impression that the private sector was incapable of 
meeting the reasonable demands of its customer. These were just 
some of the issues facing both "Ordnance" and the private gun 
trade as the middle of the century approached. 
Delavinq change 
By 1854 the Board of Ordnance had received reports both from the 
Commission to America led by Lt. Colonel Burn in that year and 
from Joseph Whitworth in the previous year, detailing the reality 
that the government armouries in the United States were employing 
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large amounts of machinery in the manufacture of rifles. The 
level of mechanisation was reported as being particularly 
advanced in the operations of forming, shaping, and fitting out 
gun stocks, formerly considered a highly labour intensive part of 
the gun manufacturing process. It was not as if the American 
Government had kept the technology a secret, for machinery 
capable of making 130 to 160 gun stocks per day had been offered 
to the Board of Ordnance by an American agent Samuel Cox as early 
as 1841. As is well known, the technology for manufacturing large 
scale irregular and complex shapes in wood had existed in Britain 
since the early part of the century. Less than one hundred miles 
from Enfield, in the Portsmouth dockyards, the relatively 
complicated ship's pulley block had been manufactured for the 
Navy on a sequence of machines invented by Marc Isambard Brunel 
and built by Henry Maudslay, the eminent London engineer. 
Maudslay's workshops were located within one hour's travel from 
Enfield, so it is hard to imagine that "Ordnance" management were 
ignorant of the available manufacturing technology, especially as 
it was the Admiralty, another branch of Government, which had 
been responsible for financing the Portsmouth factory. . 9. 
However, the process seems not to have been adopted in Britain 
for the purpose of manufacturing gun stocks although there is 
evidence to suggest that the principles upon which the Portsmouth 
machinery was based were probably taken up by American machine 
tool inventors like Blanchard and the ideas incorporated into 
their own designs, these finding their way back to England later 
in the century. These aspects of technology transfer will be 
discussed in a separate chapter. 
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The Great Exhibition of 1851 in London's Hyde Park allowed a 
wide body of "Ordnance" experts and private gun contractors as 
well as members of the public to witness the advances made by 
American manufacturers and engineers in production technology. 
Robbins and Lawrence, an American company, sent six U. S. Army 
rifles for display and demonstration, all manufactured with 
parts that interchanged. Samuel Colt exhibited his revolversr 
which he claimed were made almost entirely by machinery and 
having parts that were interchangeable. . 10. what is interesting 
about these two American companies employing high levels of 
machinery in the manufacture of their products was that they were 
both in the private sector and producing weapons for the United 
States Government, setting them quite apart from their labour 
intensive British counterparts. It would therefore seem 
reasonable to speculate that there must have been compelling 
reasons for their adopting the approach of investing in high 
levels of capital equipment, while in the main their British 
equivalents appear to have resisted mechanisation. For this 
reluctance to have existed for so long in Britain, would seem to 
indicate that strong and powerful forces were at play. 
The reasons which prompted these transatlantic-differences will 
be addressed in the thesis. 
Grasping the nettle 
When the second Commission was sent to America in 1854 led by 
I 
Lt. Colonel Burn R. A. it had been given quite specific 
instructions to inspect the different gun factories and to 
purchase such machinery and equipment as found necessary for the 
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proposed new factory at Enfield. This was quite a different 
approach to that of the Commission of 1853 which included Joseph 
Whitworth (later Sir) the distinguished engineer. Whitworth did 
not go to America expressly to view the gun manufacturers as 
might be implied by reading some accounts of the visit. Initially 
he went to attend the New York Industrial Exhibition. This would 
seem to indicate that in less than a year, the procurement of 
small arms for the British army and navy had reached an extremely 
critical state. Accompanied by George Wallis, Headmaster of the 
Birmingham School of Art, Whitworth appears to have taken it upon 
himself to have altered his itinerary, as it is suggested 11 ... and 
while there they extended their enquiries by visiting several 
establishments, among others the Government Arms Factory at 
Springfield". . 11. This observation is further substantiated in 
Whitworth's evidence to the 1854 Select Committee when he stated 
"... that he had not been specially directed to inspect the 
manufactories of fire-arms, and had not therefore given the close 
attention to the subject which he would have done if he had 
foreseen the present inquiry". . 12. 
The introduction to the 1854 Committee on Machinery-s 87 page 
report sets out their terms of reference and provides an insight 
into some of the circumstances which helped bring about a marked 
change of direction by "Qrdnance". The reasons which were 
eventually to cause "Ordnance" to take on the responsibility of 
becoming a major manufacturer of military small arms can be seen 
from the following extract of the report. 
Owing to the delays constantly recurring in the fulfilment , 
of contracts for arms, the high price demanded by contractors, 
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and the inconvenience occasioned to the Service by these 
causes, the Honourable Board of ordnance, towards the end of 
the year 1853, considered it advisable, in order to secure a 
regular supply of them, to take this branch of manufacture 
into their own hands, and erect a Government establishment 
capable of producing muskets in large numbers, and at a 
moderate price by the introduction of machinery into every 
part of the manufacturing where it was applicable... Having 
caused a plan of the building they proposed to erect to be 
drawn out, ... set to work as speedily as possible; and hearing from Mr Whitworth and others that machinery was extensively 
applied to this branch of manufacture in the United States of 
America, where, on account of the high price of labour, the 
whole energy of people is directed to improving and inventing 
labour-saving machinery, the Honourable Board consider it 
advisable to send over to that country some of their officers, 
with a view to obtaining every information in their power 
connected with the manufacture of arms as there conducted, and 
with the power of buying such machinery as they might consider 
would be more productive than that used in England for similar 
purposes. . 13. 
The second Commission to America placed contracts for machine 
tools with Robbins & Lawrence of Windsor, Vermont, and the Ames 
Manufacturing Company, Chicopee, Massachusetts. This latter 
company produced machinery for fashioning gun stocks, bedding 
the barrel, and letting in the lock. The machinery proved to be 
so efficient and reliable that when writing the history of the 
Royal Small Arms Factory in circa 1930, GH Roberts, the then 
Superintendentr proudly wrote: - 
It is interesting to note that several of the woodworking 
machines supplied by the Ames Co. are still in use today and 
giving good service, in fact one well known Firm of English 
machinists recently declared that even today they could not 
improve upon the American machines in the matter of output 
etc. . 14. 
Roberts commented further: - 
As regards Messrs. Robbins & Lawrence machines, a small 
Horizontal Milling Machine of their make, probably one of the 
last of the plant supplied by them, has been scrapped within 
the last year or two, although it has not been worked for some 
time. . 15. 
It can be concluded from the report made by the Commission after 
visiting the U. S. Armoury at Springfield, that their decision to 
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place orders for what must be considered a substantial quantity 
of machinery was influenced by at least two important factors. 
One, that a complete gun stock could be made on a sequenced 
operation of forming machinery and two, the ability of a workman 
to randomly assemble arms from parts taken from weapons which had 
been manufactured over a ten year period. The Commission was also 
successful in arranging for James H Burton, former Master 
Armourer of Harpers Ferry, to be brought to England on a5 year 
contract to oversee the installation and the commissioning of the 
machinery at Enfield Lock. . 16. 
Enfield comes of age 
The years 1855 to 1859 saw the rapid expansion of building at 
Enfield Lock. Construction work was carried out by the Royal 
Engineers under the supervision of Captain Thomas Bernard 
Collison, R. E. During this period the large machine room was 
completed specifically to house the new machinery, much of which 
was purchased in America by the 1854 Commission. The plant was 
designed for an estimated annual production of 130,000 muskets 
and bayonets. In these early years, although expenditure on land, 
buildings, machinery, and gas works amounted to E315,000, the 
success of the plant was such that, according to Roberts, by 1862 
this sum together with depreciation of E48,000 was said to have 
been entirely repaid by the reduced cost of production. 
Before 1861 the energy source for the Enfield manufactory had 
been water taken from the River Lea to drive two 18 foot diameter 
cast iron water wheels, each having an estimated output of 46 
horse power. The design of the drive, which did not incorporate 
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governors, was reported to have made the outputs very irregular. 
The main function of the water wheels was to run the barrel 
grinding shop which according to reports continued with this 
power source until 1887. Remarkably, the traditional grit 
grindstone remained in use much longer, not being finally 
discontinued until circa 1926. . 17. 
In 1852 a new barrel rolling plant was installed and by 1853 
Roberts suggests that the factory capacity had been increased to 
accommodate 50,000 muskets and 3,000 swords per annum. Prior to 
this, and using only an average of 25 horse power before steam 
was introduced, it was claimed that the production rate of the 
Enfield factory had been in the order of 7,000 small arms and 
1,500 swords annually. . 18. However, Tim Putnam when referring to 
George Lovell suggests that "the number of complete weapons in 
his period never approached that figure". . 19. This is based on 
evidence that Enfield took in parts from sub-contractors for 
setting-up into arms, which would tend to reduce the claim of the 
overall number of weapons completely manufactured on site. 
In the year ending 30th June 1860 the output of rifles alone had 
increased to 90,707, an average of 1,744 per week, later to go 
up to 1,900. By the year 1861 1,700 men were employed at the 
plant and it is recorded that the large machine room was dr iven 
by two 40 horse power steam engines with Fairbairn expansion 
gear, while in the barrel mill a 70 horse power steam engine was 
employed along with the existing water wheels. . 20. 
It would therefore seem that one can proclaim with confidence 
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that by the late 1850s the "American system of manufactures" (as 
it has popularly become known), had truly arrived at Enfield and 
was seen to be working. The private gun trade had yet to respond 
to the challenge of producing military weapons with standardised 
and interchangeable parts by the extensive use of machine tools. 
In this introductory chapter a number of themes and issues have 
been highlighted which will be investigated in individual 
sections of the thesis. one in particular concerns the role of 
the Inspector of Small Arms, George Lovell and his relationship 
with the private gun trade when acting as the interface between 
them and "Ordnance". As it will be revealed it is Lovell's 
influence, more than any other individual, which has helped to 
mould the shape-of the future British-small arms industry. 
While there are issues of standardisation and flexibility arising 
from the installation of the American machine tools at Enfield 
Lock, there are also aspects of "Ordnance" weapon selection which 
need to be evaluated in the context of engineering efficiency. 
All these points will be discussed and analysed together with the 
effects, problems and advantages of the new machine technology 
for both the Board of Ordnance and the British independent gun 
trade. 
Note. 
Due to the complexity of the subject under investigation and the 
many different influencing strands, the individual chapters will 
address the major issues separately. To assist continuity and to 
reinforce the debate, the opportunity is taken throughout the 
thesis to repeat certain important themes, issues and events. 
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THE GREAT MECHANISATION DEBATE 
There has been much debate amongst economic historians and 
historians of technology regarding the different speed of certain 
technological developments between Britain and America in the 
first half of the 19th century. It is agreed by most commentators 
that Britain at the beginning of the century led the world in 
innovative manufacturing machinery particularly in the processing 
of cotton and the sequenced production of mass produced ship's 
pulley blocks by dedicated machine tools. . 1. Somehow, as the 
century progressed, these early initiatives appear to have been 
lost to American engineers and entrepreneurs who developed and 
enhanced the technology of self-acting machine tools and 
standardisation. The area of manufacture chosen by most leading 
commentators, and the one which best-illustrates how America 
seemingly gained the initiative over Britain, was in the 
production of standardised small arms with interchangeable parts. 
This also includes the development of machine tools upon which 
these small'arms were made. 
In general scholars have concentrated on the reasons for 
America's rapid industrial progress from the start of the 
century, rather than addressing in a systematic way the many 
complex issues which influenced Britain's apparent technological 
slow-down. Some of the popular assumptions imply an air of 
contest, suggesting that fresh Yankee ingenuity was more in 
keeping with the visionary advance of the Vew World, which was 
leaving the more mature and sedate ways of the old country 
behind. Although some historians have attempted to explain why 
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British industry had not seemingly maintained its technological 
advantage in the area of mechanised production by using such 
arguments as material shortage and the abundance of cheap labour 
which suppressed machine growth, they have failed to fully 
explore the influence and effect upon the indigenous gun trade of 
a military small arms procurement system operated by the Board of 
Ordnance and its officers. 
To commence the debate it is worth looking at the state of the 
British small arms industry through the eyes of a mid 19th 
century observer and from there investigate the various reasons 
put forward-by the more prominent commentators concerning the 
technological development of small arms manufacture on both sides 
of the Atlantic. We will concentrate on the reasons which 
seemingly held the British small arms industry back during the 
first part of the century, rather than those which gave their 
American counterparts a technological lead in the field of 
machine tools and mechanical interchangeability. 
The state of the British qun trade 
In his presidential address to the Institute of Civil Engineers 
in January 1868, Charles Hutton Gregory, speaking of the year 
1852, stated that: - 
... prior to this time the construction of firearms was really 
carried out by small manufacturers, who each made only one 
separate part, one for locks, one for barrels, one for 
bayonets etc, the gunmaker being, in fact, little more than a 
setter up; and the Government after obtaining by contract the 
separate parts of the muskets, excepting barrels and some 
small parts, from separate manufacturers put them together at 
their own works at Enfield". . 2. 
Research has confirmed the picture of the gun trade prior to the 
mid 1850s painted by Gregory but -further investigation suggests 
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that, as a result of a poorly operated Government arms 
procurement system, the private sector suffered from 
under-investment in capital equipment. It will be shown later in 
the thesis that the private gun trade, which up until the middle 
of the century had produced the lion's share of military small 
arms, had been successful in preventing a major Government 
intervention into its sector by maintaining pressure upon 
Parliament. There is also evidence to suggest that, as late as 
the latter part of the 1840's (at least on the surface), 
"Ordnance", through the office of the Inspector of Small Arms, 
was having. second thoughts about its original intention of 
becoming a major small arms manufacturer. That is not to say 
"Ordnance" lacked the necessary skills to perform such a task, as 
evidence confirms they were suitably experienced and equipped. 
Previously in 1787 "Ordnance" had-taken over the running of the 
Waltham Abbey Gunpowder Mills to secure supplies of powder for 
the army and navy and of course Woolwich Arsenal had been 
successfully developed from its early roots in the 16th century 
into a major military manufacturing and laboratory complex. By 
the the beginning of the 19th century the Board of Ordnance had 
become 11 ... a large Department of State of considerable power and 
influence, second only to the Treasury". . 3. 
From this experienced and prestigious position it would seem fair 
to conclude that there must have been powerful reasons why the 
initial plan to produce military small arms in-house had not been 
implemented on a large scale. This notion gives support to the 
belief that the reasons why Government had taken almost half a 
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century to adopt a major controlling stake in the manufacture of 
military small arms are not straightforward issues and require 
in-depth investigation. At first it does seem curious that the 
British gun trade had taken so long to arrive at a position of 
being apparently incapable of meeting the national demand for 
military small arms, both in quality and quantity, by the start 
of the Crimean conflict in 1853 (which Britain entered early in 
1854). This appears particularly surprising when one considers 
that it was the low state of weapon stocks in Britain two decades 
before the start of the Napoleonic Wars which provoked the 
Government to establish the armoury at Enfield. On this occasion 
the Board of Ordnance considered the situation so serious that in 
1779 J Colgate, an officer, was sent to supervise the setting-up 
of 40,000 stand of arms in Liege. Later Major General Miller was 
dispatched to Liege and Hamburg to supervise the setting-up and 
procurement of arms in the years 1794,1795 and 1800. The 
inability of the British 'gun trade to supply the needs of the 
military had become so acute that by 1802 Lord Chatham was 
publicly complaining that the craft of military fire-arm making 
had virtually died out in England. A. 
If it is accepted that the main reason for establishing the 
"Ordnance" factory at Enfield Lock in 1816 was to ensure that 
British national interests and security would never again be put 
at risk by a chronic lack of serviceable weapons, as it had been 
at the time of the Wapoleonic wars, then it would appear odd that 
Government had seemingly not learned any lessons from this 
earlier arms shortage. Astonishingly, it was again the outbreak 
of war, this time in the Crimea, that was to highlight the state 
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of Britain's unpreparedness for major conflict, due once more to 
the lack of serviceable military small arms. This would further 
suggest that the question of the British Government adopting a 
major manufacturing interest in the production of military small 
arms was anything but a straightforward matter. Therefore, 
explanations for what would appear-to be a dilatory approach to 
arms procurement are required if we are to gain an understanding 
of the issues at stake. We have identified a number of factors 
which accounted for the British Government remaining a relatively 
minor manufacturer of military small arms for over half a 
century, which will be analysed individually in Chapters Five and 
six. 
The wider debate on growth of the U. K. and U. S. light industry 
The reasons why the industries of America were thought to be 
generally in advance of those in Britain during the first half of 
the nineteenth century has caused much discussion among economic 
historians and historians of technology. Over the years a number 
of hypotheses have been put forward as to why these differences 
existed and how they had come about. The economic historian 
H. J. Habakkuk has suggested that both Britain and America had 
similar opportunities to design and install new manufacturing 
equipment. He goes on to pose the question "how far the rapidity 
of American mechanisation was due to the stimulating effect of 
bottle-necks, and in particular to a scarcity of labour"?. . 5. 
Here Habakkuk suggests, in simple terms, that due to the shortage 
of labour American industry was forced to exploit machine 
manufacturing methods. However, in his analysis of the situation, 
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he expresses doubts about other commentators conclusions with 
regard to the scarce labour argument. For example, Habakkuk is 
generally dismissive of the explanations and observations for the 
technical progress of American industry given by the respected 
Victorian engineer Joseph Whitworth after he had visited the 
United States in 1853. Whitworth had commented "The labouring 
classes are comparatively few in number, but this is 
counterbalanced by, and indeed may be regarded as one of the 
chief causes of, the eagerness in which they call in the aid of 
machinery in almost every department of industry". . 6. Similarly 
H abakkuk is unconvinced by the report of the "Committee on the 
Machinery of America", published in 1855, when it was suggested 
that the speed of mechanisation in America was provoked by the 
scarcity and high cost of labour. . 7. Henry Pelling is treated in 
a like manner when he argued that American industry's rapid 
expansion into labour-saving machinery was caused by a general 
shortage of labour. . 8. While Habakkuk initially seems to have 
some sympathy for Erwin Rothbarth, who has added to the debate 
when he argued "to attract labour the industrial wage had to be 
sufficiently high to prevent an effective alternative to the 
independent cultivation of land; and such a wage could only be 
paid if the American industrialist raised the productivity of 
labour by installing labour-saving machinery", in general he 
finds difficulty with this view also. . 9. Habakkuk therefore asks 
what appears to be a very pertinent question,, "If it paid 
American entrepreneurs to replace expensive American labour by 
machines made by expensive American labour, why did it not pay 
English entrepreneurs to replace the cheaper English labour by 
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machines made with cheaper labour"? . 10. 
In addressing Habakkuk's question in relation to the British gun 
trade, there would appear to be a major fundamental difference 
between the way the small arms industries had evolved on either 
side of the Atlantic. In Britain, the small arms industry grew 
from a collection of modest sized gun makers over a period of 
several hundred years. For example the village of Birmingham by 
the middle of the sixteenth century was becoming known as a 
manufacturing centre, and it is recorded "many Smiths, Lorimers, ' 
Naylers and Cutlers" were to be found there at the time. Although 
1603 has been suggested to mark the establishment of the 
Birmingham gun trade, the exact date when the industry became a 
separate branch of manufacture has not been exactly determined. 
. 11. Pollard has listed more than thirteen hundred gun makers as 
opposed to merchants, most of them being grouped around London 
and Birmingham. . 12. By the nineteenth century, the British 
Government, in the main, relied for its supply of military 
weapons on these small heterogeneous gun-smiths and out-work 
artisans. As research has shown, up to the middle of the 
nineteenth century the Government-owned part of the small arms 
industry was not capable of large scale production. The reasons 
for this will be discussed later in the thesis, where it will be 
revealed that "Ordnance" had not been able to expand small arms 
production from its own factory at Enfield, owing to the 
continued pressure upon Government by the independent gun makers. 
Due mainly to the uncertain nature of the contract system 
operated by "Ordnance" (to be discussed in Chapter Five),, the 
private gun makers had resisted the installation of high cost 
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capital equipment, particularly in the manufacture of locks and 
stocks, relying chiefly on the plentiful reserve of cheap labour. 
In summary, the British gun trade had reached the middle of the 
19th century still largely rooted in the craft based practices of 
the past. 
However, in the New World the American small arms industry did 
not have the luxury of time to experience the same evolutionary 
development as in Britain. In a way, by being a young country and 
a comparatively late industrial starter, American entrepreneurs 
. could 
benefit from machine tool and other technological 
developments which had already become established in Britain and 
on the Continent, not necessarily in the small arms industry. In 
essence, it could be said that American industrialists had gained 
an advantage over their British counterparts by leap-frogging a 
large section of the technical evolutionary process. Often a 
pioneering development can bring disadvantages for the host 
country or company. This can happen when a competitor is able to 
capitalise on the later availability of the often cheaper "off 
the shelf" technology which has effectively allowed him to avoid 
the research and development costs. 
Using a 20th century technological example as an illustrationr 
Britain, in 1936, was the first country in the world to have a 
television public broadcasting service (405 line system). After 
the second world war improved television systems (625 line) were 
developed outside of Britain which were incompatible with United 
Kingdom standards, making it impossible for British manufacturers 
to export their indigenous product. Therefore, the home system 
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rapidly became obsolete. . 13. Hence, it is not always 
economically beneficial to be first in the field with a 
particular product or leading edge technology. In this particular 
example other countries were able to benefit from the pre-war 
television technology developed in Britain, adopting later and 
more advanced know-how in the post war period, free from dated 
technical constraints. In a similar way the American small arms 
industry had the advantage over its British counterpart in the 
time-scale of technical development. American weapon 
manufacturers had not been constrained-by a traditional 
heterogeneous labour intensive small arms industry which had the 
ability to bring political pressure upon Government to maintain 
the status-quo. As it will be seen later in the thesis, the 
relationship between American machine tool and small arms 
manufacturers and their government was quite different from that 
of British manufacturers and "Ordnance". 
There was of course a possible benefit for American industry in 
having a large influx of emigrant labour. These people coming 
from the Old World were looking for fresh opportunities and 
fortune in the new. Because they sought advancement for 
themselves and their families it is conceivable they would have 
been more amenable to change. This being the case, it is likely 
the new arrivals would have been willing to adopt a flexible 
approach to working with machinery which demanded a division of 
labour and in general did not require high levels of skill. It 
has been supposed that to the emigrant who had just entered the 
country and was eager to learn, machine intensive production 
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would have distinct advantages for those who wished to establish 
themselves in work quickly. . 14. 
There is certainly evidence that because of the long craft based 
tradition, the British artisan did not welcome the notion of 
change which he saw as depriving him of a livelihood through the 
introduction of machines and this had to be resisted. Neither was 
the suggestion that new self-acting machinery be introduced 
welcomed by all the gun makers. Several of these men had come 
from family concerns and inherited the skills and status handed 
down by their forefathers. . 15. These men were proud of their 
heritage and many were of the opinion that any move towards 
developing a machine based system of manufacture would not lead 
to improvements in the quality of the-weapon and would eventually 
be detrimental to. their trade. Indeed, we have encountered 
similar strongly held views even today, when conducting 
interviews with skilled gun makers within the private sector. 
There is also a considerable amount of evidence to be found in 
several 19th century Select Committee reports of the widespread 
belief that machines could not replace people. No doubt some who 
gave evidence were arguing from a protectionist stand-point, 
although there were others who could be regarded as artists in 
wood and metal who genuinely believed manual skills could not be 
bettered. 
As already suggested, there was considerable reluctance amongst 
the small gun-masters to mechanise, 'there being little incentive 
to invest in costly capital equipment. Their unwillingness had 
chiefly resulted from the short term and intermittent nature of 
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the contract system as operated by the Board of Ordnance. . 16. 
Any financial advantage which might have been gained from the 
installation of new plant and machinery to produce standardised 
parts could not sensibly be justified in the short term. A 
system, of manufacture which would cut weapon assembly times 
thereby reducing the necessity for skilled hand finishing, would 
no doubt have been off-set by the high capital cost of the 
equipment. From the position of the small producer there was 
little to be gained from an "Ordnance" procurement system which 
could not guarantee continuity or regularity of orders. 
Furthermore, if any new machinery was to be maximised to the full 
by encouraging the manufacture of standard products, then the 
private sector would lose the flexibility to produce a range of 
non-standard weapons to satisfy the varied requirements of their 
long standing customers which was a major traditional advantage. 
From the available evidence, there would appear to be no dispute 
between economic historians and historians of technology. They 
agree that American light engineering industry by the middle of 
the nineteenth century was considerably ahead of its British . 
counterpart in the application of machinery to the production of 
small arms. Where there is not general agreement is on the answer 
to the question, why this should be?. The matter is probably best 
summed up by Ames and Rosenberg in their article "The Enfield 
Arsenal in Theory and History" when they state: - 
The central issue in the historical literature on technical 
change in the nineteenth century seems to be this: Americans 
clearly led the British in the adoption of many machine 
methods of production. If this precedence is not simply 
"Yankee ingenuity" working in a void it must reflect such 
economic factors as resource endowment, the structure of the 
labour force, the structure of prices and the nature of 
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consumer tastes. The simpler techniques of analysis reveal 
that several variables must be considered simultaneously. The 
working historian will naturally wish to keep his explanation 
as simple as he can. . 17. 
While this latter advice would appear eminently sensible, the 
task of analysis has not been made easier by the endeavours of 
many commentators who have wrestled with the subject in the hope 
of making a decisive break-through. A scholarly attempt by 
Eugene S. Ferguson to examine the differences in manufacturing 
technology between America and Britain by drawing together the 
writings of many technological, economic and social historians 
clearly demonstrates that the subject under discussion is highly 
complex with many influencing strands. . 18. This suggests that 
the debate is set to continue for some time unless new evidence 
can be found to explain the reasons behind Britain's 19th 
century technological pause'. 
A different approach 
From the early part of the 19th century the American National 
Armouries had experimented and developed techniques to 
standardise the manufacture of small arms by machine methods, 
while in Britain within the private sector there was resistance 
to change from a traditional labour intensive system which had 
been in operation for several hundred years. However, in America 
the government had taken the initiative to encourage small arms 
production by machinery, even going as far as to invite public 
sector engineers and entrepreneurs to develop their ideas within 
the confines of the national armouries. . 19. In Britain this 
approach was not followed and was effectively discouraged. 
Differences in the Government's approach to manufacturing between 
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the two countries are most graphically illustrated in the 
production of the gun stock, the first major musket component of 
complexity which American engineers were able to produce 
successfully by machine methods in a standard form. The 
progression to the eventual development of the second generation 
of sequenced self acting machines took many years to perfect, and 
it is arguable, that without the active encouragement and support 
of the American Government, the programme would at best have been 
delayed and at worst not commenced. 
Professor Arthur Marwick, amongst others, has argued that the 
early 19th century development of machine intensive production by 
American industrialists and engineers followed from the demand 
for arms as a result of the rapidly expanding frontier. . 20. Yet 
pressures to move from labour intensive small arms production 
would seem to have been just as great for the British Government. 
Early in the century Britain was committed to a large scale 
military role, the war with France, and there was of course the 
constant discipline of policing her. widely spread Empire. 
Therefore, in the face of this large scale requirement for 
weaponst Marwick's argument does not explain the reasons why 
British small arms manufacturers apparently favoured labour 
intensive methods of weapon production. 
It will be recalled that a disparity in wage rates has been 
suggested to account for the differences in the speed and scale 
of manufacturing development between Britain and the United 
States. In America high wages were paid to ensure the scarce 
resource of labour. was drawn toward industry rather than enticed 
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to purchase cheap land. This, it is argued helped contain costs 
by stimulating the growth of machine intensive production. 
Further factors making American labour scarce and expensive were 
said to be the sparsity of the population and the high cost of 
transport. In contrast, the industrial towns of Britain were 
situated next to densely populated areas where the poor lived, so 
advantage could be taken of this cheap and plentiful resource. It 
is reasonable to assume that cheap labour helped sustain the 
sub-contracting element of the independent gun trade, giving it a 
cost competitive edge over the generous terms and conditions 
. enjoyed 
by those working in government industries. . 21. This 
might explain in part the reluctance of British small arms 
manufacturers to pursue capital intensive programmes, but it does 
not go far enough. However, if Habakkuk is correct in his 
abundance of cheap labour hypothesis, suggesting that British 
manufactures should have been able to build machine tools more 
cheaply than their American counterparts, it would seem to imply 
that powerful reasons were preventing this plentiful resource 
from being used in the machine branch of engineering. . 22. 
Nathan Rosenberg has contributed to the debate by arguing that 
British industry was technologically ahead of America in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, because of the need 
to seek and develop alternatives to the diminishing supply of 
wood as a fuel and raw material. He suggests that America, 
unlike Britain, had a rich abundance of forest products which 
directly accounted for the way in which her technology advanced. 
Making the point quite succinctly he states: - 
Whereas much of Britain's early industrialization should be 
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understood as a deliberate attempt to overcome the constraints imposed by the dependence upon organic materials, Americans 
possessed no similar inducement. In fact, a key to much of 
early American industrialization - certainly until at least 
the middle of the nineteenth century - should be understood in 
terms of technology specifically geared to the intensive 
exploitation of natural resources which existed in 
considerable abundance relative to capital and labor. This 
background information is critical to the explanation of the 
fact that, in spite of America's late industrial start as 
compared to Britain, she quickly established a worldwide 
leadership in the design, production, and exploitation of 
woodworking machinery. . 23. 
Rosenberg's abundant natural resource argument may go some way 
towards explaining why American manufacturers developed and 
exploited machinery but, like the other arguments, it does not 
fully explain why British manufacturers, who after all possessed 
knowledge through earlier industrial innovation, did not seek to 
exploit machine intensive methods by further making 11 ... a 
deliberate attempt to overcome the constraints imposed by the 
dependence upon organic materials For example the 
mechanisation of gun stock production did not occur in Britain 
until American machinery was imported and installed at the Royal 
Small Arms Factory, at Enfield Lock, -in the mid 1850s. While 
it 
was known that the application of wood-working machinery was 
generally more wasteful of the scarce raw material than the 
employment of skilled hand labour, there is no evidence to 
suggest that this was ever used as an excuse for British small 
arms manufacturers to deliberately reject the introduction of 
machine tools. As Rosenberg and others have argued, it was 
British manufacturers who were ahead at the beginning of the 
century in mass production technology with the manufacture of 
uniform parts. What has not been satisfactorily explained is how 
the technology seemingly paused and why the future advantages 
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which could have been gained for British manufacturers were 
allowed to be developed by their America n counterparts, making 
them leaders in the field of machine tool production. The final 
irony was that the British Government was forced to purchase 
large quantities of machine tools from America in 1854 and 1855 
to equip the factory at Enfield Lock. 
As research will show in the following chapter the powerful 
reasons preventing the development of light engineering machine 
tools in the U. K. was inter alia, associated with demand and the 
reluctance of the largest customer, the Board of Ordnance under 
the control of the British Government, to operate a contract 
system which would have given the private gun trade the incentive 
to invest in capital equipment. 
The notion that the ending of military conflict between Britain 
and France after 1815 had somehow suppressed the need for a 
complete overhaul of the way weapons were produced and acquired 
for the armed forces cannot be accepted as a valid reason for the 
seeming pause in the transfer of the new machine technology 
(developed during the 18th and early 19th century) to Britain's 
small arms industry. Given the perilous state of weapon stocks at 
the time of the Napoleonic War, coupled with the long and deep 
distrust of the French, it would seem unreasonable to believe 
that the British Government would have left the defence of the 
realm vulnerable for almost forty years. . 24. This therefore 
suggests that other powerful reasons existed which prevented the 
Board of Ordnance pursuing its original plan to develop Enfield 
as a key weapon supplier. 
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While the private gun trade would appear to have had valid 
reasons for not totally embracing mechanised production methods 
early in the century, any notion that industry as a whole had 
rejected the new machine technology wholesale was patently not 
true. As already pointed out by Rosenberg and others, in the 
preceding period of the 18th century Britain had experienced the 
start of the industrial revolution with the technological 
advancement of the cotton industry from hand labour through 
water to steam power, creating a boost for trade and expanding 
opportunities for exports. . 25. Consequently, it can be seen that 
the British Government not only had the opportunity but-also 
possessed the technology and the motive to develop, expand and 
modernise the military side of her small arms industry. However, 
it would appear that for some reason the motivation was lacking 
and it is this particular aspect which requires investigation. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, at about the same time as the 
British Government was faced with the decision to improve its 
methods of procurement of military weapons, it might be 
concluded that there was no great urgency for the American 
Government to build up weapon stocks. once the 1812 to 1814 
hostilities between Britain and America had ceased, it could 
be argued that the American nation had little need to expand or 
equip her armed forces, for unlike Britain she had no powerful 
enemies on her door-step. This point is made by Professor Peter 
Parish who has suggested that the American Government spent a 
far lower proportion of her national income on military power 
than the majority of developing countries in the western world. 
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. 26. While this would seem a rational observation to make, 
Merrit Roe Smith has pointed out that after the American 
Government had taken control of the two national armouries 
(Harpers Ferry and Springfield) in 1815 the problem of 
"Thousands of arms (which] had been damaged and rendered 
virtually useless during the recent war with England" had to be 
addressed. He goes on to say "... the immediate concern was the 
production of cheaper, more uniform weapons that could be 
repaired in the field by substituting new parts for broken ones". 
. 27. This was of course the beginning of the exercise which led 
the American Government, engineers and entrepreneurs into a long 
and costly programme of standardisation and machine tool 
development. Whatever the reasons were which motivated the 
American Government to take a different route to her British 
counterparts in the manufacture of small arms during the first 
half of the 19th century can be debated at length. However, what 
seems clear from the evidence is that both Governments had 
exactly the same opportunity to review their arms procurement 
procedures at about the same time. Therefore, the question still 
remains, what caused the British Government to effectively 
discourage the private sector military gun trade from modernising 
its methods of production, allowing them to retain labour 
intensive manufacture to the middle of the century? 
Understanding the task 
There is little doubt from the research already carried out that 
the subject under investigation, that of apparent British 
backwardness in small arms manufacturing technology in the first 
half of the 19th century is multi-faceted and*highly complex. It 
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is probably for these reasons that the debate surrounding this 
particular issue looks set to continue and why the subject has 
held scholarly interest for so long. HJ Habakkuk, in evaluating 
the various economic arguments for technological development on 
both sides of the Atlantic, recognises that a high degree of 
complexity exists. When discussing his observations in the. 
context of factor-endowment he suggests: - 
There is no reason why-abundance of a factor should not have 
been favourable to technical development in one Bet of 
circumstances and scarcity of the Bame factor favourable in 
another. The influences which are relevant to development 
combine in many different ways, and has a different effect 
according to the combination in which it appears. Arsenic 
cures in. Bmall doses and kills in large. But this does not 
dispense with the need to decide which doses are homoeopathic 
and which are lethal. It is clearly unsatisfactory to Bay that 
cheap-labour countries grew because their labour was cheap, 
and dear-labour countries because their labour was expensive. 
. 28. 
While it can not be denied that the subject under examination 
requires several lines of research, directing the investigation 
towards what slowed or delayed Britain's once held technological 
supremacy would appear to be a clearer route to follow in the 
quest of understanding why the British small arms industry 
developed in the way it did. These issues will be brought out and 
discussed in the following chapters. However, it should be 
understood that the investigation is not about claiming 
intellectual property rights for one country or another. 
Therefore the writer does not wish to imply through the research 
findings an air of what might be construed as a recurring British 
malady - "invented here, developed elsewhere". 
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THE "ORDNANCE" CONTRACT SYSTEM AND THE "VIEW" 
In this chapter the opportunity will be taken to examine the 
relationship between the Board of Ordnance and the private gun 
trade which pivoted on the Government method of small arms 
procurement. To help understand the interplay between the 
private and the public sectors, it will be necessary to explore 
the workings of the "Ordnance" contract system and to discover 
how "the view" (inspection) was performed by "Ordnance" 
personnel. By studying these two areas and their effect upon the 
private gun trade, particularly in the period from 1840 to 1854, 
we can resolve a number of complex issues. While research has 
shown that there were several reasons governing the slow progress 
of British industry in the 19th century towards a fully 
mechanised system of small arms manufacture, in many ways it was 
the "Ordnance" viewing and contracting systems which had the 
strongest influence upon the industry's shape and structure. 
Because of the complicated and multifaceted nature of "Ordnance" 
practice, the pivotal role played by the Inspector of Small Arms, 
George Lovell, will be treated in greater detail in the following 
chapter. There, a reassessment of the available evidence will 
allow a fresh look at the influence of this complex and talented 
man upon the operation of the "Ordnance" small arms inspection 
and procurement which was firmly linked to the functioning of the 
weapons contract system. 
To assist this study and to gain a better understanding of how 
"Ordnance" viewed the performance of the independent gun trade 
during the first half of the century, it will be necessary to 
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look at the prevailing situation from an "Ordnance" perspective. 
Fortunately a detailed and quite vivid account of the "Ordnance" 
viewpoint survives, recorded in a memorandum written on the 18th 
February 1854 by Joseph Wood, Secretary, War Office, which 
encapsulates the unsatisfactory history of weapon supply as he 
saw it. From the text of the memorandum it is possible to detect 
the increasing tension between "Ordnance" and the private sector. 
Wood's memorandum 
Hghlighting the relevant sections of Wood's memorandum allows the 
backdrop of events to unfold, giving a clear image of the 
circumstances which were to dramatically change the methods of 
weapon supply and procurement for the British armed forces: - 
In 1803, when the war with France was renewed, the scarcity of 
arms was so great, and the want of them so urgent, that the 
Government had recourse to foreign markets, and bought up all 
they could obtain. These were bad in quality, cumbersome and 
heavy in pattern, and comparatively few in number. ... At the 
peace in 1815, the manufacture of arms for Government ceased, 
and the workmen were dispersed. Little was afterwards done 
with regard to the provision of arms, until the adoption of 
the percussion principle, when a re-equipment of the army 
became necessary. The trade had fallen into a very disjointed 
state, and there was a difficulty in collecting together men 
capable of making the new arm in a satisfactory manner. In 
1840 the inspector of small arms represented the very 
unsatisfactory state of affairs; the masters complaining of 
the workmen, the workmen of the masters; the lock-filers and 
the stockers striking for wages; the masters exposed to 
serious combination of workmen, and the ' 
latter having a fair 
ground of complaint against the masters; the result being 
higher prices to the department, or injury to the service by 
delay. 
Again, in 1842, the inspector of small arms represented the 
injury to the service, ... and in 1848 he further represented the disadvantages of the system then pursued for obtaining 
arms, ... The opinions of the inspector of small arms 
expressed coincided with those which the Board had previously 
entertained. ... In March 1850 they decided upon putting up to competition the supply of arms then required, for calling 
for tenders of the several parts of the musket except the 
stocks, of which there was a store, and then for setting them 
up. The result showed a great reduction in the cost of the , 
arms; ... Many of the tenders were at one price, showing that 
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the parties had acted in concert, ... Great difficulties 
arose in the execution of the contracts; the setting up was 
delayed for want of materials, the lock-filers having struck 
for wages; and it was also impeded by the very unsettled state 
of the workmen in the military-gun trade generally: 
In February 1851 the Board were desirous of obtaining a 
further number of muskets, before the end of the financial 
year, 31st March 1851, but were informed by the contractors 
that there were not enough workmen in the trade to enable them 
to increase the number they were under engagement to supply. 
In May 1851 a new pattern rifle musket was adopted by the 
British Army, and tenders, by competition, were obtained for 
the supply of the materials requisite, in addition to those in 
store which were applicable, for setting up 28,000 rifle 
muskets. Great delays occurred in the supply of the materialst 
and sufficient were not collected to enable the Board to make 
contracts for setting up the muskets, until the month of 
December 1851; and the muskets were not completed until 
November 1853. 
In January 1853 a new pattern rifle carbine was adopted io*r* the artillery, and the contracts were made for the 
materials for setting them up; but so great has been the 
difficulty and the delay in obtaining them, notwithstanding 
all the efforts of the Board, that not more than 500 carbines 
were completed by the end of January 1854. 
The rifle musket of 1851 having been superseded in 1853 by 
another of smaller bore, and somewhat different construction, 
the Board, in July last, called for tenders for materials for 
20,000 muskets of the latter description. The offers received 
were so unsatisfactory as to price, and evinced so perfect a 
combinationAmongst the parties, that they were, after some 
correspondence, declined; ... The consequence is, that, up to the present time, the Board have not been able to commence the 
setting up of the muskets; and though they have made a 
contract for that purpose, it is uncertain, even if the 
material-s should now come in wit 'h regularity, when 
it will be 
carried out, from the difficulties which the contractors may 
again encounter from the workmen. . 1. 
From Wood's memorandum, it can readily be established that after 
almost half a century the Board of Ordnance had hardly improved 
its position as a weapons procurer. As the second half of the 
century began, the Board was still unable efficiently to equip 
the British Army with small arms. This was the sorry state in 
which "Ordnance" found itself after initially planning to avert 
such future disasters by constructing the factory at Enfield Lock 
in 1816. The predicament poses two questions. How had such an 
unsatisfactory set of circumstances arisen after active measures 
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had been taken to rectify the problem of arms supply, and was the 
position as one-sided as Wood had described? 
Procurement Droblems 
Prior to 1850 the contract system of arms procurement relied on 
"Ordnance 11 working with an established list of approved 
contractors. These contractors in turn used their own 
discretionary authority to employ sub-contractors and to engage 
the workers they required. There was considerable distrust 
between "Ordnance" and the private sector almost from the start. 
. 
In May 1816 the Birmingham and district gun manufacturers held a 
meeting which passed a resolution opposing the Board of Ordnance 
on the erection of the Enfield factory. Subsequently a petition 
was drawn up, but not presented to Parliament. "Ordnance" 
subsequently made an offer to the private sector only to use the 
facilities at Enfield for repair and not the manufacture of small 
arms. This promise was accepted by the trade. . 2. 
The short term nature of the contract system and the strictness 
of the view had resulted in complaints to Parliament by the 
independent gun trade through their political representatives. 
This had helped create difficulties and delays for "Ordnance" in 
their weapon procurement programme. Tensions did not improve 
between the two sides when George Lovell was promoted to 
Inspector of Small Arms in 1840. Lovell effectively took 
responsibility for every aspect of military weapon procurement. 
Under him, the "Ordnance" inspection system of gauging and 
measuring to pattern was tightened, no doubt spurred on by the 
drive towards improvements in standardisation he had begun at 
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Enfield. Tolerances were becoming so stringent that contractors 
were having great difficulty in getting their work accepted by 
"Ordnance". The private gun trade suffered considerably from the 
high rate of rejection and were in constant fear that Enfield 
would eventually undertake all military business in-house. This 
was the unsatisfactory state of the military gun trade as the 
second half of the century commenced. With war looming in the 
Crimea, the British Government found itself placed in the same 
embarrassing position it had been nearly half a century before at 
the start of the Napoleonic conflict,. that of not having the 
ability to supply good quality arms in quantity to the front line 
troops. 
Examining correspondence between the Board of ordnance, the new 
Inspector of Small Arms, RW Gunner (promoted after Lovell's 
death in 1854), and some of the private contractors in the period 
September 1854 to March 1855, suggests that the demands and 
requirements of the "Ordnance" arms. procurement programme had 
unfairly placed great strain upon the private contractors. In a 
letter to Joseph Wood, dated 12th September 1854, the Birmingham 
contractor Hollis & Sheath stated "we believe that we can 
complete the 20,000 musket pattern 1853 in March next, providing 
we have the materials (less sights) issued to us at the rate of 
200 each per week from this date. We have received up to the 9th 
instant 10,000 sets". The letter goes on to explain: - 
We beg again to assure the Honourable Board that every effort 
is being made to supply the sights so as to keep the pace 
with the setting up and we have already made from 9 to 10,000 
sights, the greater part of which have not passed the view but 
we shall be able (as soon as the proper tools are prepared for 
viewing the sites) to deliver them in such quantities as to 
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fetch up the lost time. . 3. 
At first glance the reference in the letter to the tools not yet 
having been prepared for viewing the sights, might imply self 
criticism on the part of the contractor for failing to produce 
these items on time. However, reading a later letter from the 
contractor dated 16th November 1854 to Wood does place a somewhat 
different interpretation on who should be supplying the tools. In 
the correspondence Hollis & Sheath state that between 27th May 
and 28th October 1854, they had delivered 14,636 sights for 
viewing. Out of these, 8,613 had been "marked" (passed 
inspection) and 5,823 rejected. The following section of the - 
letter is most revealing when the contractor complains "We 
believe that the immense number of rejections would not have 
taken place had the viewers been supplied with proper tools to 
test their accuracy - to which we refer in our letter of 
September 12th and with which tools the viewers have not yet been 
supplied". . 4. While it can not be categorically deduced from the 
correspondence that "Ordnance" should have actually made the 
tools, there is certainly a strong implication that they were 
responsible for their supply on time in support of the contract. 
The reference in the correspondence to "the viewers" not being 
supplied with tools seems to imply the "Ordnance" viewers rather 
than those employed by Hollis & Sheath. However, even if this was 
not the case "Ordnance" would still be at fault for being the 
root cause of the delay. 
further revealing piece of evidence comes to light when 
examining a letter from RW Gunner to the Board of Ordnance, 
dated 22nd November 1854, in response to complaints of delays in 
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the delivery of the pattern 1853 musket. Gunner reported that 
between April and November 15th, 16,880 sets of material had been 
issued, but he had only received 8,080 completed sights. 
Interestingly, there is no mention of tools not being BUpplied to 
the viewers. However, he does go on to say "sights have been 
obtained from other sources and issued for their service making 
up the numbers as stated by the contractors to about 10,000 
Rifled and Sighted, where as only 5,000 finished arms had been 
delivered up to the 6th instant". . 5. 
On 2nd March 1855 the Board of Ordnance wrote to Gunner regarding 
the contract for the 20,000 pattern 1853 muskets entered into on 
21st February 1854, reminding him that "the whole should be 
delivered by the 5th March". Gunner responded on 10th March, 
reporting that the "four old contractors" had delivered 18,406 
pattern 1853 [muskets] which had all passed the view, and that he 
had another 385 muskets in hand, leaving an outstanding balance 
of 1,209. On 31st March 1855, Gunner wrote to Wood "I beg to 
report to the Honourable Boards information that the four old 
contractors have delivered 20,000 Musquets Rifle Pattern 1853 
(first-pattern) in completion of their contract of the 21st 
February 1854". He then went on to give the following totals as 
"set up and finished complete": - 
Set up Birmingham 20,000 
Set up Enfield 1"000 
Set up London lF500 
22,500 
Studying the evidence surrounding this particular contract has 
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revealed what might be construed as a "cover-up" on behalf of 
certain individuals working for the Board of Ordnance who appear 
to have either withheld or not supplied important gauges (Fig. 11) 
or patterns to the contractors. This may have been an individual 
deliberate act, and not necessarily a piece of "Ordnance" 
collusion. However, in the future the incident along with other 
similar examples could easily strengthen the Board's hand when 
arguing the case for expanding the Enfield Lock small arms 
manufacturing facility, on the grounds of the gun trade's 
inefficiency. This would be a trump card to play against the 
private sector's opposing Parliamentary lobby. Although the Board 
was eventually to take a major controlling interest in the 
manufacture of military weapons by the introduction of American 
manufacturing technology at Enfield, this was not before a 
complex series of events had unfolded. 
Unfair criticism? 
Although the private gun trade had been much maligned over its 
poor manufacturing and delivery performance by "Ordnance",, 
perhaps in some instances rightly, nevertheless, with regard to 
the contract for 20,000 weapons, it has been shown that in spite 
of being denied specialist setting-up tools, a substantial order 
had been completed within a few weeks of the agreed date. This 
was achieved in the face. of strict viewing procedures, a reliance 
on hand production methods and, as Wood had pointed out in his 
memorandum dated 18th of February 1854, "there was a difficulty 
in collecting together men capable of making the new arm in a 
satisfactory manner". . 7. While the information above suggests, 
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that the fault was not always with the private sector, there is, 
in addition, further strong evidence which is at variance with 
the "Ordnance" criticisms of the gun trade. This information also 
conflicts with the generally accepted view of arms experts and 
historians like De Witt Bailey who have suggested that at the 
time, there was within the gun trade many "slovenly workmen". . 8. 
Giving evidence to the Select Committee on Small Arms in March 
1854, Colonel John George Bonner, the Inspector of Stores to the 
East India Company for the past twenty-one years, when asked, 
"How do you. provide your supply of fire-arms"? Replied: - 
As regards the musket, the materials are provided from various 
bona fide manufacturers at Birmingham and its neighbourhood, 
such as locks, bayonets, barrels, ramrods, and brass work; the 
smaller articles, such as screws, nails, swivels, and the 
minor parts of the gun, are entrusted entirely to the 
setters-up, viz., the gunmakers of London, and they provide 
the stock also, the Company not deeming it advisable to 
accumulate a store of stocks; no difficulty has been found in 
getting them at all times from the gunmakers in London; that 
forms part of their charge of course for setting up. . 9. 
From Bonner's evidence it can be seen that the East India Company 
between the years 1840 to 1851 had taken 329,340 stand of arms 
from the private gun trade, the year 1847 to 1848 having the 
maximum total of 58,180 weapons. One of the most revealing pieces 
of information taken from Bonner came during a series of 
questions relating to the East India Company's acceptance 
standard for weapon quality. When the point was put to him "You 
view them much in the same way as the Government view their 
muskets, do you not? " Bonner replied "Just the same". . 10. It can 
readily be deduced from following the probing cross examination 
that Bonner and his highly experienced long serving assistants 
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were the final arbitrators in any controversial issues over 
standards of acceptable quality. one gets the distinct impression 
that should a dispute arise over the dimensions or finish of a 
particular weapon or part, then a practical common sense 
settlement would be found and mutually agreed. 
In the continuing cross examination Bonner was asked "When you 
have required so large a supply as 58,000 for one year, and 
48,000 for the next year, have you found the contractors raise 
their prices? " To this Bonner replied "Never,, except it was 
called for by those circumstances which enhance all prices". . 11. 
Interestinglyr and in contrast, Wood in his memorandum of 18th 
February, had complained of 11 ... high prices, which resulted from 
the organised combinations both of the masters and men in the gýin 
trade . 12. 
When probed deeper on the subject of charges,, "You met with 
nothing unfair on the part of the contractors? " Bonner made the 
following telling statement which implied a good working 
relationship between customer and supplier. He explained, "I must 
do them the justice to say that they were always particularly 
anxious to do what was right and proper between the Company and 
themselves, which is my duty to watch". . 13. This display of 
mutual trust appears genuine and probably accounted for the East 
India Company getting the weapons they required at the right 
price. In fact there is evidence of the good relationship between 
the private sector and the East India Company, and the somewhat 
strained alliance between the Board of Ordnance and the gun 
contractors, dating back to the 18th century. At the time a 
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dispute arose between "Ordnance" and the private sector over the 
design, price and conditions of a contract for the manufacture of 
the pattern 1777 flint lock. On this occasion the East India 
Company were having a simpler form of the lock manufactured for 
which they paid the contractors one shilling more than "Ordnance" 
were offering. Not unnaturally, their work was given preference 
over "Ordnance". . 14. 
Further evidence of fairness and a good working relationship can 
be seen when inspecting the price of some popular 19th century 
weapons. Although not exactly the same as the then current 
British service pattern, by 1850 the cost of a weapon to the 
East India Company from the private sector was E2-7s-7d, which 
at the time was not excessive. . 15. This figure compared more 
than favourably with a Baker rifle costing E4-8s-3d in 1810, or 
the Minie rifle manufactured at the RSAF Enfield in 1853 costing 
E3-4s. . 16. 
With regard to pricing, it should be remembered that "Ordnance" 
had a distinct advantage over the private sector, as Enfield had 
the ability to estimate the various manufacturing costs. However, 
the gun trade, being denied long term contracts, were reluctant 
to invest in capital equipment which over a reasonable period of 
time would have helped reduce the labour cost content of a. 
weapon. Allegations by "Ordnance" of the private sector 
overcharging may have been the result of contractors trying to 
maintain sensible profit margins to compensate for high reject 
rates and the short term nature of the contract system, rather 
than a deliberate policy of making excessive profits from the 
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Government. This observation would appear to be validated if the 
quantities of weapons delivered (shown later in this chapter) to 
the East India Company and "Ordnance" are compared. Over a nine 
year period (1841-1850), the private sector sent on average 
almost three guns to the former, against only one to the latter, 
suggesting that the best prospects for the future of the 
independent trade lay with customers like the East India Company 
rather than "Ordnance". 
"Ordnance" on the other hand were supported by, and were part of, 
Government. Before the end of the 1850s Enfield, a public sector 
factory, would receive substantial internal orders for weapons 
allowing them to sustain high annual volumes of production. While 
it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the methods of 
"Ordnance" financial accounting to see if all overhead costs had 
been properly administered and apportioned to the weapon, it is 
however recognised that government departments have historically 
been clever at concealing the true cost of products and services 
through the vastness of the budgetary machine. Therefore, without 
an in-depth study, it would not be possible to guarantee that the 
"Ordnance" price for a weapon supplied to the military reflected 
all the attributable overheads, like warehousing, material 
deterioration or wastage, packing and transport. 
The importance of good relationships 
The concept of a good working relationship between customer and 
supplier is one that should not be overlooked, as often it can 
provide vital clues and broaden our understanding of why a 
particular set of circumstances arose, or why certain situations 
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prevailed. From Wood's memorandum of 18th February 1854, it can 
be seen that relationships had remained strained between 
"Ordnance". the contractors and their workers for a number of 
years, as he speaks of "... organised combinations both of the 
masters and men... ". . 17. This,, he implies, caused contractual 
delays and higher prices for "Ordnance". However, as with all 
forms of accusations and counter accusations, there is seldom one 
side which is completely innocent or correct in its assessment of 
the situation. Reasons governing the difficulties are often 
complex and not always what. they appear on the surface. Under, 
such circumstances, there is a need for mutual trust and 
understanding if issues of difference are to be resolved. 
Although there were some calm and conciliatory voices from within 
the ranks of the gun contractors, there was a growing general 
belief that "Ordnance" was planning to take away their 
livelihoods by increasing the number of manufacturing functions 
carried out in-house. As it will be seen later, the fears of the 
gun trade were not without foundation. 
It is quite usual today to discover examples of strained 
relationships between customer and supplier, resulting in lack of 
mutual trust. Often the customer will take advantage of the 
contractor or supplier, when the market demand for the product is 
weak, by offering a lower price. This is on the grounds of the 
product being more difficult to sell, which on occasions can be 
quite genuine. Nevertheless, when the market becomes buoyant, 
then it can be the turn of the contractor or supplier to take 
advantage of the customer by putting up the price, often on the 
grounds that material costs have risen, prompted by increased 
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demand. Both forms of commercial blackmail are the basis for 
distrust, each party awaiting the earliest opportunity to regain 
the upper hand. When such breakdowns in relationships occur, it 
is normal for the customer to seek to place business with other 
contractors or suppliers, while the supplier strives to gain 
contracts with other customers. Such behaviour is not conducive 
to the maintenance of. good quality products, as both customer and 
supplier have to go, once more, through a fresh learning cycle 
with their new partners. Inevitably this can lead to higher 
product reject rates as new procedures are adopted, with the 
added risk. of failure to meet delivery schedules. While these may 
not have been the exact circumstances experienced by the Board of 
ordnance and the private gun trade, research has revealed that a 
number of the elements outlined certainly existed, particularly 
when "Ordnance" moved from a list of established contractors to 
the open tendering system in 1850. 
These complex issues of relationships, the short term 
intermittent nature of contracts, the strictness of view, and 
what might be seen as the delaying or withholding of essential 
measuring equipment by "Ordnance" made up a cocktail of events 
which in turn eventually influenced Parliament into voting large 
sums of money to re-equip the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield 
Lock with the latest American machine tool technology. This 
action thereby enabled "Ordnance" to take virtual control of all 
military small arms manufacture. However, in the ensuing period 
until the improved manufacturing facility was firmly established, 
the private gun trade was to be called upon once more to supply 
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the British Army in time of war. 
A different relationship 
It would be difficult forthe researcher sifting through the 
considerable documentation of the period not to escape the clear 
impression that there was a general feeling of mutual respect and 
trust between the East India Company and the private gun 
contractors. This understanding had developed over a number of 
years, resulting in a good long term working relationship. Much 
of this had come about through the stewardship of Colonel John 
George Bonner with his more practical approach to the viewing of 
arms. The same could not be said of the relationship which 
existed between the private contractors and the Board of 
Ordnance. Much of the ill feeling came about after George Lovell 
was promoted to Inspector of Small Arms in 1840, when he had 
insisted on stricter standards of viewing for weapons and parts. 
Lovell's endeavours to improve the quality of British military 
firearms and, to his credit, the contractual relationship with 
the independent gun trade were generally not understood, lacking 
the whole-hearted support of "Ordnance" (this will be discussed 
in the following chapter). The years from 1840 to the middle of 
the century saw a rapid deterioration in the relationship between 
the private gun trade and the Board of Ordnance, with increasing 
acrimony, much of the venom being directed at Lovell. 
k 
By the time Joseph Wood had written his critical memorandum on 
the performance of the private gun trade in February 1854, and 
Bonner had given an opposing view in his evidence before the 
Select Committee on Small Arms in the following month of March 
(this being given some prominence in the Committee's summing up 
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in the May), the situation had been overtaken by events. on the 
28th March 1854F Britain declared war on Russia which effectively 
loosened the private gun maker's lobbying grip on Parliament. In 
the national interest, Bonner's contrasting testimony would have 
to be ignored as "Ordnance" pushed home the initiative to expand 
the Enfield Lock manufacturing facility. 
A misunderstood Private sector 
Several contemporary writers have given the impression that the 
private gun trade in Britain was woefully inadequate and 
generally slovenly in its performance, producing sub-standard 
weapons and parts. While one can understand how such an 
impression has grown and remained with some commentators, by 
examining the available evidence in detail a somewhat different* 
and more balanced picture emerges. 
The British private gun trade can be looked upon as being 
extremely flexible and adaptable in its methods of manufacture, 
coping with a range of weapon types. These essentially fell into 
three main categories. At the bottom of the scale there were the 
cheap flint-locks with beech-wood stocks made for the African 
market, at a unit price of around ten shillings. Then there were 
the different types of contract military patterns for supply to 
overseas markets and to the British Government, typically selling 
at E3-0 to E3-10s. At the top were the sporting guns or fowling 
pieces. These could command prices in the order of E18 or more. 
. 18. Some of these sporting guns can 
be considered as lovingly 
hand crafted masterpieces, even desirable works of art, many 
having engraved lock plates andbarrels, with highly figured and 
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polished walnut stocks, the wood in the most expensive models 
coming from selected areas of the tree root. 
Much of the criticism of the private gun trade had come from 
"Ordnance" sources such as Joseph Wood (alluded to earlier). No 
doubt from his particular point of view the situation of arms 
quality and delivery was as bad as it could be. When he wrote his 
memorandum in February 1854, giving his analysis regarding the 
state of the gun trade, it is doubtful if he was fully aware, or, 
for that matter, understoodr the intricacies surrounding arms 
procurementr particularly the constraints placed upon 
manufacturers by the contract system. Due to the private gun 
trade being loosely organised around a flexible system of 
out-working, employing small jobbing artisans using mainly manual 
skills, it was able on the whole to cope extremely well with the 
three main categories of weapon manufacture. This was 
particularly true of the African and sporting gun trade, and that 
of the East India Company. Problems. arose when the trade tried to 
fulfil contracts for the Board of Ordnance which did not appear 
to understand the nature of the private sector's business, and 
had therefore unilaterally set standards of high quality and 
finish. This level of perfection was not compatible with the more 
practical requirements set by other major customers, such as the 
East India Company. Naturally these differing standards for 
military weapons caused confusion and even resentment among the 
private contractors, as large numbers of their arms were rejected 
by the "Ordnance" viewers, when their work was generally accepted 
elsewhere. If "Ordnance" had really understood the workings of 
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the private gun trade, they would have realised what they had 
before them was what might be described collectively as a large 
and versatile factory system. Admittedly the production processes 
were widely spread throughout Birmingham and London, but the 
overhead costs were relatively low and not borne by "Ordnance". 
This "factory" had certain advantages over the machine intensive 
plant which would eventually be installed at Enfield. Firstly its 
manufacturing processes were not locked into producing only one 
type of weapon in volume, as Enfield would effectively be. Due to 
its heterogeneous nature the private trade had the ability to 
satisfy different markets with different grades of weapons, - 
sub-assemblies, and parts, all at the same time. Because of this 
flexible approach, and despite the level of complaint from 
"Ordnance", the private sector remained the most reliable and 
effective supplier of small arms to the Board until 1859, only 
reducing deliveries of military weapons when the Enfield factory 
came fully on-stream in 1857. . 19. 
Reading the well documented evidence of the many witnesses 
called before the 1854 Select Committee on Small Arms, and taking 
into account the previous accusations of "Ordnance" that the 
private gun trade had acted in combination against them, it would 
be difficult to accept, if the evidence is viewed objectively, 
that the problems of poor quality and supply was wholly a 
one-sided affair. There is sufficient information provided from a 
good cross-section of witnesses who were interrogated in depth 
for the researcher to form the opinion that the private gun trade 
had been treated rather shabbily by the Board of Ordnance. 
However, if one reads only the critical reports from "Ordnance" 
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members, and accepts, in isolation, the failure of contractors to 
meet completion dates, then it will not be too difficult to 
understand why the private gun trade has been held in such low 
esteem by some for so long. 
In recent times the poor image has been perpetuated by Nathan 
Rosenberg, perhaps inadvertently, when he quoted from a section 
of Joseph Wood's memorandum (February 1854) relating to arms 
,,... of an inferior description". The arms to which Wood refers, 
inter alial is the India pattern musket supplied to the British 
Army during the Peninsula Wars. Although Rosenberg acknowledges 
that at the time when this weapon was supplied there was a "rapid 
growth in the output of military firearms", he suggests that this 
was "achieved in part by a relaxation of standards of quality". 
. 20. Whether the "rapid growth" alluded to by Rosenberg had been 
achieved by the deliberate "relaxation of standards" is not 
clear. The information contained within Wood's memorandum covers 
a period of over half a century and the point relating to quality 
and acquisition of arms is quite general and refers also to 
weapons purchased from abroad. However, what is clear is that the 
Birmingham gun trade alone was able to average a grand total of 
158,484 muskets, rifles, carbines and pistols-per annum for the 
Board of Ordnance throughout an eleven year period between 1804 
to 1815. During this time Birmingham also manufactured some 
3,037,644 barrels and 2,879,203 locks for setting up into arms by 
the London gun trade for Board of Ordnance contracts. Also there 
was an estimated 1,000,000 sets of material produced for the 
London trade to set up into arms for the East India Company and 
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in excess of 500,000 fowling pieces manufactured, all during the 
same period. . 21. Considering the reliance upon mainly manual 
methods of production, and all the other problems alluded to 
above, the private sector's achievements can be viewed as 
outstanding. 
The "factory" concept of out-working within the private sector, 
which can be viewed as a "collective industry" was not quite as 
archaic as it might first appear. While certainly there were 
difficulties for the private sector in the way "Ordnance" 
organised the system of viewr nevertheless by the 1840s the 
London and. Birmingham trades had easy access to each other 
through the rapidly expanding railway network. This effectively 
brought together and improved communication between the more 
distant assortment of typically small, yet diverse component 
manufacturers. John Dent Goodman, the respected Birmingham 
manufacturer and writer, lists the chief branches of these as 
,, Stock, barrel, lock, furniture, and oddwork making; and for 
military guns there are in addition, bayonet, sight, and rammer". 
. 22. While 
it is generally accepted that the private sector 
relied mainly on manual methods for the manufacture of the lock 
and stock, from early in the century the barrel making branch of 
the industry had invested in machinery. Goodman reports, "Barrel 
making is quite a distinct trade. For the manufacture of military 
barrels, a somewhat large plant of rolling, boring, and grinding 
machinery is required. " . 23. 
Taking the earlier quoted figures for the private gun trade in 
Birmingham alone between the years 1802 and 1814, Goodman makes 
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the somewhat chauvinistic point that "upwards of 200,0001, more 
arms for the British Government were produced when comparisons 
were made with the combined output of the ten national 
manufactories of France. He further suggests that during this 
period, Birmingham turned out 11500,000 to 600,, 000" more barrels 
and locks than the same French manufacturers. . 24. Without this 
quite outstanding manufacturing commitment by the British private 
sector in the face of growing "Ordnance,, criticism, achieved 
under the gathering cloud of a poor supplier contractor 
relationship, it is doubtful if Wellington would have been 
victorious over Napoleon. 
Throughout the period of the Napoleonic Wars "Ordnance" made only 
a minute contribution to weapon manufacture. The barrel and lock 
factory at Lewisham, which began production in 1807, fell 
woefully short of its expected target of 50,000 barrels per 
annum. -Beset by failing water power, production was eventually 
transferred to the newly constructed, although rather modest, 
Government'manufactory at Enfield. Lock. The factory and its 
workers cottages were not completed until 1816. This meant the 
artisans took no part in providing military small arms for the 
war with France. . 25. 
Understandinq the supplv backqround 
The build up of friction between the Board of Ordnance and the 
private sector over allegations of poor quality products, and the 
failure of gunsmiths to meet contractual obligations, had reached 
critical proportions by the 1850s. However, the private gun trade 
countered and complained bitterly about the strictness of the 
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view imposed by "Ordnance", which in the eyes of many contractors 
was "vexatious" and quite unnecessary. "Ordnance" were seen to be 
uncompromising, constantly imposing financial penalties upon the 
gun makers for late delivery; and non payment for parts which 
failed the view was a common occurrence. There were criticisms by 
"Ordnance" over the quality of finished parts, the allegation 
being that the gun trade placed too much reliance on individual 
sub-contractors who employed low standard workmen who would toil 
for the lowest wage. There were further complaints aimed at the 
trade's slowness and apparent reluctance to invest in modern 
machinery. While some complaints against the gun trade were 
probably justified, research has shown that the overall picture 
as painted by "Ordnance" seems'to have come from the brush of an 
impressionist artist. 
The nature of the contract system as operated by "Ordnance" had 
changed by the early 1850s from a list of approved suppliers to 
one of open tender. Suppliers who tendered had to put up with a 
system which was price competitive, with contracts that were 
short term. Implementation of the new contract system did not 
help the gun trade maintain a stable work-force as masters laid 
off skilled workers when business was lost or slack. This, as we 
have learned from Select Committee reports, helped exacerbate 
insecurity within the private sector. Further problems for the 
private sector occurred during the inter-war years due to the 
lack of "Ordnance" orders. This was partly due to the high levels 
of arms in store long after the cessation of hostilities between 
Britain and France. Putting all the above factors together, it is 
not difficult to understand why it was the private sector rather 
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than the public which took the brunt of the industrial down-turn, 
with skill losses as craftsmen were forced to find work 
elsewhere, in some cases never to return to the trade again. 
To a large extent, this was the situation in which the industry 
found itself when George Lovell took up the post of Inspector of 
Small Arms in 1840. From this period to the mid 1850s there were 
gathering complaints by "Ordnance" over the seeming inability of 
the private gun trade to meet order schedules. There was also a 
growing mistrust of the trade's willingness to produce reasonably 
priced military small arms and parts, with accusations of firms 
operating cartels. Certainly this was the view of a number of 
"Ordnance', officials who, in fairness, probably lacked the 
overall experience and vision to know what was required when it 
came to administering contracts at grass root level. This 
observation is supported by the fact that it took an independent 
Select Committee to identify the problems of contractors not 
being supplied with specialist equipment to check their work 
prior to submission to the "Ordnance" viewing houses. While it is 
not denied that the private contractors had joined trade 
associations and discussed matters of mutual interest, the 
"Ordnance" policy of not issuing long term contracts or 
guaranteeing follow-up work, would of necessity have forced 
prices upward as the independent trade had little other 
opportunity of recovering the costs of setting-up and material 
losses incurred through the high rate of product and component 
rejection. However, in contrast, it is interesting to note that 
Colonel Bonner of the East India Company had not complained that 
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he had experienced a cartel operating against him. 
On balance, who was to blame for supply failures? 
From the continuing allegations of "Ordnance" over the failure of 
the private gun trade to regularly meet delivery schedules and 
pass the view, it would be a simple matter to assume that the 
fault was always with the contractor-. However, the evidence would 
suggest that these allegations should not be taken as a wholly 
one-sided affair. Reading the correspondence between the private 
gun makers and the Board of Ordnance (much of which is engrossed 
and included within the appendix to the report of the Select 
Committee on Small Arms 1854) and studying the evidence given 
before the Committee has allowed an insight into the difficulties 
experienced by-both "Ordnance" and the private sector. Here we 
have clear indicators which show that the private gun makers were 
not always to blame for the poor quality and late delivery of 
which they were accused by "Ordnance". To illustrate the point, 
it is worth examining extracts from the evidence of masters, 
workmen and experts who came before the Select Committee of 1854. 
The Committee had been appointed with a prime objective to 
"consider the Cheapest, most Expeditious, and most Efficient Mode 
of providing Small Arms for Her Majesty's Service". . 26. 
Although the Committee were finally to recommend to Parliament 
"... that a manufactory of Small Arms under the Board of Ordnance 
should be tried to a limited extent. This manufactory would serve 
as an experiment of the advantages to be derived from the more 
extensive application of-machinery, as a check upon the price of 
contractors and as a resource in time of emergency... ". The 
Committee made it clear that 11 ... the system for the contracting 
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for the supply of Small Arms should not be discontinued... ". They 
further recommended that the Enfield factory should be expanded 
to accommodate their plan for the increased use of machinery. 
. 27. 
In achieving their objective, the Committee had to investigate 
very thoroughly the complaints of the Board of Ordnance over the 
difficulty of procuring sufficient numbers of small arms on time 
and made to a particular quality and standard. On the other hand, 
to be objective, the Commit-tee had seriously to address the many 
criticisms made by the private contractors over the Board's 
strictness of view. This the trade alleged had prompted delays in 
delivery and, in some cases, non fulfilment of contracts. The 
witnesses called to give evidence before the Committee were 
subjected to very close scrutiny. The procedures adopted were not 
too dissimilar from a cross-examination in a court of law. Making 
a careful study of the questions and replies allows a greater 
awareness of the problems surrounding the gun trade. This helps 
to bring about a more balanced view which enhances our 
understanding of the difficulties which the "Ordnance" 
contractors experienced. 
Joseph Brazier, a prominent Wolverhampton lock manufacturer, who 
had been making locks for the Board of Ordnance since 1836 had 
not continued to be a contractor after 1850. In evidence he 
explained that the "Tower at Birmingham" had rejected a new 
musket lock of his and he was unable to discover the reason why. 
Brazier even produced the lock before the Committee and 
challenged any member to pass an opinion. During questioning it 
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was learned that Brazier had exhibited this very lock at the 
Great Exhibition of 1851, for which he had received a prize. 
Brazier stated "The lock was looked at by the commissioners 
appointed by Government from Belgium and France, and Mr Lovell 
was there also". The question was then put,, "Mr Lovell was one of 
the commissioners, was he not"? To this Brazier replied,, "Yes". 
. 28. This must have given Brazier great satisfaction as his 
evidence shows he attributed the strictness-of view solely to 
George Lovell. In reply to the question "Has there been any 
improvement in the view during the last month? " Brazier 
answered, "They are not so strict; they were aware of this 
investigation, and that has put a check upon them, I suppose". In 
reply to the next question, "Since when have they ceased to be so 
strict? " "Since Mr Lovell's'indisposition" came the response. 
. 29. 
Brazier was asked further questions about why complaints were not 
generally made about the viewer. This was said to be because the 
viewers would "punish them for it". It was explained to the 
Committee that the method of view was by jig and gauge. Brazier 
produced a gauge for them to see, suggesting it was-identical to 
those used by the viewers. When a part was rejected by the viewer 
it was customary to identify the problem area with a chalk mark. 
Even after these measures., it was suggested, on many occasions 
the contractor was still unable to discover the reason for 
rejection. If an explanation was sought from "Ordnance" often no 
new information was forthcoming. From the evidence it can be 
discovered that many parts were rejected on the basis of what the 
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viewer perceived to be questionable finish and not because the 
piece failed the gauge test, these judgements being purely 
subjective and having no bearing on the mechanical working of a 
particular mechanism or part. 
When questioned further, Brazier revealed there were different 
qualities of lock which were price dependent. His locks tended 
to cost in the order of thirty shillings each, while the current 
contract lock was eight shillings and three pence. The point was 
therefore put to Brazier,, "Does not the price at which it is 
possible to produce the Government lock depend on the view? " To 
which Brazier replied, "Yes, it depends upon the view as a matter 
of course". The questioner then concluded, "If the view is too 
strict, it would not be possible to produce it at the price? " It 
cannot be"t Brazier replied. Staying with the point, the 
questioner confirmed,, "In short,, the possible production at the 
price depends upon the view? " "Yes"; came the response from 
Brazier. . 30. From this very crucial piece of evidence it would 
appear that-"Ordnance,, would have had extreme difficulty in 
getting any locks past the viewer if they insisted upon a high 
level of finish for the lowest price. It would seem the only 
sensible way for the Board of Ordnance to break out of this 
"endless loop" would be by accepting mechanically functional and 
correctly dimensioned locks, with a lower standard of finish 
than they had hitherto set. Presumably this was the way in which 
the East India Company was able to obtain satisfactory quantities 
of serviceable weapons. 
In answering the qupstion "What do you think has been the cause 
77 
of the delay in producing arms, which is complained of by the 
Board of Ordnance? " William Scott, a Birmingham gun maker who had 
been in the trade some thirty years, and had previously worked as 
an "Ordnance" viewer, gave the opinion that it was because 
manufactories were having to close due to lack of orders from the 
Board. As an example, he explained that "since 1851,1,, amongst 
others, have had nothing at all to do for my men; the vices, the 
benches, the machinery, and the rifling machines are lying idle". 
He then went on to say "I have seen men often about the London 
Docks and wharves, scores of them, almost shoeless and 
stockingless, and in a state of destitution and starving, and 
seeking labour and occupation elsewhere". . 31. 
While Scott's experiences are not directly related to the 
strictness of view, it will be obvious that if skilled men are 
lost to the trade, or at best return after a period of lay-off, 
then the standard of workmanship will generally not be the same 
as that where craftsmen have been continually employed. Until 
such times as the artisan can once more regain confidence in his 
ability to work accurately and fast the standard of workmanship 
will in general be below his best. So it can be seen that if a 
government lacks a well thought out strategy for the arms 
industry, on which it relies for its supply of military weaponsf 
taking into consideration such aspects as continuity of orders, 
fairness of inspection and good communication, then indirectly 
the standards of quality and delivery will be influenced by 
default. Scott had identified the problems of a weapon 
procurement system which was not designed to place regular long 
term orders on its suppliers. The. reasons for this were probably 
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due to a combination of ignorance on behalf of some members of 
the Board in not having a clear understanding of manufacturing 
requirements, and political pressure created by the private 
sector to limit "Ordnance" encroachment into their area of 
livelihood. 
Of course it could be argued that if "Ordnance" had an 
understanding of manufacturing needs and the will to work 
amicably with the private sector, the difficulties encountered by 
both sides would not have arisen. However, with the technical and 
structural problems identified by Brazier and Scott, it would 
have been almost impossible for military gun making in the 
private sector to develop efficiently and to prosper. That was 
unless Government adopted a consensus strategy with the gun 
makers, similar to that operated by the East India Company. By 
1854, with war looming in the Crimea, any idea of such a policy 
materialising from a Government initiative would have passed into 
obscurity. 
John Stephenson, a lock filer who now resided in Birmingham, had 
previously worked at the RSAF, Enfield. He explained to the 
Committee that he had a contract in November 1851 with the Board 
of Ordnance for hardening and freeing 10,000 sears and tumblers. 
Unfortunately he had been unable to get any of his work past the 
"Ordnance" viewers and he had now left this branch of the 
industry. Stephenson had contracted to do the work at seven 
shillings per 100, when he had previously been paid twenty-five 
shillings per 100. Even then he stated that he "could have got a 
living at it if they had been looked at as they were when they 
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were 25s. a hundred". Stephenson informed the Committee that he 
had been a lock filer for 17 years. The work, he explained, which 
had recently been rejected, was similar to that undertaken during 
his time at Enfield which had passed inspection without any 
problems. When asked, "was anything said to you about the 
difference in the price? " Stephenson replied,, "Yes, there was an 
item made in Mr Lovell's office, and he said it was a most awful 
price". Reading through Stephenson's evidence, a rather ironic 
story emerges. He had only completed 150 pieces of his contract, 
all of which he was unable to get past the viewer. In his words, 
"I let them. lie for some time, and sold them to another 
contractor, and he sent them in, and I heard no more of them". 
. 32. 
From this evidence it is possible to offer two probable causes 
which might have accounted for the viewer's rejections, providing 
the assumption is made that Stephenson's work had not 
deteriorated in any way since he left Enfield. 
(a) There was a difference in viewing standards operating 
between Birmingham and Enfield. 
(b) The strictness of view had increased in the period between 
Stephenson getting 25s. per 100, to when he contracted to the 
Board for 7s. per 100. 
Considering the evidence, it would appear on balance that the two 
proposed reasons for rejection probably carry similar weight. 
For example, Brazier was of the firm belief that different 
standards of view were operating between Birmingham and Enfield. 
He cited an incident to the Committee concerning a particular 
80 
consignment of gun locks which had been rejected, he explained, 
11 they sent them back at Birmingham when they did not do so at 
Enfield". . 33. 
Interestingly there was the distinct possibility that reason (b) 
was operating against Stephenson. Brazier in his evidence had 
alluded to the "view" being "much more strict" after the open 
tendering system "made its appearance" in 1849 (it will be 
recalled that Wood gave the date for the introduction as March 
1850). . 34. Under the circumstances, and given this latter fact, 
it would have been logical for "Ordnance" to impose a tighter 
level of inspection to ensure that standards of workmanship by 
any new contractor did not further compromise quality. This could 
have accounted for the difficulty experienced by Stephenson. 
George Lovell, in a letter dated December 1848, had recommended 
to the Board, inter alia, that "The Board's List of Tradesmen" 
be scrapped and that "tenders should be called for by public 
advertisement, ... and that such selection will be governed solely 
by reference to the lowest price offered, and by consideration. of 
the capabilities of the parties to fulfil their contracts. " . 35. 
This clear recommendation by Lovell, and Brazier's evidence to 
the Committee, would suggest that the system of open tendering 
had been implemented, further confirming Brazier's allegation of 
the view becoming "much more strict". With the contracting system 
being thrown open to all and sundry, and Lovell stating that 
acceptance would be "governed solely by reference to the lowest 
price offered", "Ordnance" would have had little option but to 
tighten its inspection procedures to make sure that lower prices 
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did not equate to lower standards. 
While the precise reasons behind the rejection of Brazier's and 
Stephenson's work, with its subsequent alleged acceptance when 
sent to Enfield or passed on through another contractor, may 
never be known, it is difficult to believe that these incidents 
were unique or would have passed unnoticed. In the atmosphere of 
distrust and suspicion which existed in the private sector, 
Brazier's and Stephenson's stories would have, no doubt, gained 
credence as they circulated within the gun trade, helping to 
convince the contractors that "Ordnance" was operating unequal 
inspecting standards in different viewing departments. With the 
bulk of British military weapons being manufactured in the 
Birmingham district and the procurement system having changed to 
open tender at the "lowest price", it is conceivable that the 
Birmingham viewers might have been more severe with their level 
of inspection than Enfield. There is also the fact that George 
Lovell took up residence in Birmingham in the autumn of 1852 to 
fulfil the duties of Assistant Inspector. This may have increased 
pressure on the local viewers to apply a stricter standard of 
inspection. . 36. 
Functionality or finish? 
The evidence given to the Committee by John Barnett, a prominent 
London gun maker whose fýmily had been a contractor to the Board 
of Ordnance since 1794 was seriously to challenge the "Ordnance" 
notion that the fault of quality and late delivery lay mainly 
with the private sector. Barnett explained he had not had an 
order from the. Board since 1849 and had to rely on orders from 
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"merchants and foreign parts". He stated that in 1852 he had made 
"repeated applications", both personally and by letter, to the 
Board of Ordnance for part of a contract which he had heard was 
being issued to the Birmingham gun trade. In his words "I begged 
that the Board would give a portion to London, and I offered to 
take them at a price which I afterwards found was lower than they 
issued to Birmingham for". . 37. Apart from obviously wanting the 
business, it does appear from the evidence that Barnett was 
desperately trying to secure work to keep his men employed. In an 
attempt to ensure the survival of his business, Barnett had 
secured orders over the years with North America, the East India 
Company and the Hudson Bay Company. By a strange twist of fate 
the orders for the latter have given the writer the opportunity 
to question further the methods of view employed by the Board of 
Ordnance. It so happened that, at the time of the Select 
Committee's investigationst Barnett had a legal action pending in 
Belgium over what was a blatant case of forgery. This was 
revealed in'Barnett's answer to a question concerning the sale of 
Belgian arms to the Hudson Bay Company,, "Do they buy any in 
Liege? " - "No; the Belgians only copy that gun, the English gun, 
and put my name on it; and the Belgians, to a very great extent, 
send them out to New York. That is one of the guns that I have an 
action pending now about; the gun sent to America". A further 
question followed,, "They put your name on it to give the gun a 
better character? " - "Yes; not only the name, but the address, 
and they imitate every mark; they are exceedingly clever at 
that". . 38. 
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From this last piece of evidence it would seem reasonable to 
conclude that John Barnett's company was capable of making arms 
to a sufficiently high standard that others wished to jump on the 
band-wagon of his success by making copies. If one was taking a 
sceptical view point, it might be argued that the Belgium gun 
makers were only putting Barnett's identification on their arms 
to command a higher price, which we know from the evidence 
Barnett was able to get. However, if this particular conclusion 
is drawnr then one should acknowledge that the quality and finish 
of Barnett's weapons must have been universally known and 
therefore perfectly acceptable to the Belgian gun maker's 
customers. The corollary to this would be to conclude illogically 
that a higher price would have been paid for an inferior weapon. 
This example of Barnett raises a further question regarding the 
private sector. How was it, if the standard of manufacture was so 
poor, that the Birmingham and London gun makers were able 
successfully to supply arms in quantity to customers other than 
the Board of Ordnance, -seemingly without high levels of rejects? 
The facts are, as the evidence shows, that although the private 
gun trade did have rejects from the non "Ordnance" trade, the 
bulk of the problems seem to have been confined to barrels and 
locks. In the case of John Barnett's company, he suggested that, 
out of a total of 105,000 complete arms made for the East India 
Company he had experienced a reject rate of between 15 and 25 per 
cent before and after proof of barrels, which incidentally were 
made in Birmingham, and a figure of 10 to 15 per cent for the 
locks. -Even given these relatively high rates of component 
rejectst the London gun trade alone was able to deliver the 
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following quantities of arms between 1841 and 1850: - 
Date. East India Company. Government. Total. 
1841 20,, 150 7,660 27,810 
1842 36,353 12,926 49,279 
1843 34r880 12,270 47,150 
1844 25,362 13,496 38,858 
1845 49f623 12j, 539 62j, 162 
1846 50,880 16,336 67,, 216 
1847 57,214 18,, 376 75,592 
1848 55,068 23,862 78,930 
1849 71,381 26,366 97,747 
1850 26,025 13,607 39,632 
426,936 157r440 584,376 
it will therefore be seen, t hat the London t rade over a period 
of nine years was supplying almost three gun s to the East India 
Company to every one supplie d to "Ordnance". Also it should be 
remembered that these figure s are exclusive of supplies to 
foreign governments and the commercial trade generally. In fact, 
Barnett was confident that " Under proper man agement,, the 
productive power of the London gun trade alo ne for Military Arms 
is 100,000 per annum; while the trade of Birmingham is capable 
of furnishing, with ease, a similar amount". . 39. 
An independent assessment 
It has been shown that the private gun trade was capable of 
producing large quantities of arms mainly by manual methods, 
there being a general reluctance amongst the gunmakers to invest 
in costly capital equipment. Without an "Ordnance" system that 
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supported the principle of issuing long term contracts, it is 
difficult to see how the trade's attitude might change. However 
the strictness of view, which was felt to be so unreasonable by 
the private sectori, the nature of contracts and the reluctance of 
the Board of Ordnance to issue patterns and gauges (this will be 
addressed when examining the role of Lovell in the following 
chapter), had not gone entirely unnoticed by the Select Committee 
on Small Arms. In their report to Parliament dated 12th May 1854 
they were to state: - 
With a view of expediting supplies, and giving confidence to 
the trade, Your Committee recommend that contracts should only 
be entered into with such men as have means and capital to 
fulfil engagements; that in future the contract should be 
understood to commence from the time of the delivery of the 
pattern; and that in all cases of doubt on the part of the 
viewer, or remonstrance on the part of the contractor, a ready 
appeal to a competent person should be afforded. . 40. 
The Committee also took the opportunity to point out that, in 
their viewr while recognizing the contractor's need for 
continuous orders to stop skilled workmen drifting away from the 
industry in slack times, they were in general against the 
principle. It was argued that if contracts had been placed for 
periods of three years or more, then 11 ... in this age of rapid 
invention, such a course might be attended with very inconvenient 
consequences". As an example, they referred to the change of 
pattern from the 1851 rifle to that of the 1853, suggesting that 
had long term contracts been in operation then "Ordnance" would 
have been supplied with a large quantity of out of date arms. 
. 41. This might suggest that financial penalty clauses were not 
in operation at the time for cancelled orders or perhaps 
"Ordnance" did not wish to enter into this kind of agreement. 
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While it is not appropriate to deal with the arguments of "rapid 
invention" here, it is worth remembering that a factory is 
usually unable to cope efficiently with hasty product changes. 
These invariably lead to loss of production volume until 
experience of manufacturing the new article is gained. Initially 
this might result in poor quality products, as the workforce go 
through a learning phase before the required standards are 
reached. It would also seem reasonable to conclude that the 
uncertainty which would have been caused by a period of "rapid 
invention" was yet another factor which confronted the private 
gun trade, furthering their reluctance to invest in increased 
levels of new machinery. If the trade had opted for higher levels 
of mechanisation over the traditional methods of production, it 
could be argued that they would have lost the advantage of 
flexibility in the event of frequent model changes. Also, by 
adopting dedicated machine production methods it would have made 
it more difficult to manufacture their three main weapon 
categories, sporting, African and military. 
There is of course a further consideration for the private 
sector, which is that it is not always the first company to 
install the latest technology which benefits-in the longer term. 
It has often proved better to leave a period of time to allow the 
technology to stabilise before the decision is taken to install 
the latest plant and equipment. This point has been made in 
Chapter four in relation to the competitors of the British 
television industry, when it was argued that a waiting strategy 
can often bring about economic and cost benefits. 
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What emerges from the research into the strictness of view is 
that the Board of Ordnance appeared to be demanding standards 
which the gun trade could not consistently meet, particularly 
that of finish, until George Lovell was replaced by Gunner. It 
also seems remarkable from the evidence that, if one excludes 
"Ordnance"r the customer did not generally want arms manufactured 
to such a high standard of finish. This was particularly true in 
the case of the East India Company who were looking for 
functional replacement weapons, with the minimum amount of design 
change, at a reasonable price. 
To support this view it is worth examining a report dated 6th 
August 1839 written by Colonel Bonner. This document highlights 
an extremely important point concerning the private gun trade 
which hitherto seems to have gone unnoticed. That is, even if 
"Ordnance" had the capacity to manufacture large quantities of 
small armsf it could not be sufficiently flexible to meet 
efficiently the individual requirements of a section of the 
widespread military market (as Bonner would have wanted). 
Bonner's report is addressed to the Honourable Political and 
Military Committee and sets out, inter alia, his objections to 
taking quantities of new arms fitted with percussion caps. From 
the evidence it is clear that Bonner had already studied reports 
of the superiority of the cap over the earlier flint lock and had 
accepted that it was infinitely more reliable. He went on to say 
"I hope I shall not be deemed presumptuous in offering an opinion 
somewhat at variance with that recognized with the Board". Bonner 
complained that the new pattern muskets had "'a heart stock 
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instead of the usual and less expensive description, both the 
interior and exterior of the barrel have a finish beyond what is 
given or is necessary to be given to military arms - it is 
provided with a double sight, flat bolts, box trigger, and 
Ram-rod and Bayonet springs and the cost is stated to be 
E3: 12: 1/2". What Bonner was really objecting to was changes to 
design and price, since he stated that the cost is "much beyond 
what has ever been paid for a musket". Going on, Bonner explained 
that as far as the Indian Army were concerned, jie could provide' 
modifications which in his opinion would cost far less than what 
was on offer from "Ordnance". He further suggested that there 
were no problems with the current East India barrel regarding 
"strength and correctness of bore and requires no improvement". 
With regard to his suggested modifications he wrote: - 
I have therefore in the musket No. 4 applied the percussion 
principle of the Ordnance Pattern - substituting round bolts 
for the flat bolts of the Ordnance and for the wire pins 
heretofore in use: with these exceptions it is the existing 
pattern of the Company's musket. The lock is the same in 
principle, workmanship and value as that of the Ordnance - but 
I have made some alterations in. the screws and tumbler pin, 
which I consider improvements". . 42. 
Bonner also stated that he had "not applied the double sight, box 
trigger, bayonet spring, or new ramrod spring, as I consider them 
unnecessary and I have retained the present pattern bayonet". In 
concluding his report Bonner remarked: - 
With regard to the stock, I am clearly of the opinion, that 
although a Hart stock may improve the appearance of the 
musket, its exclusive adoption is neither necessary or 
desirable - The difference of expense is considerable and 
great difficulty would be experienced, particularly in the 
event of war, in obtaining them in any quantity. I am the more 
satisfied of what is technically termed Sap Stocks (that is 
stocks cut indiscriminately from the Plank) from an 
examination of-upwards of 100 muskets recently brought from 
India by invalids bearing dates from 1808 to 1816 - not one of 
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these have heart stocks, yet after a period of service, of from 23 to 31 years they are perfectly sound and exhibit no tendency to decay. . 43. 
By Bonner's clear evaluation of the weapon from the perspective 
of the customer, it can be seen that the interests of the East 
India Company were not being served. Had "Ordnance', wished to 
take over the role of supplier of military weapons, then they had 
clearly got this customer's requirements wrong. Bonner had 
demonstrated that from the East India Company's stand-point, the 
product had been over engineered in both specification and 
finish. Therefore it did not meet the criteria of the army in 
India who were clearly looking for a straightf . orward and reliable 
weapon. 
The report illustrates that, during the first half of the 
century, the requirements of the British armed forces, as 
perceived by "Ordnance", were quite different from those of other 
large consumers like the East India Company. This would suggest 
that it was highly unlikely that "Ordnance" could or would 
fulfil, in the same way, the role of the private sector. This 
branch of the gun trade was capable of manufacturing military 
weapons to suit differing customer requirements. The key strength 
of the private sector was its heterogeneous structure which 
allowed them to manufacture weapons flexibly without being 
constrained by a rigid factory system. Until internationally the 
military market accepted a standard type weapon, it could be 
argued that the labour intensive nature of the private sector was 
a key factor in its own survival. 
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A different approach 
The report of the 1854 Select Committee, probably for the first 
time, formally recorded a somewhat different and more amicable 
method of dealing with the private gun trade when it revealed how 
Colonel Bonner purchased arms on behalf of the East India Company 
for its regular army of over 200,000 men. While the Committee, in 
its final recommendations, pointed out that the East India 
Company as well as the Board of Ordnance "provide only one 
pattern of the articles for contract", they did however suggest 
that "... there seems no reason why a larger number should not be 
provided if-by this means the operations of the contractors could 
be saved from needless delay". The Committee were clearly 
impressed by Bonner's method of procuring small arms which they 
summarised in the following detail: - 
Colonel Bonner described to Your Committee the system under 
which Small Arms were procured by the East India Company. They 
have a list of contractors for setting up and making the 
materials of muskets. The smaller articles, such as screws, 
nails, and swivels, together with the stocks, are provided by 
the setters up. Each of the other. parts of the musket is got 
directly from the persons whose trade is to manufacture it. 
When a supply of muskets is required by the Company, Colonel 
Bonner ascertains the Ordnance prices, and calls together the 
setters-up and material makers. He shows them the pattern gun, 
and discusses with them the price. The price is then fixed by 
discussion and arrangement, and not by competition. . 44. 
It is perhaps the last sentence of the summary which gives the 
true meaning and allows us to understand more fully Bonner's 
method of dealing with the private sector. With references to 
"discussion and arrangement" and "not by competition", it can be 
seen how his methods of procurement differed radically from that 
of "Ordnance". 
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A labour intensive industry without incentive to change 
The respected "Ordnance" engineer John Anderson had been sent in 
March 1853 with Lieutenant Warlow, Royal Artillery, on a fact 
finding tour of British manufacturers associated with the 
forging of wrought iron. As the tour embraced Birmingham, Warlow, 
accompanied by Anderson, took the opportunity to call upon some 
of the gun makers he was acquainted with as a matter of courtesy. 
On returning to Woolwich, Anderson produced a report covering the 
whole tour, within which he was able to provide a unique glimpse 
of mid century small arms industry in Birmingham from the 
perspective of a respected engineer. He describes the status of 
the trade thus. "We then visited a number of establishments 
engaged in military musket and bayonet work, all of which, 
however, are in a low mechanical state, and at least 50 years 
behind most of the other branches of manufacturing industry which 
we have been examining. " . 45. Anderson lists these other branches 
of manufacturing as "... cotton, flax, and woollen trades, 
engineering and machine making, the tool makers of Leeds and 
Manchester, steel pen and wood screw making of Birmingham. Those 
we were very much pleased with. " . 46. Two interesting 
observations emerge from Anderson's report in connection with the 
Birmingham gun trade. Firstly, he comments on the backwardness of 
the industry with regard to the lack of machinery employed in 
weapon production, but makes no comment on the skill of the 
workmen or the quality of the product, apart from mentioning the 
"great waste" of the out-work system with parts being carried 
from the profusion of workshops to the setter-up. This Anderson 
compared to the efficiency of the flow-line process he had 
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proposed for Enfield, with self-acting machines where 
11 ... everything connected with it passing consecutively on from 
one stage to another, never passing over the same ground twice, 
so that the raw materials which go in at one side shall come out 
a finished musket at the other". . 47. 
Anderson's report, with his observations of the Birmingham gun 
trade, may simply have been a. case of him publicising his 
strongly held views. He was a committed machine enthusiast with 
an exceptional record of inventing and modifying. It is known . 
that he had been responsible for devising and introducing new 
mechanical manufacturing processes at Woolwich Arsenal. 
. 
. 48. 
Nevertheless, the fact that he had not commented on the 
Birmingham workforce or the product might suggest that what he 
had witnessed of the manual system of manufacture did not strike 
him as being unduly odd or slovenly, perhaps no less than an 
engineer of his calibre would have expectedr given the way the 
industry was structured. If Anderson had encountered poor 
standards of workmanship to the levels implied by "Ordnance" and 
some later commentatorst then it would seem reasonable to assume 
that he would have mentioned the fact in his report. After all, 
he did see fit to comment that the gun trade was "50 years behind 
most of the other branches of manufacturing industry". Secondly, 
and even more interestingly, the industries which were mechanised 
and up to date, which he was "pleased with", do not appear to 
have any direct links with "Ordnance" and small arms contracts. 
Perhaps there is a subtle lesson to be learned here. The 
suggestion being, that if you are a company in the private sector 
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wishing to do business with "Ordnance", then it would seem wise 
to negotiate a contract with mutual terms and conditions of 
trading, in a similar way to Bonner for the East India Company. 
The first signs of an atmosphere of normality descending upon the 
private sector can be detected from the evidence given before the 
1854 Select Committee, when several of the old established 
contractors began to experience less severe viewing standards 
when RW Gunner accepted responsibility for the "Ordnance" office 
in Birmingham after Lovell's health began to fail in 1853. This 
was not a case of contractors now being able to turn in shoddy 
work, they still had to comply with "Ordnance" inspection 
standards, but it would appear that a mutually agreeable common 
sense approach was starting to develop. An example of this 
emerges from the evidence given by Brazier when he described what 
he considered to be a good functional gun lock. Under 
questioning, Brazier wholeheartedly agreed that if a lock sent to 
"Ordnance" "did not meet all the requirements of the gauge', it 
should be rejected. However, he did make the point that it 
should not "fit the gauge to a hair's breadth", as in his 
considered opinion "it cannot be better or worse for it". . 49. 
This would seem to be a perfectly reasonabýe position to adopt 
under the system of out-work which employed mainly manual methods 
of manufacture. After all, it would not have been possible under 
such an arrangement to, supply large quantities of weapons made to 
close tolerance at prices attractive to "Ordnance". The 
exactness, repeatability and interchangeability of machine 
intensive manufacture could not be expected from men filing to 
gauge. 
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Support for Brazier from the 20th centurv 
Using a set of the pattern 1853 rifle gauges belonging to the 
Ministry of Defence Pattern Room, Nottingham to measure the 
dimensions of a 19th century Birmingham gun lock revealed a 
minutely raised surface on the lock's bridle. This area of 
raised metal had been caused by the viewer stamping his pass 
mark on the part, so that the bridle, which we know from the 
viewer's stamp had already passed inspection, was made to fail 
the gauge test retrospectively. This interesting and highly 
significant discovery adds further authenticity to the 
documentary. evidence of witnesses like Brazier recorded in the 
Select Committee Reports and supports the private sector's claims 
that "Ordnance" were operating too tight an inspection criterion. 
The gun lock in question was still operating perfectly over 120 
years after manufacture, the viewer's mark having been stamped in 
an area of the bridle which was in free air and had no 
detrimental effect whatsoever on the function of the mechanism. 
of course it could be argued that the viewer placing his mark on 
a surface which remained in free air*was a deliberate act. 
However, the point being made is this. If the bridle dimension 
w hen originally gauged had measured to the minutely increased 
width caused by the viewer's stamp, then the "Ordnance" inspector 
would have had little option but to reject it as failing the 
test. Here we have a classic example of a standard being set and 
applied without taking account of the function or physical 
position of the part in question. Even if the bridle had been one 
or two thousandths of an inch thicker it could not in any way 
have affected the part's ability to function correctly and it 
95 
would have made no difference whatsoever to its 
interchangeability with other like components. It is not often 
that one is fortunate to discover such a good example of physical 
evidence which supports the interpretation of data obtained from 
documentation, suggesting that "Ordnance" were in fact applying 
too strict a standard of inspection. 
The discovery would also support the notion that "Ordnance" 
viewers were not allowed to exercise individual discretion; the 
part either fitted the gauge or it did not. While measurement by 
a gauge was precise and left little room for doubt, the viewer's 
Judgement of finish, by its very nature, was subjective and open 
to challenge. However, it will be recalled from the evidence 
obtained from the Select Committee Reports that there was a 
slightly more relaxed approach to viewing when Gunner took over 
the responsibility of inspection from Lovell. This might have. 
meant the acceptance of a bridle which was marginally over gauge. 
Unfortunately one can only speculate on the possible outcome, as 
the opportunity to prove this point has probably been lost with 
the passing of time and the difficulty of obtaining authentic 
samples which could be identified as being manufactured after 
Gunner took over. 
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LOVELL'S ROLE IN SHAPING "ORDNANCE" 
AND THE IMPACT ON THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
Examining the role of George Lovell, looking at his relationship 
with, and his influence upon, the private gun contractors, 
particularly after he was promoted to Inspector of Small Arms in 
1840, casts further light on the continuing problems experienced 
by Government in the procurement of sufficient quantities of good 
quality small arms during the first half of the nineteenth 
century. Lovell emerges as an exceedingly complex man, at times 
headstrong, with a burning-desire to secure for the British 
soldier the best possible weapons to defend the Empire. To 
discover how Lovell tried to achieve this goal, and the lengths 
to which he was prepared to go, will require the reader to 
follow carefully his footsteps down an intricate path and be 
ready to weave and change direction as different external 
influences come into play. 
Enfield armouries developing-role and Lovell the enctineer 
At this point in the thesis it ismorth pausing to remind 
ourselves of the early role of the Enfield armoury, so that 
Lovell can be viewed against the background of the factory's 
development. 
Prior to the introduction of the "American system of 
manufactures" at Enfield Lock in the mid 1850s, the factory's 
role was one of assembly, repair, re-furbishment, development and 
testing, of a range of muskets, swords and rifles. A further part 
of Enfield's responsibility, that of monitoring the quality and 
cost of weapons supplied to "Ordnance" by the private gun trade, 
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became considerably strengthened with the transfer of the 
remaining sealed patterns from the Tower of London after the 
devastating fire at the armoury and workshops on the night of 
30th October, 1841. . 1. Holding the patterns against which 
military arms were judged placed Enfield in a very powerful 
position, allowing them to determine and maintain strict 
standards of accuracy and finish. However, as we will learn, it 
was the appointment of George Lovell, the resident Storekeeper at 
Enfield Lock, to the position of Inspector of Small Arms in 1840, 
placing him in charge of all aspects in the manufacture of 
military weapons, which was to have a profound influence upon the 
development of the British military gun trade. 
Significantly the position of Inspector had been re-established, 
which suggests that at the time, not only did the Board of 
Ordnance hold Lovell in high regard for his inventive and 
technical skills, but also that they were becoming aware of the 
increasing variations and gathering-pace of weapon technological 
development. It was therefore important for "Ordnance" to ensure 
that this growing and evolving technology was carefully monitored 
and managed by experienced personnel, making Lovell, with his 
considerable knowledge of invention and the gun trade, the ideal 
candidate for the job. The fact that Lovell had spent a quarter 
of a century at the Enfield factory, taking him from the 
establishment of the plant to the perfection and development of 
the percussion cap, had no doubt helped his candidature. Lovell's 
promotion, apart from making him responsible for over-seeing the 
manufacture of military weapons, had effectively placed him in 
charge of all military small arms inspection, with responsibility 
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for the superintendence of the "Ordnance" departments at the 
Tower, Birmingham, and the manufactory at Enfield. His reporting 
line was direct to the Master General of Ordnance, placing him in 
a very powerful and influential position. . 2. 
Lovell's appointment, as we will learn, was to become an act of 
mixed fortune for the British small arms industry, although at 
the time it is probably fair to conclude that the major changes 
he was to impose upon the gun trade could not have been foreseen. 
However, his promotion can be identified as one of the most 
important single factors contributing to far reaching 
improvements in the manufactured quality and standardisation of 
British military small arms, although the path to this eventual 
destination was paved with many hazards. 
Since his appointment as Storekeeper at Enfield Lock in 1816, a 
position roughly akin to a factory director of today, Lovell had 
not only involved himself in purely organisational and 
operational matters but had also taken a personal and active 
interest in the design, development and improvement of small arms 
generally. He was responsible and influential in the design and 
development of a wide range of ordnance products, from the 
percussion lock system to bayonets and different forms of 
ammunition including experiments with various types of 
fulminating powder. De Witt Bailey has identified Lovell as being 
responsible for the design of at least twenty-five small arms, 
and if modifications are included he suggests this figure would 
be much higher. . 3. 
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Largely under Lovell's direction a new smooth-bore musket 
received approval in 1841 and went into production. The model was 
to be known as "The Percussion Musket 184211 (Fig. 4), continuing 
in service with the British Army until being partially succeeded 
by the Minie rifle in 1851 (Fig. 5), which in turn was replaced by 
the "Enfield three-grooved Rifle" or "Rifle,, musket Pattern 1853" 
(Fig. 6). This arm had a double distinction. It was the first 
weapon to go into service with the British Army bearing the name 
"Enfield" and it was also the first musket to be manufactured in 
Britain using the mass production techniques of interchangeable 
parts under the "American system",, when the new purpose built- 
factory at Enfield Lock officially started volume production in 
January 1857. . 4. 
What views did Lovell really hold? 
Lovell's former role as Storekeeper at the Government armoury at 
Enfield Lock had allowed him the opportunity to bring together 
and maintain a small group of skilled artisans. This encouraged 
him to hold the view that significant differences in product 
quality and finish existed between the "Ordnance" manufactory, 
which he had nurtured from its inception in 1816, and the private 
gun trade at large, particularly that of the Birmingham district. 
In April 1852 (a time approaching the end of his career) he was 
prompted to write: - 
At Enfield no workman is admitted unless he be of the first 
class in his trade, and of sober, moral, and regular habits. 
He has the assistance of the best machinery and works under 
the immediate eye of the viewer, who corrects any errors of 
work as they arise. He has a comfortable home, and receives 
his wages in full at a certain hour every week. Whereas at 
Birmingham, the first and ruling question is price; the man 
who will work at the lowest rate is entrusted with it, without 
much care as to capability or character; there is little or no 
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tie between him and his master; he is mulcted for the 
mill-power that he uses and for tools, and receives his wages 
often very irregularly. The consequence is, that the 
workmanship is inferior, and the men often resort to all sorts 
of shifts and tricks to evade the viewer's eye. The master 
complains of the injustice of the inspection, when it is his 
own fault for employing inferior workmen and screwing them 
down in price. . 5. 
Lovell's account which stressed the flawlessness of the 
Government armoury compared to the workmanship of the Birmingham 
district was accepted as a clear indication of the "superiority 
of the Enfield manufactory" by the Master General, who was no 
doubt looking for ways to alleviate the political pressures 
placed upon "Ordnance" by the continuing lobby of Parliament by 
the private gun trade. The April Minute of the Master General 
when referring to Lovell's definition of Enfield, suggests that 
this "would be of use to the clerk of the Ordnance in answering 
any attack in the House of Commons". . 6. 
There can be little doubt that Lovell harboured strong and 
lasting opinions regarding the inadequacies of the private gun 
trade, singling out Birmingham manufacturers as a particular 
example. It is also abundantly clear that he favoured the notion 
of having Government owned and run establishments for the 
manufacture of military supplies. In 1830 he had taken the 
trouble to write a lengthy critique on blank sheets opposite the 
main text of an anonymously published pamphlet on the 
"Observations on the Manufacture of Fire-Arms for Military 
Purposes" where he expressed the following vehement views: - 
It is the first Duty of every Department entrusted with the 
details, to see that our Fleets and Armies be equipped at 
every point in the most-perfect manner. - 
In all the essential parts this has been tried by competition 
in Private hands, and failed: -lst: our ships of war, when 
built by Contract were notoriously unsoundl-The Navy Board 
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were obliged to increase the number of Publick Dock Yards. - 
2nd: Our Gunpowder made by Private hands would not reach our 
enemiesl-The ordnance Department established their own Powder 
Mills. -3rd: The Carriages of our field and Battering Guns when 
made by Private Carpenters were disgracefull-The Royal 
Carriage Department was instituted. -4th: The arms of our 
Soldiers, made by Birmingham Contractors were as proverbially 
"bad as a Brummagen Halfpenny" and even to these the supply 
was deficienti-The Royal manufactory of arms was in 
consequence established. - These several Institutions have 
arisen and increased out of pure necessity: -The Government has 
positively been driven into the measures, and what are the 
results? - 
Our Ships, our Powder, our Artillery, our Arms, are 
acknowledged even by our enemies to be superior to all the 
world. - 
That System is good which works welli- . 7. 
While it is probably fair to say that some of these comments 
contain elements of emotion, nevertheless it is a particularly 
damming judgement not only of the private gun trade, but private 
industry generally. It is obvious from Lovell's exposition that 
he firmly believed that only properly administered government 
establishments were capable of turning out work of a satisfactory 
standard. Comparing these earlier opinions with those he espoused 
in 1852, suggest his views had not changed that much with regard 
to the private gun trade's quality of workmanship. 
However,. in contrast, if one examines Lovell's evidence given 
before the 1849 Select Committee on Army and Ordnance 
Expenditure, a completely different picture emerges. Lovell was 
questioned by Sir James Graham on matters relating to the 
possible advantages of "Ordnance" having in-house production of 
small arms. Responding to the point put by Sir James "You do not 
concur in the opinion that it would be desirable to manufacture 
as the exclusive mode of supply"? Lovell replied, *"Certainly not; 
we should then have no check upon our own men". Confirming the 
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response Sir James continued; "You would prefer contract as the 
rule, with Enfield as the check"? To this Lovell replied; "Yes, 
Enfield is useful as a check". Making absolutely sure what Lovell 
had in his mind Sir James pressed home the point; "You would keep 
the establishment at Enfield as low as possible, keeping in view 
the necessity of it as a check"? Lovell replied; "Yes". . 8. 
On the face of the 1849 evidence, it would appear that Lovell had 
completely reversed the strong views he had expressed in 1830 and 
accepted the role of Enfield as a minimum manufacturing 
establishment which would act as "check" upon the private gun 
trade. It is interesting to note that he volunteered the opinion 
that the private gun trade would act as a "check" upon his "own 
men", a complete contradiction of his earlier and later views 
when he had boasted that they were "first class" in their trade. 
The example of Lovell's apparent change of direction from his 
erstwhile opinions can be seen in his report of April 1852 
(mentioned above), illustrating a side of Lovell bordering on the 
devious. This aspect of Lovell's character has never before been 
discussed. The report shows that he held clear views regarding 
the superiority of the workmen employed at Enfield over those 
doing comparable jobs in the private sector. While these later 
opinions appear less vigorous than those expressed in 1830, it 
does, however suggest, that he had not altered his original 
strongly held beliefs and that his evidence to the 1849 Select 
Committee formed part of a "smoke-screen" to cover a secret plan 
he was nurturing. 
At first glance, the seeming contradiction in Lovell's views 
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appears puzz ing. However, if we try to see the situation which 
confronted Lovell through his eyes, from the perspective of his 
burning ambition to equip the British soldier with the best 
possible weapons, while at the same time being constrained by 
"Ordnance" regulations and the private sector's lobby of 
Parliament, we may imagine the various schemes which could have 
gone through his mind. At the time there were many personal 
attacks by members of the gun trade upon Lovell's character which 
were probably causing his superiors some discomfort, therefore he 
may have considered discretion to be the better part of valour, 
deciding not to reveal his true opinions in public. Perhaps there 
were personal pressures for his less forthright stance. At the 
time, an enquiry was in progress into the behaviour of Lovell's 
son Francis, the Assistant Inspector of Small Arms, who had 
compensated the French gun stock contractor Pierlot & Siminos for 
losses sustained in a Government contract for gun stocks. The 
inquiry continued until July 1852, when Lovell junior was sacked. 
It is clear from the ensuing correspondence with the Master 
General that Lovell senior was deeply upset by the incident. 
Returning from leave he wrote to the Board of Ordnance on the 
19th July, asking them to reconsider their judgement. In his 
letter Lovell stated he "deeply deplores" the fact his son should 
have exposed himself to want of discretion, although in support 
he suggested the inquiry had found no "moral turpitude,, in his 
son's actions. Lovell believed the incident had brought disgrace 
upon his house. His letter expressed the view that the "sentence" 
would weigh heavily on "a large family of brothers and sisters". 
The Board ignored Lovell's pleas, and did not reverse its 
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judgement. . 9. 
A brave trv to chanqe the Procurement svstem? 
The evidence placed before the 1854 Select Committee on Small 
Arms, included the debate carried on in correspondence since the 
early 1840s between George Lovell, the Master General, and Board 
of Ordnance over Lovell's plan to break what the Board perceived 
as an endless cycle of poor quality and late delivery by the 
private contractors. Lovell had pointed out that the gun trade in 
London and Birmingham had joined in combination against 
"Ordnance". Therefore he concluded that it was impossible for the 
system of placing contracts to work as the competitive element 
had effectively been removed. Furthermore, he explained that the 
gun trade workers had in turn joined Trade Unions and were acting 
in combination against their masters by striking for better 
wages. In spite of this, and his considerable reservations of the 
private gun contractor's ability to produce sufficient quantities 
of good quality weapons, Lovell advanced what would seem to be a 
very sensible and practical approach to ease the situation when 
he suggested: - 
eee before I can propose any further orders being issued, it 
appears to me to be absolutely necessary for the security of 
the public interests, that a better understanding should be 
come to with gun contractors, and that the prices of setting 
up arms should be thoroughly investigated, and regulated 
upon a more fair and reasonable base than they have hitherto 
been. . 10. 
Considering Lovell's strongly held views of the private sector, 
this was a revolutionary proposal. Lovell went even further by 
suggesting that he thought the arms supply and quality situation 
could be remedied if he was allowed to call a meeting consisting 
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of representatives from the London and Birmingham gun trades to 
which he would attend with the Storekeeper from Enfield, RW 
Gunne r. He also suggested that the Board of ordnance should 
nominate a suitable person to be present. As Lovell explained, 
his reasons for calling the meeting was so: - 
That every process in detail should be gone carefully through, 
item by item, and that the prices that are to be paid to the 
workmen fixed and settled: taking the scale of prices paid in 
the Royal manufactory as a guide, but subject to such 
modifications as the differing circumstances of the private 
trade may point out as necessary; and when this has been done, 
that the per-centage shall be determined upon, which the 
contractor shall receive for his outlay of capital, his risk, 
losses, time and trouble. . 11. 
Lovell went on to say "I would further advise,, that the workmen's 
prices, when so fixed, for Ordnance work, should be printed and 
distributed, and that no contractor should be allowed to give 
more or less". . 12. This was a brave and ambitious proposal and 
clearly shows that Lovell had a good understanding of the working 
of the private sector. It is doubtful if Lovell would have made 
such a proposal on the spur of the moment, it is more likely that 
he had taken time to carefully consider and formulate his ideas 
during his period at Enfield. Furthermore, it demonstrates that 
although Lovell was harbouring strong personal beliefs about how 
and where weapons should be made, he could astutely weigh up the 
political situation, probably judging that in the relatively 
peaceful inter-war period there was little opportunity for 
"Ordnance" to take outright control of small arms manufacture. 
Such an action would also have been difficult to achieve, given 
the frequent questions, raised within the House of Commons by 
vocal members who were supporters of the gun trade, regarding the 
military public spending estimates. . 13. Lovell's way forward was 
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to recommend to the Board of Ordnance a radical overhaul of the 
contract system, which if implemented would have helped to 
address the serious haemorrhaging of skilled workers from the 
industry as labour was cast off in peacetime. 
Quite soon after his promotion to Inspector of Small Arms in 
1840, Lovell placed his plan before the Board of Ordnance. It is 
clear from the correspondence that Lovell's thoughts were focused 
on the survival of the British gun trade as a whole, as he had 
prepared his case with care by taking prior soundings in the 
private sector. Lovell explained, "I have mentioned this proposal 
to some of. the leading contractors at Birmingham and in London, 
who are quite ready and willing to enter into such an agreement". 
In view of this bold initiative, it may seem somewhat ironic that 
Lovell was to come under an increasing number of personal attacks 
and criticisms by the gun trade at large, particularly for the 
strictness of inspection imposed by his viewers, when it would 
appear, at least on the surface, that he was desperately trying 
to improve the overall conditions within the small arms industry. 
Perhaps the trade was becoming wary of Lovell, suspecting that he 
had an ulterior motive. On the one hand he was apparently trying 
to improve the conditions of the contractors and their workers, 
while at the same time he was tightening the quality screw. 
Although the logic of his proposals seems to have been 
recognised, Lovell received the following reply, "... the Master 
General and Board cannot of themselves interfere in any 
proceeding affecting the arrangements of the contractors with 
their workmen". . 14. The Board's response does not appear to have 
ill 
put Lovell off striving to achieve his objective, as he 
single-mindedly and courageously persevered with his ideas, 
writing some eight years later: - 
I have since the year 1842, been enabled to bring about an 
understanding between the masters and workmen, and to 
establish a "List of Prices of Labour, " by which every master 
has agreed to be governed; which the workmen themselves find 
to operate beneficially, and which has had the effect of doing 
away with "strikes" for wages ever since. . 15. 
However, Lovell does point out that while he considered the 
prices paid for labour in the gun trade generally fair and 
reasonable, he did feel that the profits of the masters should be 
brought into competition. As an example, he highlighted the 
trade's setting-up costs for the new percussion musket which he 
was able to measure quite accurately against similar work carried 
out at Enfield. From this he concluded that the masters because 
of the method of payment, were regularly deriving an advance of 7 
shillings and 5 pence (24.5%) monthly against each gun. This sum, 
Lovell suggested, can be turned over twelve times a year "without 
any risk of the bankruptcies or delays the mere private commerce 
brings with it". . 16. He therefore reasoned that the 24.5% was 
the sum, more than any other, which the gun trade would be 
prepared to negotiate down in open competition, providing the 
number of contracts put out were strictly regulated by the Board 
and extended over periods of not less than three years. . 17. 
It can be seen, that Lovell has identified a major problem with 
the "Ordnance" contract system, that of its short term nature. 
This observation has highlighted a further important point. 
Should "Ordnance" have offered the private sector long term or 
guaranteed follow-on contracts, then initial tooling-up and other 
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associated costs could have been amortised across a longer 
production run, resulting in customer benefit from a lower 
product price. This perhaps illustrates that members of the Board 
did not fully understand the manufacturing requirements. These 
issues will be addressed in Chapter Eight. 
In achieving his plan, Lovell wrote "I have sedulously avoided 
lowering the quality of the musket either in workmanship or 
material; for in that I am convinced there would be no true 
economy". He concluded his letter of December 1848 in confident 
mood by drawing the Board's attention to the following current 
supply position (the desiccating process will be discussed 
separately in the next chapter): - 
... by the perfect'success of the desiccating process for 
seasoning stocks, which is now in full operation at Enfield, 
and by the powerful assistance of the machinery for jointing 
and percussioning, which I have introduced of late years, and 
looking to the store on hand, I can be certain of providing in 
regular succession a sufficient supply of stocks, locks, 
bayonets, and all other materials, to whatever extent and for 
whatever period may be determined upon". . 18. 
It is clear from Lovell's proposals regarding the introduction of 
long term contracts that he was trying to introduce a strong 
element of stability into the gun making industry. Over the years 
the gun trade were subjected to great pressures to supply large 
quantities of arms in time of war but during peacetime orders 
were not forthcoming. Had Lovell's policies concerning contracts 
and payments been fully implemented, and as yet there is no 
evidence to suggest that they were, not even partially, it would 
have gone a long way towards solving the problems of gun makers 
poaching skilled workers from other gunsmiths in times of boom, 
and the workers themselves plying their trade between several 
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masters at once. All these movements of people were known to 
affect seriously the quality of the product, which in turn led to 
delays as "Ordnance" rejected deliveries of unsatisfactory 
weapons and parts. 
A change of tactics by Lovell? 
Studying the fully documented evidence of the 1854 Government 
Select Committee on Small Arms can be both fruitful and 
rewarding, in teasing out subtle clues concerning what would 
appear to be Lovell's hidden agenda. 
One of the most revealing pieces of evidence to come before the 
Committee was from the Birmingham gun maker, Isaac Brentnall 
Sheath, who had contracted to set up a quantity of arms for 
"Ordnance" in 1851. The contract had not been completed on time. 
When questioned about the delay, Sheath gave two main reasons* 
These were 11 ... not having materials", and "... the pattern was not 
decided upon by the Board of Ordnance to enable us to proceed 
with it". He was then asked, "have you not a proper pattern 
given to you at first"? Sheath replied, "no we never have 
patterns allowed us". This is quite an extraordinary revelation, 
as without a pattern for reference, it would have been almost 
impossible for the setting up contractor to ensure that the work 
being carried out was in accordance with the required "Ordnance" 
standard. From the testimony it is learned that the closest the 
contractor is able to get to the pattern is at the "Ordnance" 
viewirig rooms. Sheath elucidates, "the pattern is placed in the 
viewer's hands, and we send a workman down to the viewer to have 
our jigs made in his presence, and then he explains the 
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different points that he wants attended to". . 19. 
The understanding of the consequences of this arrangement and 
its impact upon quality and standardisation is a crucial factor 
in explaining the differences which existed between mid century 
American machine made weapons and their British labour intensive 
counterparts. To have grasped the implications and significance 
of how the private sector had to cope with "Ordnance" small arms 
contracts under such unreasonable conditions of working, may 
have allowed some contemporary writers to have been a little 
more generous towards the independent gun trade's manufacturing 
capabilities. 
It is worth reminding ourselves once more of the information 
contained in the letter dated 12th September 1854, from Hollis & 
Sheath to Joseph Wood, Secretary Ordnance Office, (discussed in 
the last chapter) and comparing this evidence with the 
revelations by Sheath to the Select Committee earlier that March 
regarding the 1851 setting up contract. This would appear to 
reinforce the notion that "Ordnance,, had learned little from 
their earlier experiences of poor quality and late deliveries. In 
the letter, the contractor suggests that "... we believe we can 
complete the 20,000 musket pattern 1853 in'March next, providing 
we have the materials (less sights) issued to us at the rate of 
200 each per week from týis date. " What is more revealing comes 
later in the letter when the contractor suggests that he will be 
able 11 ... to keep pace with the setting up... " "... as soon as the 
proper tools are prepared for viewing the sites... ". . 20. It 
is 
clear that the reference to "tools ... for viewing the sites 
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refers to measuring gauges. On the face of this information 
it does seem incredible that after three years "Ordnance" were 
still not prepared, or were slow, to let contractors have 
patterns or gauges to check that their work conformed with the 
standards they themselves had set. It will be recalled from the 
Hollis & Sheath letter that it was not absolutely clear who was 
responsible for making the gauges, the contractor or "Ordnance". 
Neither is it clear, when the later pattern 1853 contract was 
issued,, that "Ordnance" would be supplying the contractors with 
master patterns on time. 
From the recommendations contained within the report of the 1854 
Select Committee on Small Arms, "... that in future the contract 
should be understood to commence from the time of the delivery of 
the pattern one might conclude that old ways were slow to 
change. . 21. Either way, it would seem "Ordnance" were at fault. 
If they had not supplied the pattern, then, without this 
essential standard to work from, it would have been impossible 
for the contractor to construct accurate gauges. Therefore, it is 
difficult to see how essential work on the weapon could have 
commenced. On the other hand, if it was the responsibility of 
"Ordnance', to supply the gauges, then we know from Hollis & 
Sheath's letter that they had not done so. What is perhaps more 
surprising, particularly when considering the Master General and 
George Lovell's previous views of the private sector (with "the 
man who will work for the lowest rate"), that it had still not 
been planned to ensure dubious quality was filtered out at source 
prior to the weapon or component being submitted to the 
"Ordnance" viewers'. This could have easily been achieved by 
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supplying contractors with duplicate sets of gauges and patterns. 
After all, it was as much in the financial interests of 
"Ordnance" as of the contractors to get the article right first 
time. Delays and quality problems emanating from the inability of 
contractors to accurately check their work would no doubt have 
posed a grave risk to Britain's national security when demand for 
weapons increased in time of war. 
George Lovell accomplished many positive things in his long 
career. However, the notion that contractors should be 
. 
deliberately denied duplicate sets of gauges and patterns seems 
to go against all the very bench-marks he was trying to set in 
his quest for quality and standardisation. By effectively forcing 
the various contractors to make their own jigs (and perhaps 
gauges) from a pattern held by the viewer, it can surely not have 
escaped the attention of "Ordnance" that it would have been 
almost impossible to achieve uniformity of manufacture. Gauge 
making was carried out by the highest skilled craftsmen, some of 
these precision tools taking many months to make and perfect. If 
Lovell was genuine in his belief regarding the low level of 
competence of the private sector craftsmen, it would seem folly 
in the extreme to have trusted contractors to manufacture their 
own gauges and expect precision. Furthermore,, if "Ordnance" were 
deliberately forcing the individual contractors to manufacture 
their own duplicate sets of gauges, then it must have been 
realised that the outcome would have resulted in considerable 
delays in the military weapon supply chain. Moreover, it would 
have been difficult if not impossible for each individual 
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contractor to meet a consistent standard of component tolerancer 
as it is highly unlikely that all the gauges could have been made 
to a precise specification in the different manufacturing 
establishments. 
In Britain at the middle of the 19th century, concepts of 
manufacturing from a controlled single standard were known and 
understood. Much of the pioneering work had been done by eminent 
engineers like Henry Maudslay and Joseph Whitworth, who had both 
set national bench-marks for Accurate measurement. Had "Ordnance" 
adopted a policy to supply patterns and gauges to the contractors 
they could. have ensured that these tools complied with a single 
set of standards. As viewer's gauges and patterns were already 
made by "Ordnance"I the logical plan would have been to extend 
this work and make duplicate sets for the contractors. Although 
this action may have seemed costly in the short term, in the 
longer term the outlay could have been recouped by cutting the 
reject rate, saving material, reducing losses incurred through 
delays and ensuring the army and navy were equipped on time. 
To ensure the system operated fairly, independent officers within 
"Ordnance" could have held master sets of patterns and gauges to 
act as arbitrators should a dispute over standards of 
acceptability arise. These are not simply the retrospective views 
of a 20th century writer, as Sheath had put forward similar ideas 
in his evidence to the Select Committee. If gauges and patterns 
had been made for the private gun trade at Enfield, the work 
would have corresponded with the role already adopted by the 
factory which functioned largely as a unit for specialist and 
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experimental work. More than any other British establishment, 
Enfield was ideally suited to the task, particularly as one is 
mindful of Lovell when he said of the place "no workman is 
admitted unless he be of the first class in his trade". Had 
"Ordnance" taken responsibility for making and issuing all gauges 
and patterns, then they would have been in a stronger position to 
accurately monitor the work of the private sector with greater 
authority. Contractors would have had little room to complain of 
misunderstandings over manufacturing dimensions and there could 
be no excuses for delays to finished product due to lack of 
measuring equipment. Therefore, with the knowledge and means of 
accurate systems of measurement open to Lovell and his 
colleagues, one can only speculate why a universal scheme was not 
adopted for "Ordnance" contracts. 
A hidden agenda? 
While "Ordnance" were continually complaining of high reject 
rates and late delivery, it is difficult to comprehend why they 
had apparently not considered issuing patterns and gauges to at 
least the major setting up contractors. The necessity for a 
closer watch on accuracy and quality would have seemed an obvious 
precaution when the system of open tendering was first introduced 
in circa 1850. With the emphasis firmly on lower prices, this 
could have attracted inexperienced companies to tender for 
business in the hope of establishing themselves as "Ordnance" 
contractors. 
As the system of open tendering had been introduced when Lovell 
was Inspector of Small Arms, being brought about by his 
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recommendations to the Board of Ordnance, one would have expected 
that a man of his intellectl desperately striving to achieve 
standardisation of parts and weapons, would at least have put the 
idea to his superiors of issuing patterns and gauges to the 
contractors. Research to date has not been able to uncover any 
evidence which might suggest that Lovell had discussed or 
recommended these fundamental principles to the Master General or 
to members of the Board. Could it be that Lovell was cleverly 
developing a hidden agenda? If the private gun trade could be 
subtly denied the wherewithal to manufacture weapons to a 
satisfactory standard, then this would leave the way clear for 
"Ordnance" to take control of the production of military small 
arms, allowing Lovell to realize the ambition he had proffered in 
1830. It might therefore be construed from Sheath's experience 
that Lovellf by deliberately denying the contractors patterns and 
gauges for the 1851 contract (although this was never outwardly 
obvious from the evidence taken before the Select Committee) was 
trying to ensure that the private gun trade would fail in its 
attempt to supply "Ordnance" on time with good quality arms. 
If this was his hidden agenda, it would have allowed Lovell the 
opportunity to persuade the Board that the plans he had advocated 
earlier for setting prices and wages within the private sectorr 
which the Master General had rejected, were worth reviewing once 
more. Had the Board then decided to accept an interventionist 
role, adopting a policy similar to Lovell's earlier proposals for 
the contractors, this compromise would have gone some way to 
meeting his 1830 aspirations, when he had advocated "Ordnance" 
taking total responsibility for the production of all weapons 
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supplied to the military. 
Parliament on the other hand, which had been under pressure from 
the private gun trade not to expand the "Ordnance" capability of 
military small arms manufacture, would no doubt have welcomed the 
financial benefits to be gained from such an outcome. This 
concession, if implemented, would also have met Lovell's opposite 
view, expressed in 1849, when he agreed that he "would keep the 
establishment at Enfield as low as possible... 11. . 22. In other 
words, if Lovell was unable to realise his main ambition, that of 
,; Ordnance" taking over full manufacturing control of military 
weapons'from the private sector, then the lesser option would 
have provided a face saver. Of course these suggestions are no 
more than speculation, but Lovell was a man of considerable 
intellect who wanted his ideas adopted, and as De Witt Bailey has 
pointed out, he wished 11 ... to ensure that Britain's soldiers 
could defend their Empire with an unfailing supply of the best 
possible weapons which technology and experience could produce". 
. 23. It is therefore conceivable that the suggestion of Lovell 
harbouring long term plans for "Ordnance" to take control of the 
manufacture of military small arms, was his way of-trying to 
ensure the British soldier got the best. 
What was Lovell's motive? 
While it is not intended to 
contribution to the British 
that he was generally over 
regard to the strictness of 
that by applying such rigid 
devalue Lovell's magnificent 
arms industry, research has shown 
ambitious in his application with 
view. Of course it might be argued 
standards of inspection, it was 
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Lovell's plan to force the private gun trade into employing more 
machinery. This was surely not his intentiont as Lovell was 
fully aware of the gun trade's reasons for not investing in 
higher quantities of equipment, their reluctance being primarily 
due to the short and intermittent nature of the contract system, 
which gave little confidence or incentive to commit capital to 
machine intensive programmes when the future was so unsure. It 
will be recalled that Lovell, as early as 1842, had recommended 
to the Board methods of regulating wages and prices within the 
private sector. He had also suggested that it would be advisable 
to offer the gun trade a minimum contract period of three years. 
Therefore, it is more likely that Lovell, frustrated by the 
reluctance of "Ordnance" to intervene in the private sector over 
wage and price structures and unable to reduce the sector's 
influence upon Parliament, was preparing his own agenda to force 
the Board's hand to a greater manufacturing commitment. 
From the evidence of the contractors given before the Select 
Committee on Small Arms in 1854, it is known that they had either 
not been issued with patterns, or at best had to wait their turn. 
This could cause considerable delays to individual firms 
completing their part of the contract. James Gunner (son of RW 
Gunner) had reported to the Committee that one pattern was 
supplied "as a guide" for all the manufacturers, which if correct 
was a most unsatisfactory way of working. . 24. There is 
confirmation of this point through the evidence of Richard Aston 
who worked with his brother as a "General Gun Furniture Maker" 
(odd metal parts of the gun stock and elsewhere). Aston gave the 
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reason for being late with deliveries of the 1851 bayonet because 
we were seven weeks before we got the pattern". When asked 
if he had ever applied for a duplicate, he replied "Many times; 
and Mr Lovell said that I should be the first to find fault with 
it". Asked what he had meant by this, Aston alleged that Lovell 
had said "they could not make six or seven near enough to view 
to". . 25. 
This remark would appear extraordinary in the light of Lovell's 
boast that Enfield employed only skilled artisans. If this was 
the real position, it would seem hardly fair to have expected 
high standards from the private sector considering Lovell's low 
opinion of them. And of course, Lovell was well aware that he had 
been more than economical with the issuing of patterns and 
gauges. As Enfield already produced a number of duplicate gauges 
of high accuracy for the "Ordnance" viewers to check the 
contractors work, the excuse offered through Aston would not seem 
plausible. More likely Lovell was offering Aston the least line 
of resistance, perhaps not wishing to reveal his innermost 
thoughts. If Lovell had issued duplicate patterns and gauges, 
then as suggested above, he would have lost the initiative to 
blame the contractors for failing to honour their agreements with 
"Ordnance". 
It is known from correspondence that George Lovell was signing 
letters as Inspector of Small Arms in 1853. This would confirm he 
still had overall responsibility for manufacture and inspection. 
From this, one can only conclude the responsibility for issuing 
the precise means of measurement to the contractors was entirely 
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his. If he was somehow denying the contractors the ability to 
measure work accurately to assume manufacturing control, then as 
an employee of "Ordnance" he was taking a dangerous strategic 
gamble. Clearly it would have been physically impractical for the 
different contractors in London and Birmingham to check the 
accuracy of their work from a solitary pattern held by the 
Government viewer before submission to "Ordnance". Such an 
arrangement would seem completely out of character with Lovell's 
enthusiastic drive towards improved weapon quality and 
standardisation. However, as suggested above, it is possible that 
Lovell's judgement may have been influenced by the incident 
concerning the Master General and the Board's treatment of his 
son Francis over the compensation of the French gun stock 
contractor. The influence of the gun stock episode (debated 
separately in the next chapter) upon Lovell's state of mind is 
probably no more than one would expect from a man whose health 
was failing, as is evidenced by the shaky and deteriorating hand 
writing in correspondence towards the end of his career. Arms 
expert and historian Howard Blackmore has implied that the 
incident led eventually to Lovell's demise and has described it 
thus. "Lovell himself was admonished and ordered to move to 
Birmingham where most of the new rifled muskets were in the hands 
of the contractors. He died in 1854, his achievements forgotten 
and largely blamed for the failure of the system". . 26. 
However, the argument suggesting faulty judgement due to Lovell's 
poor state of mind can only be upheld if his later life is taken 
in isolation, clearly an unsustainable proposition. As Lovell had 
been appointed Inspector of Small Arms in 1840, he would have had 
124 
both the authority and the opportunity to 
in place a strategy for issuing duplicate 
gauges to contractors had he so wished. T: 
Lovell's downfall had somehow been caused 
later in life after the gun stock episode 
confidently be dismissed. 
have developed and put 
sets of patterns and 
herefore, to argue that 
by failing faculties 
with his son can 
The most likely reason for Lovell's final isolation, as suggested 
by the overwhelming evidence, was his single minded devotion to 
the quest for small arms perfection by hidden agenda or 
otherwise. This outwardly manifested itself in his uncompromising 
adherence to the strictness of viewing standards, placing the 
independent gun makers in an impossible position. Support for 
this opinion can be seen in the evide nce of Joseph Brazier when 
he explained that viewing had become less strict when Richard 
Webb Gunner took over the responsibilities of Inspector of Small 
Arms from Lovell. 
The evidence suggests that Lovell never gave up his quest for 
perfection. This therefore makes it difficult to fully understand 
why the private sector had not been issued with the necessary 
measuring tools to do the job. Under the circumstances, one would 
have expected the private gun trade to have been given the 
opportunity on at least one major contract to accurately measure 
their work, even as an experiment. Perhaps this denial implies 
that Lovell really did have a hidden agenda. 
An impossible task for the private sector 
Because of the strictness of view, the private gun trade was 
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unable to cope with the more exacting levels of inspection 
imposed when the new system of open tendering was introduced in 
circa 1850. Without standardised gauges or patterns, the private 
gun trade found it almost impossible to cope with the military 
contracts. Having only manual methods of manufacture to rely on 
the gun trade was trapped, unable to meet economically the new 
exacting standards imposed by the viewers under Lovell's 
authority. The effect upon the industry was chaotic, with 
contractors failing to meet their delivery dates and, as a 
consequence, suffering financial penalties and material loss. 
Once Lovell had set the standards for tighter inspection he could 
not have easily gone back, even had he wanted to do so. 
*Apart 
from a loss of face had he reverted to former standards it would 
have created confusion amongst the viewers. If the harsh measures 
he had imposed were designed to force the private sector into 
failing, then Lovell had not fully succeeded. Neither had he been 
able to convince Government that an "Ordnance" committed to 
full-scale military small arms manufacture was the only way 
forward. 
However, if Lovell was not operating a hidden agenda and was 
genuinely trying to organise the private gun trade into a first 
class British arms industry, then surely he could not have failed 
to recognize the most practical way of achieving his goal was to 
invite co-operation by developing a co-ordinated strategy for the 
industry, not by alienating the participants by denying them the' 
wherewithal to check their work. After all, he had laid the 
foundations earlier by ignoring the Board's instruction when he 
unilaterally decided to discuss an improved price structure with 
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both masters and men. Nevertheless, by his adherence to strict 
standards of tolerance and finish and by withholding gauges and 
patterns, he had alienated a large section of the would-be 
participants. Therefore it was hardly likely that he would 
personally realise his passionate ambition. 
Had Lovell seen the report of the Select Committee published in 
May 1854 before his death in April that year, he may well have 
realised that there were other ways of improving the supply of 
good quality military arms through a more liberal policy of 
collaboration with the private sector. With his first rate 
knowledge of the gun trade, Lovell must have been well aware of 
the East India Company's methods of procuring arms from the 
private sector. While it is recognised that the East India 
Company's methods were not perfect, they did have an infinitely 
better customer supplier relationship, and were therefore more 
likely to resolve difficulties mutually with their contractors 
than "Ordnance". Had Lovell approached his quest for perfection 
on a similar basis and secured the support of the Board of 
Ordnance, we may have seen a different outcome for the British 
small arms industry. Of course one can be wise with the benefit 
of hindsight. 
De Witt Bailey, in summing up Lovell's contribution to the 
British arms industry,, states,, "Lovell was the most effective and 
successful standard-bearer in the struggle between the two 
opposing factions regarding the hotly contested question as to 
whether the Government or the private sector should control the 
manufacture of Britain's military small arms. *Throughout his 
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career Lovell was passionately dedicated to the concept that the 
central Government should control the manufacture of military 
small arms... ". . 27. While Lovell's passion to see an efficient 
well run military small arms industry can not be denied, from the 
evidence so far uncovered he can not really be classified as the 
"standard-bearer" in the contest for Government control of the 
military small arms trade, as all his public statements do not 
support this view. 
Lovell's real ambition Posthumously achieved 
Sadly, it was not until 1857, less than three years after 
Lovell's death that his innermost ambitions were to be fully 
realised. Provoked by the war in the Crimea, the Government 
controlled factory at Enfield Lock started production with the 
newly acquired machine tools from America. Now it was possible 
for Enfield to achieve levels of standardisation of which Lovell 
could have only dreamed. 
It had been the continuing pressure upon Parliament from the 
private gun trade which had helped tie "Ordnance" hands for so 
long. Support for the private sector by politicians had remained 
firm. In a letter to the editor of the Aris's Gazette in March 
1852, the Birmingham M. P. William Scholfield, added a 
conciliatory note to a dispute between the gun manufacturers and 
their workmen when he took the opportunity to warn of the 
possible dangers facing the trade: - 
Already it is understood that the Government has largely 
extended the operations of Enfield, and, no longer confining 
itself to repairs and experiments, has undertaken many 
processes of manufacture; and it is seriously to be feared 
that the ordnance Office will not be slow to avail itself of 
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any excuse for still further steps in this direction. . 28. 
Before the 1854 Select Committee on Small Arms had been 
appointed to consider the cheapest and most efficient way of 
providing weapons for her Majesty's service, John Dent Goodman 
was to observe: - 
Before this resolution was carried out the subject was warmly 
debated in the House of Commons, Mr. Newdegate, Mr. Muntz, 
Mr. Geach, Lord Seymour, and other members strongly insisted 
upon the impolicy of Govetnment entering into competition as 
manufacturers with the private trade of the country .... 
. 29. 
Even as late as 1868, eleven years after Enfield had commenced 
full-scale production, the continuing influence of the private 
sector could still be recognised. John Bright M. P. addressed a 
deputation of Birmingham gun-makers, when it was stated: - 
The object which these manufacturers had before them was to 
criticise the action of the Government in establishing 
manufactories at Enfield and elsewhere, and generally to 
condemn the policy of Government in undertaking such 
commercial or industrial operations as can be carried out 
adequately and safely by private enterprise. . 30. 
Had Lovell been allowed in the early. 1840s to negotiate improved 
contracts with the gun trade, there may have been a different 
outcome as to how the military would be supplied in the future. 
Although the Government eventually had to commit large sums of 
money to upgrade Enfield, it is probably fair to speculate that 
they would have preferred to have obtained their arms from the 
private sector, thereby saving vast amounts of public funds. No 
doubt politicians appreciated that once small arms manufacture 
had been taken on by Government, there would be a continuing 
requirement for a long term financial commitment. Under the 
circumstances in which they found themselves, their hands forced 
by war, there was little choice but to take "in-house" control. 
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However, the Lovell period had helped shape Enfield, providing 
the factory with the necessary discipline which would be required 
in its future role as a major small arms producer, bringing it 
for the first time into unfettered competition with the private 
gun trade. Had George Lovell been alive to witness the scale of 
the new factory, he would no doubt have been justly proud. While 
the strictness of inspection he had imposed was probably too 
ambitious for the day, he had nevertheless broadened the debate 
on precision and standards. 
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arrival of the flint lock Baker rifle (Fig. 2) with its 
barrel containing seven rifled grooves. The technique of 
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greater stability in flighti making the weapon's 
performance superior to that of the earlier smooth-bore 
muskets.. Unfortunately the introduction of rifling to the 
inside of the previously smooth barrel of the 
muzzle-loader, made loading more difficult because of the 
grooves presenting resistance to the ball. In an effort 
to overcome the problem, for a time a small mallet was 
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two grooved Brunswick rifle (Fig. 3). The rifle fired a 
spherical lead ball with a raised belt around its middle, 
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improve the introduction of the ball into the barrel, a 
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assisted the belted area into the grooves. After trials 
at Woolwich the weapon was finally approved and a 
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TRANSATLANTIC DIFFERENCES AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE 
GUN STOCK UPON "ORDNANCE" MANAGING INNOVATION 
In the previous chapters it has been argued that the Government 
contract system of arms procurement, the withholding of gauges 
and patterns from the private gun trade and the strict inspection 
standards employed by "Ordnance" viewers under the watchful eye 
of George Lovell all contributed to the technological pause in 
the progress of Britain's military sector of the small arms 
industry. In other words it was the way "Ordnance",, a public 
sector establishment, did business which had determined the 
position, structure and development of the military sector of the 
private gun trade in the first half of the 19th century, 
effectively keeping it tied to a system of mainly labour 
intensive manufacture. 
However, in America, the government had adopted a different * 
approach to its British counterpart, encouraging and cooperating 
with entrepreneurs and others in the field of machine tool and 
interchangeable small arms technology. The economic and political 
reasons accounting for these differences which have been advanced 
by leading commentators have been examined in Chapter Four. 
While some of the reasons highlighted above have helped to - 
explain why there was a technological pause in light engineering 
development in Britain, we have not fully explored the question: 
had the conditions been favourable, were there engineers and 
entrepreneurs capable of taking the technology forward? As one 
of the most labour intensive components of the small arm is the 
manufacture of the gun stock, our attention will be turned 
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towards the diffusion of available technology in Britain with 
particular reference to this part. 
Early expertise in Britain 
The protection of the expanding world markets was paramount in 
sustaining the growing British economy. In a military sense, this 
was primarily achieved by strengthening naval power. In 1796 the 
British Government appointed Brigadier General Sir Samuel Bentham 
to the post of Inspector General of Naval Works. Bentham had 
started his working life as apprentice to the Master Shipwright 
at Woolwich Dockyard, clearly a good grounding for the task 
ahead. Whilst re-organising the Royal Navy dockyards at 
Portsmouth, Bentham was approached by Marc Isambard Brunel with a 
plan to manufacture ship's pulley blocks by a sequence of 
machines. This revolutionary concept was successfully recommended 
to the Admiralty by Bentham who had Henry Maudslay, the gifted 
London engineer, build the machines. Maudslay constructed the 
machines entirely of metal, at the time a considerable 
technological leap forward. Many earlier examples had been 
constructed with wooden frames. By 1805 the Portsmouth 
block-making machinery was operational and by 1808 the output had 
reached 130,000 pulley blocks per year. What is perhaps more 
remarkable about Maudslay's machines is that they could be 
altered to accommodate the production of blocks of different 
shapes and sizes, accounting for over 200 types. This exemplar 
clearly demonstrates that full-scale mass production with uniform 
machine made parts was in operation in Britain at the start of 
the century. It is believed this represents the earliest 
documented example of machine tools being used in a sequenced 
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factory operation. . 1. 
Early evidence of creative thinking in Britain with regard to 
techniques of mechanisation and mass production can be seen in 
the work of the 18th century engineer and prolific inventor, 
Joseph Bramah. John Farley, a writer and engineer who knew 
Bramah, has recorded for us a description of Bramah's lock 
making workshops from the position of an 18th century observer. 
Although written after Maudslay's death in 1831, it clearly 
demonstrates an early preoccupation with solving the 
manufacturing problems of making a product with standardised 
parts :- 
The secret workshops ... contained several curious machines, for forming parts of locks, with a systematic perfection of 
workmanship which was at the time unknown in similar 
mechanical arts. The machines had been constructed by the late 
Mr Maudslay with his own hands, whilst he was Mr Bramah's 
chief workman ... Mr Bramah attributed the success of his locks to the use of these machines, the invention of which had cost 
him more study than that of the locks. . 2. 
Bramah had also worked on solving the problems of the labour 
intensive and costly nature of the manufacture of gun stocks. In 
1802, Bramah registered patent No. 2652, "Machinery for Forming 
Gun Stocks, etc". Arms historian Howard Blackmore appears 
somewhat dismissive of Bramah's invention, mainly on the grounds 
that he "did not specify that the machines were for that 
particular purpose". It could be that Blackmore was sceptical of 
Bramah's submission, as he had not included a drawing with his 
patent. . 3. However, at the time it was not obligatory to submit 
a drawing with a patent. In fact it is still not a requirement 
today. In the early part of the 19th century the cost of patent 
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registration in England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales was 
E310.17s. This would equate to something in the order of E8,000 
at today's prices. The procedure for registration was tiresome, 
involving eight major stages, several minor ones and countless 
officials, taking about six weeks if followed diligently. This 
was just to obtain the patent; the specification came later. It 
was normal for an inventor to employ an agent to pilot him 
through these stages and of course this would have increased the 
costs. Therefore, it would seem unlikely that such an experienced 
engineer as Bramah, or any other serious inventor for that 
matter, would have wished to incur such excessive costs purely on 
a whim without being reasonably confident that their work would 
reach a successful commercial conclusion. . 4. It isýalso possible 
that Bramah had taken out his patent in anticipation of receiving 
an order for this type of machinery. This would not seem an 
unreasonable assumption to consider, as we have learned from 
Goodman that of the 7,300 workmen in the Birmingham gun trade, 
there were approximately 2,000 employed in making gun stocks 
manually. . 5. 
The nine pages of Bramah's patent provide a relatively detailed 
description of how he views his invention playing a somewhat 
revolutionary role, particularly with regard to improving 
efficiency and productivity within the British manufacturing 
industry. Bramah recognizes the strength of building on, 
enhancing and adapting tried and tested methods rather than 
I 
starting with completely untried ideas. This approach 
demonstrates that Bramah was cost conscious, while illustrating 
the mark of a good and experienced engineer, who appreciated the 
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economic benefits to be gained in time and expense from the 
techniques of continuous development and updating. The following 
extract from patent No. 2652 allows the reader an understanding 
of Bramah's thinking: - 
I do not rest the merits of this my said Invention on any 
novelty in the general principle of the machinery I employt 
because the public benefit I propose will rather depend on new 
effects produced by new application of principles already 
known, and machinery already in use for other purposes, in 
various branches of British manufacture. This machinery, and 
the new construction together with sundry tools and apendages 
(sic] never in use before are particularly described and 
explained hereunder. . 6. 
Henry Maudslay had gone to work for Bramah in 1789, some years 
before setting up on his own account. It is known that Bramah had 
initially employed Maudslay for his skill and expertise to solve 
problems of repeatable accuracy with the mass market locks he was 
manufacturing. It is therefore likely that certain-ideas were 
exchanged between the two men as they discussed the technical 
problems of production. If so, this might give added credibility 
to Bramah's gun stock manufacturing concepts and perhaps, in turn 
Maudslay had been influenced by this association when he came to 
build the ýortsmouth block-making machines. . 7. 
From the early evidence and dates of American machine tool 
inventors like Blanchard, Hall and Whitney, it would appear that 
by the start of the 19th century British manufacturers and 
engineers had an established technical and physical lead over 
their American counterparts in mass production techniques. 
However, the period to the middle of the century saw relatively 
little expansion of this new technology in Britain. This was 
particularly true of the lock and stock making'branches of the 
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small arms industry. Apart from a few individual examples, there 
was no immediate rush by industry at large to apply the 
techniques developed by Bramah, Brunel and Maudslay in a blanket 
fashion. It was the American manufacturers and engineers who 
perfected, developed and exploited the technology of mass 
production with uniform parts, which was strenuously applied to 
the manufacture of small arms. Later this method of production 
became known as "the American system of manufactures". The 
products the system produced and the techniques employed seemed 
to create an air of scepticism and disbelief among many craftsmen 
in Britain.. 
By the time of the Great Exhibition of 1851, housed within the 
specially constructed Crystal Palace in London's Hyde Park, there 
was ample physical evidence to support the achievements of 
American manufacturers in their determined pursuit of uniformity 
and interchangeability. Exhibits of Hobb's lockst Colt's 
repeating pistols and the rifles of Robbins and Lawrence, which 
had probably been selected by these companies before being sent 
for display, would nevertheless seem to reflect the transatlantic 
engineering progress and the devotion to standardisation. . 8. 
Interestingly, as it will be seen later, there is evidence to 
suggest that American manufacturers had only just begun to 
exploit the advantages of interchangeability through the use of 
newly developed machine tools, particularly with regard to small 
arms. However, David Hounshell and others have shown that by the 
second decade of the century, American clock makers, Eli Terry in 
particular, were mass producing two and a half thousand wooden 
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clocks per year in four styles, by using machinery and only 
thirty workmen. . 9. In spite of this early mass production 
breakthrough, Hounshell has readily accepted that the component 
parts of these clocks were not interchangeable. He concludes, 
"Terry's objective was not to revolutionize industrial techniques 
[but] ... simply to produce clocks in quantity cheaply". . 10. It 
-will therefore be appreciated that engineers had to solve many 
difficult problems to take early 19th century machine technology 
from a system of non-interchangeable mass production using wood, 
to a precision system of interchangeable manufacture using metal 
by the middle of the century. However, many respected 
commentators of the period have allowed the notion to grow, 
perhaps inadvertently, that American manufacturers had embraced 
interchangeable precision machine intensive production much 
earlier in the century, using it across a broad range of 
products, and were therefore less reliant on manual labour. 
British reluctance to chanqe 
In Britain, for reasons already debated, the transition to 
interchangeability in weapon production was exceedingly slow. 
Much of the resistance to change had come from gunsmiths and part 
manufacturers, rather than from the engineers and designers-of 
machinery. Even as late as 1854, Joseph Brazier the famous 
Birmingham gun lock maker was not convinced of the success of 
machine made parts. When giving evidence before the Select 
Committee on Small Arms in that year he was asked in connection 
with Colt's repeating pistol "What is your opinion of the 
statement, that the different parts might be thrown together into 
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a basket, and taken out indiscriminately and fitted together"? He 
replied,, "I do not believe a word of it". . 11. 
Brazier's attitude might be explained in general by the tension 
which had been created by the Board of ordnance with their strict 
standards of inspection, and in particular by the failure of the 
Government tendering system to provide stable long term contracts 
for the gun trade. These factors had severely damaged the 
industry's confidence, resulting in lack of investment in capital 
equipment. Therefore, it would be surprising if many of the 
craftsmen grouped in small workshops and filing to gauge would 
have had the opportunity to gain first hand experience of the 
latest achievable accuracies of the new machine tools. Also, 
given the craft based nature of the gun trade, it would seem 
unreasonable to expect gunsmiths or skilled artisans to 
accept immediately the proposition that high levels of precision 
could be achieved without the use of a file. As the weight of 
physical evidence increased, through the publicised achievements 
of American and other machine tools, it would have been 
surprising if the traditional British craftsman, who had 
jealously protected the manual skills which had been handed down 
to him over the centuries, had not resisted change. The 
introduction of increasing amounts of machinery would most likely 
have been viewed as a threat. After all, many craftsmen would 
have already been aware, perhaps through rumours, of radical 
changes to working conditions when Colt's Pimlico factory opened 
in January 1853. Here the use of machinery in pistol manufacture 
had introduced unskilled workmen to the production of the weapon; 
the machines taking on the work formerly carried out by 
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craftsman. This would no doubt have been viewed as a direct 
attack'upon future livelihoods within the gun trade. 
To illustrate the level of British understanding in areas of 
standardised manufacture Nathan-Rosenberg has pointed out that 
Paxton's designs for the Crystal Palace structure in the Great 
Exhibition of 1851 had been based on producing prefabricated 
parts for glazing, gutteringr flooring and general support, 
thereby heavily capitalising upon the principals of uniformity 
(Figs. 12 & 13). This illustrates that knowledge of standardized 
parts had gained acceptance in the British building industry 
after the pioneering work in mechanical engineering by Bramah and 
others but not, seemingly, in the gun trade. As early as 1812, 
within the heavy engineering sector, Henry Maudslay's company was 
prepared "to furnish (upon reasonable terms) the most approved 
and complete'Steam Engines,, & when to send abroad provided with 
all necessary duplicates &c. of the wearing parts to ensure their 
perfect success in countries where mechanical assistance cannot 
easily be procured". . 12. Here it can be seen that the principles 
and advantages of standardisation had been known and practised in 
Britain for at least forty years, although in a different branch 
of engineering from the gun trade. However, if the manufacture of 
Bramah's mass produced locks are taken into account the period 
extends backward into the eighteenth century. This, therefore, 
supports earlier findings, where it has been shown that powerful 
political forces were holding back the development of the 
technology in other areas of manufacture, notably that of 
military small arms. Nevertheless, it will be appreciated that 
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the tolerances worked to for Paxton's building components can not 
be compared with the precision required for small arms 
production and of course standardised parts are not necessarily 
the same as parts that will readily interchange, the latter being 
the goal to which many engineers had worked and were working. 
The American path to standardisation 
In America, military weapon manufacturers did not suffer the same 
inhibiting conditions as their British counterparts. From early 
in the 19th century the National Armouries of Springfield and 
Harpers Ferry were able to take advantage of a government arms 
policy which was sympathetic to technological progress; in fact 
innovation was positively encouraged. Rather than rely on a 
private contract system which discouraged investment as had 
British "Ordnance",, the American Government had realized that to 
achieve significant improvements in arms production their support 
of certain enterprising inventors was crucial to progress. For 
example, Thomas Blanchard acted as an "inside contractor" at the 
Springfield Armoury between 1823 to 1827, completing much of the 
later development work on his sequence of gun stock forming 
machines. Roswell Lee, the superintendent at Springfield, when 
explaining his reasons for having Blanchard on site, suggested 
that the exercise would "test the utility of the plan, & 
ascertain what can be saved by this improvement". Lee quite 
justifiably concluded the "principal object, is to bring the 
Machinery to the most perfect State". . 13. Merritt Roe Smith, 
when discussing this particular initiative, astutely states 
"Since a private contractor could hardly be expected to 
underwrite such an expensive experiment, the superintendent 
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through the United States had to shoulder the burden and, in a 
sense, subsidize Blanchard's project". . 14. Roe Smith's 
observations, and further examples like the inventor John H Hall, 
being granted a "special contract" at Harpers Ferry to develop 
standardized and precision methods of production for his early 
breech loading rifle, can be viewed as some of the most 
significant differences between the American and the British 
Government's approach towards the development of mass produced 
small arms and interchangeable manufacture. . 15. A later example 
of this type of cooperation between the American Government and 
the private. sector ironically benefited British "Ordnance" when 
the Commission to America placed orders for machine tools with 
the Ames company in 1854 to equip the Enfield factory. The 
strength of cooperation between the State and the private sector 
can be seen and is graphically illustrated in the example of Mr 
Ames, who would not sign the British contract unless he acquired 
the services of Cyrus Buckland, Engineer to the United States 
Armoury at Springfield. Permission was quickly granted to 
temporarily release Buckland and the contract proceeded. . 16. 
While the American national Armouries were pursuing-a policy 
towards uniformity and functionality in their weapon design, 
George Lovell under the British Board of ordnance, whilst setting 
strict viewing standards-for mechanical tolerance, had also 
directed his inspectors to examine the degree of finish on all- 
weapons and parts. . 17. While measuring mechanical tolerances 
against the pattern and checking with gauges was a reasonably 
accurate and scientific exercise, the viewer's assessment of 
145 
standards of finish could only be a subjective judgement. From 
the many examples of the gun trade's rejected work as discussed 
previously, it would seem reasonable to conclude that "Ordnance" 
viewers were not only checking to gauge, but were making 
subjective judgements based on their own perceptions of pleasing 
aesthetic features. These refinements were in all probability a 
hang-over from the standards expected within the expensive 
sporting gun business. It will be recalled that much of the 
evidence given before the Select Committee of 1854 had 
demonstrated that niceties of finish were quite unnecessaryll 
particularly when considering the treatment of the weapon under 
battlefield conditions. Spending extra time on a weapon or part 
during the manufacturing process to remove tool marks and other 
aesthetic aberrations by polishing and delicate filing would not 
have been conducive to "Ordnance" obtaining arms at the lowest 
possible price. The British gun trade was suffering from a whole 
raft of difficulties imposed by "Ordnance", which through its 
actions had. postponed manufacturing modernity. It might be 
pertinent to ask how American engineers had obtained, developed, 
and implemented the ideas which gave them the lead in machine 
intensive small arms manufacture. 
Technology diffusion 
To maintain the continuity of the debate a brief look at the 
methods of technology diffusion and transfer is taken here. The 
subject of diffusion and transfer is taken up again at the end 
of this thesis, drawing together our investigations of the more 
subtle ways in which technical know-how was obtained and 
exchanged. 
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Like many investigations there are not always clear cut answers 
to questions. The reasons why a certain set of circumstances 
evolved or prevailed are often multifarious and complex. This is 
certainly true in the case of technology transfer and diffusion. 
How American engineers and entrepreneurs obtained the technology 
in the first place is probably best explained by the on-going 
process of the diffusion of skills, physical examples and 
ideas. The most likely channels for the communication of the 
emerging technology was through migrant craftsmen who had the 
opportunity to influence American engineers and industrialists. 
Charles H Fitch, (special agent on the Tenth Census, on the 
interchangeable system of manufacturing in the United States) 
asserted when discussing the American National Armouries in the 
early part of the century "the filers - skilled workmen - were 
then mostly foreigners". . 18. Fitch would have had a good 
understanding of immigrant influence within the United States as 
his report, published in 1882, acknowledges assistance from 
senior U. S. "Ordnancell officers and many of the household names 
in the machine tool and gun related industries. . 19. Other 
routes for diffusion were open through the mobility of agents 
and salesmen who offered a range of plant and products. The 
export and servicing of such commodities would have provided 
further opportunities. Entrepreneurs and engineers from America 
made business trips to Britain and it would be unlikely that 
they returned home without gaining some knowledge of new 
developments in their particular field. 
Haemorrhaging of British engineering and other technology had 
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been felt in the 18th century. The problems were thought so great 
that by the early 1780s legislation was introduced so that "no 
skilled artisan or manufacturer was legally free to leave Britain 
or Ireland and enter any foreign country outside the Crown's 
dominion for the purpose of carrying on his trade". . 20. 
However, this did not prevent the determined, as from 1783 to 
1812 some 100,000 persons left Ulster for the United States. In 
1811 HM Customs submitted reports on the emigration of Bristol 
glass workers and Lancashire cotton workers, while in 1812 they 
... relayed an anonymous letter about workers from the Birmingham 
arms manufacturers taking their tools with them to America". . 21. 
of course diffusion took place through less obvious routes such 
as demonstrations, lectures and technical publications by learned 
bodies. Other publications were readily available, such as the 
Edinburgh Encyclopaedia and Rees's Cyclopaedia. These works gave 
illustrated diagrams with detailed descriptions of machinery and 
its functions. 
Marc Isambard Brunel fled his native France to America where he 
worked as a civil engineer, eventually becoming Chief Engineer of 
New York. He left America in 1798 for England where he was able 
to get his block making machinery built by Henry Maudslay. It 
would be difficult not to imagine that Brunel had in some way 
acted as an international conduit for ideas. Brunel's association 
with Maudslay who had previously worked for Joseph Bramah is 
further evidence of the diffusion mechanism. In turn, the 
distinguished engineers, Richard Roberts, James Nasmyth and 
Joseph Whitworth had all been employed at one time by Maudslay. 
. 22. It will readily be seen from these examples that apart 
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from engineers travelling to different countries, the profession 
was somewhat incestuous. There are many such recorded examples 
of this type of skill transfer and diffusion at all levels of 
the trade on both sides of the Atlantic. This helps to explain 
why similar ideas and designs occurred in different parts of the 
world, apparently unconnected, the hidden relationship being 
that of the mobile craftsman, engineer and entrepreneur. 
American inventors and developers in the area of machinery were 
no different to their British or European counterparts who had 
either consciously or unconsciously taken the evolutionary 
approach to technological development. There is little 
supporting evidence in the field of technology to suggest that 
invention, solution finding and product development had come 
about through a single revolutionary approach to a particular 
problem. In most instances invention and problem solving had 
been tackled and refined by many people making a contribution, 
often over a period of years and, on occasions, approaching the 
task from a different stand-point. This view is supported by 
Fitch in his 1882 Census Report when he discusses the 
development of interchangeability. Here he refers to it as "a 
gradual process, extending over a considerable period of time. 
Sample guns, with parts to interchange had been made in France 
as early as 1717, ... " . 23. 
Clear evidence of diffusion can be observed from a cursory glance 
at the shape of a 17th century French musket lock plate and 
hammer. It will be seen that the style has carried on and was 
still being used extensively in middle 19th century small arms, 
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both in Britain and America (Figs. 14,15, and 16). Further 
evidence of the diffusion of ideas can be seen in machine tool 
design. If the main principle is examined of copying a pattern as 
demonstrated by the circa 1822 Blanchard lathe for turning gun 
stocks (Fig. 17). there is a striking resemblance to the 
technology and principles employed in the "machine for making 
dead eyes" (Fig. 18) invented by Marc Brunel, as well as other 
machines used in the production sequence at the Portsmouth block 
making factory in 1805. However, David Hounshell dismisses the 
idea that Blanchard could have been influenced by Brunel when he 
wrote "Although Blanchard clearly did not draw inspirat-ion from 
Brunnel's (sic) machinery for his fundamental gunstock-turning 
lathe (because the blocks were not irregularly shaped), it is 
entirely possible that he used Brunel's ideas for mortising and 
recessing". . 24. That somehow tracing a pattern, which Hounshell 
did not believe to be "irregularly shaped", negated Blanchard's 
ability to have derived his inspiration for Brunel's copying 
principle seems a curious conclusion for him to have reached. For 
example, the groove cut in a wooden block by Brunel's dead eye. 
machine is in fact irregular. However, this is not the issue to 
be considered when evaluating the principle of Blanchard's 
machinery. It is the concept of tracing and following a pattern 
which is the crucial factor. 
Apart from the machinery under discussion, there was ample 
opportdnity for Blanchard to have been inspired and to exploit 
the many ideas of copying which were around at the time. In 1799, 
when living in America, Marc Brunel had obtained a patent for a 
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"Machine for writing with two pens", based on the pantograph 
principle. Some months later, after arriving in England, a 
British patent for a machine was granted "for making three or 
more similar writings or drawings at the same time by the same 
person". Brunel arranged for the machine to be manufactured by 
John H Farthing in London and a number were exported to America 
in 1801. The machine was advertised by Pierre Martin Stollenwerk 
and Nephew of New Yorkr with the offer to instruct purchasers in 
its use. . 25. With this and other copying machines and ideas 
freely circulating on both sides of the Atlantic, it would seem 
unreasonable to assume that an engineer of Blanchard's calibre 
would not have had his curiosity raised sufficiently to 
investigate the principle. 
Although in his text Hounshe'll refers to Rees's Cyclopaedia, he 
has probably failed to notice the significapce of the machine for 
making dead eyes. These devices, although produced on the Brunel 
Maucislay machines at Portsmouth were not mechanically the same as 
the ship's pulley block and performed a different function. Used 
in pairs, the dead eyes formed part of a system which provided 
anchor points for the shrouds, giving support and stability to 
the ship's masts. Examining the dead eye reveals a groove cut 
around the circumference of a formed wooden block. The shape 
produced can be likened to a thickish plate with a bump on one 
edge, making it irregular* Brunel's dead eye machine worked 
on the copying principle by tracing a pattern. Referring to the 
diagram in Rees's Cyclopaedia the crucial part of the machine's 
action is described thus: - 
The depth. to which it is permitted to cut is determined by 
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roller, d, situated at the end of a rod which is fitted on the 
axis, S, of the frame, R S, and attached firmly to the frame 
by arch, V; in which is a groove to receive a clamp screw, 
which gives the means of fastening it at any pointr and the 
roller then becomes a part of the moving frame R S. The roller 
applies itself to a pattern, on a shape-wheel, W, fixed on the 
spindle, and turning with it. Its figure is circular, except a 
projecting knob on one side, w. as shown by the dotted lines in [fig. 18. ] ... The screw r, at the end of the slider, 
regulates the position of the roller which applies to the 
shape N, and thus adapts to the thickness of the dead eye. The 
operation of this adjustment will be understood by referring 
to the operation of the shaping machine. The shape, N, is 
readily changed, to make different sizes, by introducing 
others of a different curvature ... . 26. 
From the information relating to Bramah's patent (mentioned 
above) and from the physical and descriptive evidence of Brunel's 
block making machinery (which the writer has examined), it is 
clear that both the technology and ingenuity was available at 
the beginning of the 19th century in Britain to manufacture gun 
stocks by machinery. What was lacking was the motivation to do 
Soo 
Hounshell, in dismissing the possibility of Brunel's influence on 
Blanchard, has drawn on information from the Portsmouth block 
making articles of Carolyn C Cooper and the late KR Gilbert. 
While both articles give an excellent account of the Portsmouth 
block making machinery, neither illustrates or describes the 
machine for making dead eyes. Gilbert lists the two models of 
machine employed (small and large dead eye machine) but nothing 
more. While it can not be conclusively proved that Blanchard took 
his ideas directly from Brunel, it would be difficult to imagine 
that he was unaware of the technology employed in his machinery. 
At the time, there was a sufficiency of published information 
describing in detail the Portsmouth machinery. . 27. 
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Was American industry fully mechanised bV the 1850s? 
An examination of the American Government's 1882 Census Report on 
Fire Arms by Charles Fitch will show that Blanchard had built a 
gun-stocking machine using the copying principle for the 
Springfield armoury in 1822 (Fig. 17), based on his 1818 
prototype. This machine was only for the rough turning of gun 
-stocks. It was not until 1827, after a period of development, 
that a much more sophisticated system of sixteen sequenced 
machines evolved, some twenty two years after a similar process 
had been installed at the naval dockyard at Portsmouth. Fitch 
lists the operations of the individual Blanchard "stocking and 
turning machinery" as follows: - 
sawing off stock, facing stock and sawing lengthwise, turning. 
stock, boring for barrel, turning barrel, milling bed for 
barrel breech and pin, cutting bed for tang of breech-plate, 
boring holes for breech-plate screws, gauging for barrel, 
cutting for tang of breech-pin, forming concave for upper 
band, dressing stock for and between bands, forming bed for 
lock plate, forming bed for interior of lock, boring side and 
tang-pin holes, and turning fluted oval on breech. . 28. 
It will be noted from the sixteen operations listed by Fitch 
above that the last one is in fact a metal-working rather than a 
wood-working procedure. 
According to the Fitch Census, it would seem that American small 
arms manufacturers were not as highly mechanised as is commonly 
thought until the 1850s. It may be worth pointing out that the 
levels of interchangeability achieved in America, while coupled 
with machine tool production, must not be seen as linked to a 
rapid implementation of mechanisation throughout that country 
generally. The private armouries, like those in Britain, had not 
in general invested in large quantities of capital equipment. 
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Fitch goes on to explain: - 
Apart from all consideration of the earliest usage of specific 
machines, it must be said that their introduction did not make 
itself felt as a great industrial agency until within 
twenty-five years past, in instance which it may be stated 
that in 1839 there were at the Springfield armoury about six 
men to one machine, and the ratio at other works seems to have 
been equally large; for of the private armouries most reputed 
for early improvements one is stated at the time to have but a 
single milling machine, and that a rude one; and at another 
armoury a single gang-saw profiling-machine was the principal 
stocking machine in use. It was some fifteen years later 
before the manufacture of milling, edging, and other important 
gun machinery was conducted on a scale sufficiently extensive 
for the general outfitting of large armouries. . 29. 
If Fitch is correct in his report of 1882, when he makes the 
observation that machinery did n8t have a strong impact upon 
industry "within twenty-five years past"i this might help to 
explain why Britain had to provide the American armies of the 
North and South with large quantities of arms during the Civil 
War of 1861 - 1865. Of course another possibility could have been 
that it takes time for any manufacturing facility to organise an 
increase in production capacity. The only way to satisfy demand 
rapidly is to obtain product "off the shelf" from elsewhere. In 
the period 1861 to 1864 the private gun trade of Birmingham and 
London alone supplied over one million weapons to America. The 
conflict appears to have galvanized the American arms 
manufacturers into overdrive as, according to Goodman, one 
reliable observer writing in August 1865 suggested that 
Springfield had doubled its output over the last two years of the 
War to 1000 muskets per day. It was also suggested that by the 
end of the War the private factories were capable of matching 
Springfield's production output, the combined capability being 
60,000 rifles per month. . 30. 
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While it is accepted that the "Committee on the Machinery of the 
United*States of America" visited a number of diverse 
manufacturing sites in 1854 and viewed a reasonable amount of 
machinery in operation, it must be remembered that their visits 
were specifically targeted at factories so equipped, as they 
particularly wished to observe mechanised production methods. 
From their report it is not possible to learn what proportion of 
American industry had invested in large scale mechanised 
. production. 
Like Joseph Whitworth before them, the Committee were most 
impressed with the level of mechanisation in the production of 
gun stocks observed at the Springfield armoury, a system not in 
use in Britain at the time. The picture painted in the minds of 
later historians and others, particularly regarding the novelty 
of the mechanised Springfield system of gun stock shaping, would 
seem to have been influenced by the reports of Whitworth and the 
Committee on the Machinery of America. This has probably created 
the false perception that United States industry was generally 
far more mechanised by the middle of the century than it really 
was. The excitement communicated by those who viewed such novel 
machines appears to have induced powerful and lasting images. A 
systematic processing of a product through a sequence of machines 
would have been relatively easy to comprehend even for the 
inexperienced observer. The visitor to the factory would have 
witnessed the product developing through its various stages from 
a roughly shaped block of wood to an easily recognisable gun 
stock. This is perhaps why this particular example of mass 
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production has received so much publicity, not only in the 
nineteenth century but also from later twentieth century 
researchers of the subject. It is not too difficult to imagine 
why people may have accepted the notion that American 
manufacturers were highly mechanised, mainly because of the 
glowing reports of the gun stock machinery in operation. Evidence 
suggests that, by the middle of the century, this machinery had 
mainly been installed at the government armouries of Harpers 
Ferry and Springfield, where it had been developed and perfected. 
Also by the 1850s, and no doubt encouraged by their close 
relationship with the U. S. Government, contractors like Ames, 
Robbins & Lawrence, Sharp and Colt had invested in mechanised 
manufacture. In contrast to their American counterparts, the 
British private gun trade did not have the luxury of a 
sympathetic government. Perhaps, if they had had such support, 
the industry would have been encouraged to developed mechanised 
methods of production much earlier. 
While the issue concerning the relatively restricted amount of 
mechanisation within the small arms industry of the United 
States seems to have been overlooked by many commentators, this 
does not detract from the fact that American engineers had 
embraced, developed and persevered with the technology of 
interchangeability, bringing it to an advanced state by the 
middle of the century. 
For the'firearms industry in America to have taken advantage of 
any cost benefit which might have been derived from 
interchangeability using mass production techniques would have 
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required large scale manufacturing plant capable of processing 
substantial orders of standard product. of course such plant 
would have required a major customer or customers providing the 
stability of continuing long-term orders. By the middle of the 
19th century, apart from the United States Governmentr these 
conditions were the exception rather than the rule in America. 
Taking the 1860 Census statistics, Harold Williamson has revealed 
that: - 
... there were some 239 establishments producing firearms which 
employed a total of 2,056 workers, on an average of less than 
nine per establishment. Only in the New England states 
and especially in Connecticut was there any trend towards 
large size concerns. In the latter state, nine producers 
employedaround 969 workers. Of this number some 369 worked 
in Colt's factory at Hartford and another 300 in the Sharps 
factory operated by Robbins & Lawrence in the same locality. 
But these two factories had only recently been established - 
Colt's in 1853 and Sharps, armory in 1854. . 31. 
S]preadinct the word 
Further support may have been given to the notion of a highly 
mec4anised American industry when John Anderson, in 1858, gave a 
paper to the Institute of Mechanical Engineers entitled "On Some 
Applications of the Copying or Transfer Principle in the 
Production of Wooden Articles". Anderson refers 
to his visit to America with the Commission in 1854 and 
comments: - 
... the writer was much struck with the many simple and ingenious contrivances there introduced, in order to apply the 
copying principle in connection with ordinary hand-lathe 
operations, where generally in this country more would be 
dependent upon the skill or attention of the turner or upon 
special machinery. For example, the production of articles 
where there is repetition and which are to be turned in a 
common lathe, the application of certain very simple additions 
tends greatly to facilitate the operation and to*enable the 
operator to dispense with the usual measuring and gauging and 
the use of callipers, which generally occupies so much time. - 
. 32. 
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Anderson also refers to the Blanchard copying lathe several times 
in his paper and devotes time to explain how "In the Small Arm 
Factory at Enfield the intricate piece of mechanism, the gun 
stock, is produced entirely by machinery". . 33. The respected 
British journal The Engineer, ran a series of articles in 1859 
describing the manufacturing processes carried out at the Royal 
Small Arm Factory at Enfield. Praise was given to the American 
machinery and the reader could be forgiven for thinking that the 
system was quite common in the United States. The following 
short description illustrates the point: - 
... the Government instituted inquiries which eventually 
led 
them to adopt a most beautiful arrangement of machinery 
perfectly adapted to the purpose in view. This arrangement is 
on the general system in use in the United States, and its 
present degree of perfection has been arrived at by the united 
and ingenious efforts of various mechanical engineers. . 34. 
The fame of the American system was also spread by the eminent 
British engineer and machinery manufacturer Thomas Greenwood. 
In 1862 he presented a paper "On Machinery for the Manufacture 
of Gunstocks" to the Institute of Mechanical Engineers. 
Replying to the Chairman's question, "where the original 
machines for the manufacture of gunstocks had been used, from 
which the machinery now described had been derived"? Greenwood 
replied, "the gunstock machinery was of American origin, and the 
American government had been occupied for the last twenty years 
in perfecting the manufacture of guns by machinery at the 
armouries of Springfield and Harper's Ferry". . 35. 
Lovell evaluates gun stock machinery 
George Lovell, for reasons not fully understood, is not forgiven 
by Howard Blackmore for his apparent reluctance to introduce 
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machinery for the manufacture of gun stocks into the Enfield 
factory. Blackmore points out that over the years Lovell was 
aware of a number of, inventions which may have assisted in the 
production of gun stocks but these were generally ignored. . 36. 
However, one such invention by the Portuguese Ignacio de Barros 
was examined by Lovell at Mauberge in France after the former's 
untimely death from cholera. 
In August 1849, the Secretary to the Board of Ordnance, R Byhaml 
received a letter from Mon. de Barros, stating that "This machine 
will produce by a Model any article required in*wood with great 
perfection and rapidity. It makes 6 gun stocks at one time and 
in perfectly uniform, and exactly according to the model, 
requiring for this purpose only the attendance of 2 men". While 
initially the description of the machine appears to be superior 
to Cyrus Buckland's improved Blanchard lathe (Fig. 19), reading 
further down the letter suggests that this is not the case when 
compared to the more comprehensive process in operation at the 
Springfield National Armoury in the early 1850s. According to the 
inventor "A workman in France,, taking a stock made by the machine 
will fix the barrel and lock and finish again completely in 3.5 
hours. By the old system of making the stock by hand, the same 
operation will take 12 hours". . 37. 
When the Committee on the Machinery of America visited 
Springfield in 1854 they reported, "the time required to pass a 
gun-stock through the sixteen different machines varies from 
twenty minutes to half-an-hour". Admittedly this did not take 
into account any allowances in down-time for tool sharpening or 
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machine adjustment during a typical ten hour day. It was also 
reported that it took a single workman a further 3.5 minutes to 
assemble the complete rifle. Research would suggest that to 
achieve this rate of assembly the lock would need to be supplied 
as a sub-assembly, rather than in its separate component parts. 
. 38. However, Carolyn Cooper has pointed out that these times did 
not take into account hand finishing, which with assembly 
amounted to 113.5 hours per stock in 184311 and "in 1854 was taking 
slightly less than 1.5 hours". 39. It is not absolutely clear 
from the correspondence if the 3.5 hours quoted by de Barros 
included hand finishing. Even if hand finishing was included 
within the production timescale, and accepting that the 
completion of the gun stock was a marked improvement upon manual 
methods, it is clear from the performance of the machiner as 
reported by Lovell, that it had not been fully developed. 
A further letter, dated 8/8/1849, to the Board of Ordnance from 
de Barros's agent in Britain, BP Pargana, discusses two sample 
gun stocks made by the machine. The agent freely admitted that 
the furniture (the metal parts fitted to the stock) had been 
"executed by hand". What is most interesting and revealing about 
this letter is that George Lovell had written on the back 
(8/8/1949), making the point thatt although he has examined. one 
of the gun stocks, he is unable to form an opinion of the machine 
without seeing it at work. Lovell's writing allows the reader an 
insight into. his thoughts, showing that he is not opposed to the 
introduction of wood-working machines as Blackmore has implied. 
In fact, it is clearly demonstrated that he has a first rate 
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understanding of the benefits to be obtained from such machinery 
when he further commented: - 
I have no doubt however from my own experiments and 
observations that a large portion of the woodworking of 
musquets may be more uniformly shaped by machinery and at very 
greatly less cost than by hand - and if the Honourable Board 
should think fit to pursue an enquiry of this nature I would 
request their authority to proceed to Paris to examine Mr 
Barros's invention - when I shall be able to report in detail 
upon its capabilities. . 40. 
In Lovell's report of 2nd October, he describes his examination 
of the de Barros machine which he observed working at the 
establishment of Dandoy, Milliard Lucy & Co. Coincidentallyr like 
the earlier devices which used the copying principle, the machine 
used a cast. iron model of a French gun stock as the pattern. 
Highlighting the point that the channel for the rammer had to be 
bored by hand and the lock furniture had to be let in, Lovell 
observed, "no part. of such work being provided for by the machine 
which in fact is only capable of roughing out". Illustrating his 
considerable understanding of the subject Lovell went on to sayr 
"a machine or set of machines for making musquet stocks must go 
much further and finish more completely than these". He then 
identified other major problems with the machinery: - 
The uniformity which is so much valued in machine made work is 
not secured because the cutters with the speed they work at 
must soon be altered in form by sharpening; and the models by 
friction - that sharpening of tools and replacing of models 
can only be done by workmen on high wages: - The circular saws 
between themselves and with reference to the floating guides 
must all be kept at exactly [Lovell's underlining) the same 
diameter after they have been re-fitted or no uniformity of 
shape will be maintained in the stocks... . 41. 
Gun stock forming machinery was never introduced into the Enfield 
factory until the machinery arrived from America in the mid 
1850s. Lovell during his time as Inspector of Small Arms had not 
found any suitable stocking machinery and, as explained earlier, 
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"Ordnance" were not placing large orders for new arms in the 
1840s. Furthermore, the maximum annual output of Enfield at the 
time was only a few thousand weapons. . 42. Thereforer it will be 
appreciated that the capital expenditure to install such a system 
would not have been justified. Apart from the cost of the 
machines, there would have been extra expenditure on buildings 
and a power source. Of course it must not be forgotten that 
Enfield remained a minor producer of small arms until the Crimean 
War, when the conflict effectively released the private gun 
trade's grip on military weapon manufacture, allowing "Ordnance" 
to go into direct competition against them, eventually becoming a 
major producer of small arms. Up until then, the vast majority of 
arms production was still in the hands of the private gun makers 
who grudgingly served the contract system operated by "Ordnance". 
Even if Lovell had been successful in finding machinery which was 
efficient and cost effective, under the politically sensitive 
conditions created by the private sector it would have been 
extremely difficult for "Ordnance" to have installed new plant 
for stocking without causing a major outcry. 
Mana ement of a scarce resource 
one of the major drawbacks to the continuous production of arms 
in Britain was the supply of fully seasoned walnut gun stock 
blanks. The seasoning process was lengthy and could take up to 
three years to complete (some estimates have suggested as much as 
five) .' 
In February 1848 Lovell wrote a report after visiting Davis & 
Symington's in London, where he examined the process of 
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"desiccation of wood and other substances by the application of 
currents of heated air". Lovell reported that the process 
consisted of having a ventilated room 241xl8I and 15' to the 
roof, formed with double walls and doors to "prevent warmth 
escaping laterally". The floor was constructed of York paving on 
a bed of concrete. Placed in one corner of the room was a stove 
furnace which had a 261 chimney. Basically the system consisted 
of a fan located in an external wall which was driven by a strap 
from a drum in an adjoining building. Air was drawn in by the 
fan and fed through an iron pipe which passed in a series of 
loops within the furnace. The furnace heated the air which'was 
then fed to ducts in the floor from which it escaped upward 
through perforated iron plates. Wood for drying was placed on 
racks within the chamber and by the action of convection the 
warm air rose around it carrying the expelled moisture through 
ventilators in the building's roof (Fig's. 20 and 21). 
Lovell, in testing the system, took thirty gun stocks that were 
partly seasoned (fifteen months in store) and thirty that were 
"quite fresh cut and full of sap". These were carefully weighed 
and put in the drying room for ten days at a temperature of 110 
to 114 degrees Fahrenheit. From this experiment the following 
results were obtained and recorded: - 
Stocks. Weight before Process. After process. Weight loss. 
30 Half seasoned. 240lbs. 14.5ozs. 206lbs. 13ozs. 34lbs. 1.5ozs 
30 Fresh. 295lbs. 10-5ozs. 207lbs. 1.5ozs. 88lbs. 9ozs. 
The sixty stocks were then exposed to the air in the stock store 
and in the first seven days they had increased in weight by 2.5% 
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as they absorbed moisture from the atmosphere. Lovell commented, 
"as might be expected from the hygroscopic state of the wood". 
But over the next eighteen days the stocks had only increased by 
1.5%. Further experiments by Lovell found that by exposing for 
thirty days, six stocks dried naturally and six dried by "the 
process". the former increased in weight by 3.6% and the latter 
only 1.55%. Not allowing the experiment to rest therer Lovell 
took it to the next stage by dispatching the stocks to the trade 
without informing them that they had been hot air processed. In 
his report he gives the reasons for his action as follows: - 
With a view to collect the opinion of working men upon the 
state of the wood; I directed 15 of the desiccated stocks to 
be set up into musquets in London, 15 at Birmingham and 15 at 
the Royal Manufactory at Enfield. My own view of the subject 
is that by quickly inspissating the albumence and juices of 
the wood at the same time that humidity or mere water is 
driven off, the wood is rendered tougher than when dried more 
slowly in the natural way. ... but the experiments may have 
satisfied me that the process offers by far the best means of 
seasoning wood quickly that has yet come under my observation; 
and I think that it may be adopted with every prospect of 
advantage to the Services: more especially at the present. 
moment when the demand for dry musquet stocks is so pressing. 
. 43. 
As a result of Lovell's successful experiments, a drying chamber 
was built at Enfield, the work being completed in September 1848. 
However, Lovell's recommendation to build the chamber was not 
immediately accepted by "Ordnance". It took several months of 
frustrating correspondence between Lovell, the Board. of Ordnance 
and Davis & Symington's (known as the Patent Desiccating Company) 
before agreement was reached on costs and royalty payments 
associated with the process. Specifications for the chamber were 
altered, the Inspector General of Fortifications expressed the 
view that the "... chamber should be isolated and not built 
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against end of water wheel house". The fan had to be increased in 
size to double as substitute bellows for the smith's forges, the 
power for this being taken by a belt connected to the water 
wheel, saving the cost of a steam engine. Costs increased from 
E630 to E710 as the end wall brickwork expanded to 18 inches. The 
estimated time to complete the work went from six to eight 
weeks. 
Towards the end of the correspondence, Lovell emerges as the 
clever politician, determined to get his way by bringing the 
matter to a head. After putting forward a range of options, the 
Patent Desiccating Company offered a compromise solution by 
dropping their demand for a substantial payment to use their 
process. The Company now proposed a package which included a 
corrugated roof for the chamber rather than an asphalted one. 
Lovell wrote to the Board on the 3rd April stating "I do not 
think that the sum now asked by the Company is unreasonable; and 
I would therefore take the liberty to. advise that their offer be 
accepted". A few days later Lovell was again writing to the 
Board and playing his "political" trump card: - 
I am under the necessity of suspending the issue of materials 
for setting up Extra Service Musquets at the Towerr in 
consequence of the store of seasoned gun stocks being entirely 
exhausted and that there are no more left at Birmingham than 
will meet the issues for about three weeks. . 44. 
Twisting the screw a little tighter, Lovell recommended to the 
Board that 15,000 stocks be sent to the Patent Desiccating 
Company for drying at E12.10s per thousand, total cost E187.10s. 
This quantity Lovell believed would be sufficient to bridge the 
gap until the erection of the chamber at Enfield. Pushing home 
his advantage Lovell made the point: - 
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I would beg the Bon Board's earliest decision upon this latter 
point; because it would be otherwise absolutely necessary to 
continue the seasoning by the Company to at least a number of 
60,000 more in the present financial year at an expense of not 
less than E750. The Board will perceive from this that the 
adoption of the proposition of the 3rd instant will prove less 
expensive even within the present year. . 45. 
From the correspondence it would seem fair to conclude that it 
was not the supply of gun stocks per se that presented the 
"bottle-neck" to arms production but the supply of seasoned 
stocks. It would have been difficult, if not impossible, for 
"Ordnance" to always accurately calculate their annual 
requirement of fully seasoned wood to meet every unforeseen 
contingency. The average natural curing time for a stock of 
approximately three years would have made the difficulty more 
acute. Therefore, the installation of the desiccating chamber at 
Enfield would have provided one of the most significant 
breakthroughs in the ability to mass produce small arms, by 
dramatically reducing material acquisition times for the gun 
stock. Of course having a reasonable quantity of seasoned stocks 
in store would also have allowed "Ordnance" greater flexibility 
in the planning process, making the annual calculations for arms 
less traumatic as one of the major "bottle-necks" would have been 
effectively removed. 
A gun stock incident related to supply problems 
At the time when negotiations for the desiccating chamber were 
taking place there were serious complaints from one of the major 
gun stock contractors, Pirlot & Simonis about the "misdirected 
zeal of the viewers". The incident which is about to be 
discussed had no doubt helped to create the shortage of gun 
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stocks alluded to above by Lovell. 
In an effort to resolve matters, M. Simonis came to England 
seeking redress and to investigate personally why problems had 
occurred with the first fourteen cargoes shipped from France 
between 1846 and 1847. Evidence suggests that, due to 
insufficient warehouse space, deliveries of stocks to the Tower 
were ordered by the Chief Clerk, Mr Poritts, to be placed in the 
moat. Here it was reported that many deteriorated and "others 
reduced wholly unserviceable". Clearly this was the fault of 
"Ordnance", not the contractor. There is also a revealing 
reference in the correspondence that there was a 11 ... great 
difference between the rejections at the Tower-and Enfield". This 
might suggest different storage arrangements between the two 
sites or the possibility that the viewing department at Enfield 
was applying a different or more lax inspection standard than the 
Tower. However, from the official report of the incident it is 
known that the Principal Viewer at the Tower, Charles Philcox, 
agreed to be slightly "... more liberal" with the view at the time 
of M. Siminos visit. . 46. 
By way of compensating the contractor, the matter was finally 
resolved, perhaps somewhat naively, by altering to a small extent 
the terms of future viewing by the introduction of an additional 
class of gun stock, "extra superior". For this, the contractor 
was paid a higher price. Unfortunately, some years later the 
episode was to lead to the severe criticism of George Lovell by 
the Master General of Ordnance, Lord Hardinge, perhaps a little 
unjustly, for over-stepping his authority. Lovell's son Francis, 
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who at the time was the Assistant Inspector of Small Arms and had 
the responsibility for dealing with the contractor, was removed 
from office. . 47. 
The events surrounding the shortage of seasoned gun stocks, which 
had no doubt been exacerbated by the poor storage facilities at 
the Tower, would appear to be directly related to the badgering 
of "Ordnance" by George Lovell to build the desiccating chamber 
at Enfield. It would seem more than coincidence that Lovell 
senior, in August 1847, while trying to resolve a number of 
problems with the contractor Pirlot & Simonis by relaxing the 
view, was at the time, almost certainly communicating w#h Davis 
& Symington. On the 23rd October 1847 results of a ten day 
experiment on behalf of the Board of Ordnance were published by 
Davis & Symington concerning the seasoning of gun stocks. As 
these experiments would have taken time to organise, the episode 
demonstrates the strong likelihood that Lovell was desperately 
trying to improve the supply of seasoned wood and was probably 
driven to examine every means possible to resolve the situation. 
Having the ability to season gun stocks fast would have almost 
eliminated the necessity to have wood standing outside and 
deteriorating, which in turn would have increased the amount of 
material passing the view. These would have been considerable 
goals to achieve in the production of small arms by any 
standard. 
Scarce'natural resources provoke differing technologies 
The available evidence suggests that Enfield, certainly as early 
as 1848, was the only armoury of note employing a desiccating 
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chamber on site. When corresponding with Carolyn C Cooper, 
acknowledged for her research in the area of 19th century 
mass production machinery and processes relating to wood, she 
commented "from your description ofthe kilns at Enfield; sounds 
as if they were more "modern" than Springfield". However, in 
spite of the considerable work by American historians on the 
Springfield armoury, no evidence has yet emerged to suggest that 
any form of kiln drying or steam curing was carried out on the 
premises. . 48. Perhaps the availability of a plentiful supply 
of home grown timber in America caused the authorities to 
believe artificial drying unnecessary. While it might be thought 
that climatic conditions in certain parts of the United States 
were better than Britain, this could not have been the reason 
for not employing a drying chamber as the natural'curing time 
for wood in both countries was similar. 
In Britain, before the middle of the century had been reached 
supplies of home grown walnut had become almost exhausted and 
imports were obtained from the Continent, the bulk coming from 
Italy. The different approaches adopted by British and American 
"Ordnance" to the assemblage of gun stocks would seem to support 
Rosenberg's argument that "In a highly resource-abundant 
environment such as the United States, it made excellent 
economic sense to trade off large doses of abundant raw material 
inputs for the scarcer factors of capital and labor". 49. Of 
course, there may have been other factors which had caused the 
American National Armouries not to employ desiccating chambers 
like Enfield. For example, the extra space required to store the 
quickly dried wood and the cost of fuel to run the drying 
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chamber may have been prohibitive. Evidence of Springfield's 
plentiful supply of suitable gun stock timber can be observed in 
the report of the 1854 British Commission to America when they 
wrote: - 
The stock of the American musket is made of black walnut, which 
grows in very large quantities in Pennsylvania, from which 
State it is procured by the persons who supply the United 
States' Armory with stocks in the rough. The United States' 
Government do not enter any contracts to obtain them, but 
whoever likes to bring a quantity to the armories can obtain 28 
cents each for them, provided they pass the Government viewer. 
. 50. 
This report provides a further clue to the different way in which 
the American National Armories procured wood for gun stocks than 
that of their British counterparts. The system of "whoever likes 
to bring a quantity to the armories" might suggest that the bulk 
of the material was held by the suppliers, allowing a flexible 
working float to be kept on site. This would have had the added 
advantage of keeping to a minimum costly warehouse space, while 
at the same time placing the risk upon the supplier for 
deterioration in store. In a way, this system of wood procurement 
might be likened to a rudimentary form of "just in time" (JIT) 
materials management. However, an article published in July 1852 
about Springfield provides contradictory information by 
suggesting that ".... an immense store of it [black walnut] is kept 
on hand at the Armory - sufficient in fact for four years' 
consumption". . 51. Therefore, it would appear that the Commission 
suggesting "whoever likes to bring a quantity to the armories" 
meant nothing more than the contractor routinely keeping walnut 
supplies topped up (presumably with green timber), as the armoury 
drew its normal production quantity of seasoned wood from store. 
170 
Invented elsewhere, developed in America? 
There seems little doubt that American engineers had evolved and 
developed what was to become known as "the American system of 
manufactures"#, leading to accurate standards of weapon 
interchangeability. To suggest however that they were the sole 
inventors of such a system cannot be supported by examining ihe 
available evidence, as the basic concepts and the technology was 
"borrowed" or diffused from Britain and Europe. Working through 
the Government procurement system, the American engineers had 
taken an idea, perfected it and made it their own. 
After the Great Exhibition of 1851, and because of the exhibits 
from the United States, there were many in Britain who believed 
that high levels of mechanisation were characteristic of Americah 
manufacturing industries in the early 19th century. However this 
image can not be sustained. Fitch was able to examine American 
industry from the closeness of the 1880s, where he observed that 
mass production techniques employing interchangeability had not 
become widespread until at least the middle of the century. 
Leadership in the technology of mass production had come mainly 
from the government armouries where the techniques had been 
pioneered and developed. Here Fitch has argued that it was only 
such establishments that were capable of large and assured 
demands which were the "... prime conditions of a uniform system". 
. 52. However, Fitch has reminded us that uniformity as recognized 
by the 1880s, was somewhat different from the perceived view in 
the early part of the century when he states: - 
If gun parts were then called uniform, it must be recollected 
that the present generation stands upon a plane of mechanical 
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intelligence so much higher, and with facilities for 
observation so much more extensive than existed in those 
times, that the very language of expression has changed. 
Uniformity in gun-work was then, as now, a comparative term; but then it meant within a thirty-second of an inch or more, 
where now it means within half a thousandth of an inch. . 53. 
This observation by Fitch gets to the heart of the debate 
carried on by historians in recent years over what really 
constitutes interchangeability. Uumerous articles have been 
written and scholars like Robert Gordon have provided a wealth 
of scientific evidence to show that hand finishing of musket 
parts persisted for much longer than originally thought. Many 
discussions regarding interchangeability centre around whether 
it is possible to detect file marks on a part, which would 
indicate that the machine tools of the day were not capable of 
bringing the component to a precise standard without having to 
resort to hand finishing. . 54. Providing the parts fit the gauge 
and interchange well and the output of the factory is not 
affected in either quantity or cost by hand finishing, then the 
niceties of the debate provide only an academic piece of 
detective work. Even today, any production manager worth their 
salt would try to recover parts by hand finishing had they not 
reach ed the required standard when coming off an automated 
process, providing of course the action was more cost effective 
than scrapping the material. One might contemplate situations 
where tight contract times were specified which included 
penalties for late delivery or, in the case of arms 
manufacturing, where production schedules had to be met in the 
event of war. 
While many people from the position of the late 20th century see 
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the development of British technology and other ideas by the 
American engineers and manufacturers as part of a long series of 
events, culminating in even greater losses to British engineering 
pride and expertise, there is a point of view which suggests that 
Britain was in fact exceedingly fortunate. To have someone else 
take on the costly risks of a major research and development 
programme (which is what the American Government armouries had 
effectively done) can often help divert scarce resources towards 
other much needed projects. While this approach may not have been 
deliberate on the part of the British Government, they had 
achieved considerable savings from the purchase of an America 
tailor made system to manufacture the Enfield pattern 1853 rifle, 
along with experts to install the machinery and to instruct the 
work-force. This episode had effectively given Britain a unique 
opportunity, as it had created a breathing space which not only 
allowed "Ordnance" to select the latest state of the art 
production system but also helped to focus attention on new ways 
of managing the scarce supply of walnut through the introduction 
of the desiccating plant. There was also a further advantage for 
"Ordnance". As the desiccating process did not rely on a system 
of machine tools it had not posed a threat to the livelihoods of 
the independent gun trade by taking away work. "Ordnance,, had 
increased its influence over the manufacture of small arms 
without apparently rocking the private sector's boat. 
The research and development role adopted by American engineers 
leading to the system of interchangeability had, in a way, 
allowed the British "Ordnance" to maintain a low profile and not 
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be seen as a major competitive threat to the private gun trade. 
As debated earlier, even the relatively modest role of the 
Enfield factory had caused Parliamentary pressure to be brought 
by the private gun trade thus keeping "Ordnance" production to a 
minimum until the influence was broken by the Crimean War. 
Although it can be said that the British Government had bought 
customized "off the peg" mass production machinery from America, 
developed at no financial cost to themselves, it could also be 
argued that allowing the technology to evolve in the United 
States had deprived the British engineering fraternity of 
hands-on experience. However, there is evidence to suggest that 
British machine tool-companies like Greenwood and Batley gained 
from this transaction, as they were able to improve, adapt and 
modify the American designs for other markets. So, in a way, the 
technology which had diffused from Britain to America at the 
beginning of the century returned in an improved state towards 
the middle and was destined to spread further afield through 
enhancement and modification. 
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APPRAISING THE EFFECTS OF THE CRIMEAN WAR, "ORDNANCE" FAILINGS, 
THE TRADE UNION AND PUBLICITY UPON THE ENFIELD FACTORY 
The mid 1850s represent one of the most critical periods in the 
history of British small arms manufacture, one in which 
apparently unconnected events have together shown remarkable 
catalytic effects. By focussing attention on this period we are 
able to identify not only the early changes to manufacturing 
technology and work-place organisation but also the difficulties 
experienced by a nationalized industry overseen by incompetent or 
inexperienced government bureaucrats. Perhaps surprisingly, 
parallels can be drawn between some of these 19th century events 
and those which have occurred in the small arms industry of today 
as the 21st century approaches. A recent example which occurred 
in the mid 1980s helps to illustrate the point. On this occasion, 
government bureaucracy interfered with the department responsible 
for the production of the Enfield SA 80 (Light Support Weapon) 
and caused confusion amongst the manufacturing staff. The action 
created a six week production delay, as government officials, who 
had not properly investigated an isolated complaint of premature 
weapon discharge, prompted design changes to the gun. . 1. 
confused picture 
Prior to the expansion of the "Ordnance" factory at Enfield in 
the mid 1850s, the establishment being the first British 
manufactory to adopt the technology and principles of mass 
production by the system of interchangeable parts, the vision of 
the English gun trade portrayed by research is one of an industry 
lacking direction and severely stricken by turmoil and confusion. 
As the middle of the century was reached, the-mounting pressure 
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from sections within "Ordnance" for control of the military small 
arms industry finally took hold, motivated in the main by the 
requirements of war. 
Following the Great Exhibition of 1851, the continuing debate 
between the private gun trade and the Board of Ordnance over 
weapon deliveries and quality standards was bqcoming more 
acrimonious, the arguments spilling over into the evidence given 
before the Select Committee on Small Arms in 1854. As we have 
already discussed, many engineers and entrepreneurs had visited 
the exhibition held within the Crystal Palace and marvelled at 
such American exhibits as the Sharpe's rifle manufactured by 
Robbins & Lawrence and the revolvers of Colonel Colt made with 
standardized parts. However, there were some established gun 
makers, like Mr W Scott of Birmingham, who would not entertain 
the idea that large quantities of machine made products could be 
accurately produced without the involvement of skilled artisans. 
When asked by the Select Committee if he thought it possible to 
produce parts by machines which could "fit into one another 
perfectly without a great deal of manual labour", he replied 
"Certainly not; by no means; it is impossible". . 2. 
Joseph Whitworth's fact finding tour of America in 1853, when he 
and George Wallis visited a number of diverse manufacturing 
establishments, and the subsequent visit by the Commission led by 
Colonel Burn in 1854, which placed substantial contracts for arms 
production machinery with American manufacturers, were all 
intertwined with "Ordnance" seeking ways to overcome the problems 
they were encountering with arms procurement. At the time the 
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British private gun trade were allegedly falling behind with 
military deliveries and failing the quality standards set by 
"Ordnance". 
The situation was further complicated by the introduction of the 
new pattern 1853 Enfield rifle to replace the existing service 
1851 Minie and as already argued, there was evidence of 
"Ordnance" withholding the the new pattern from which the 
contractors had to copy. Out of this chaotic state there was 
mounting pressure upon "Ordnance" to equip soldiers in the Crimea 
with decent serviceable weapons, not only rifles but also swords 
and bayonets. With the build up of hostilities between Russia and 
Turkey in 1853 and war between them eventually breaking out in 
October of that year, it was obvious that a major response would 
be required from small arms manufacturers. This came when Britain 
and France entered the conflict in March 1854 after declaring war 
upon Russia. . 3. 
UnpreRared for battle 
During what must be viewed as a critical period in the life of 
the British small arms industry, correspondence between military 
regiments and "Ordnance" for the years 1854 to 1855 exposes 
serious flaws in the "Ordnance" supply chain. These letters 
indicate quite graphically how fragile the position of Britain 
really was in arming her troops in time of war. It also 
illustrates that almost forty years after the establishment of 
the Government armoury at Enfield Lock in response to the 
parlous state of the indigenous military small arms industry at 
the time of the Napoleonic wars, -Britain was still un-prepared 
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for conflict. 
The position is clearly illustrated in a letter dated 14th July 
1854 from Lieutenant Colonel Griffith commanding Second Dragoons 
in Manchester to Joseph Wood the Secretary to the Board of 
ordnance, complaining, it would seem not unreasonably, about the 
poor state of his Regiment's weapons. Griffith wrote,, "The whole 
of the Carbines require to be replaced, most of them being worn 
out from long use. The Victoria Carbines have been mostly in use 
for 14 years being issued in 1640". Further complaints were made 
about the "unserviceable" state of the Regiment's swords. 
In March 1854 similar criticisms had been raised by the llth 
Hussars serving in Ireland. Soon Griffith and his men were to 
embark for the Crimea without replacement Carbines or swordst 180 
new pattern swords finally being issued to the Second Dragoons at 
their Manchester barrack on 1st August after they had already 
sailed to the front. When the mistake was eventually realised, 
the swords were dispatched to the Crimea by the Cleopatra on 11th 
November. Sadly the error was a costly one, as a communication 
from the War Department dated 13th December to Joseph Wood, 
quoted Colonel Griffith as follows: - 
Swords are very defective - as in our engagement, when our men 
made a thrust with the sword, they all but, and would no 't 
go 
into a mans body, and many of our poor fellows got badly 
wounded and some lost their lives entirely from the miserable 
state of their arms. They were quite good enough for home 
service, but quite unfit for active service* . 4. 
Unfortunately this was not the end of the Second Dragoon's 
problems as Colonel Griffith was to write again on the 25th April 
1855, reminding Joseph Wood that, before embarkation to the 
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Crimea, the Adjutant General's letters of 18th and 22nd July 1854 
had placed requisitions for carbines and swords. The Board of 
Ordnance correspondence dated 25th July clearly shows that they 
had no means of supplying this trivial amount of 286 carbines 
which Griffith had requested. A note scribbled on the back of 
Griffith's communication dated 26th April 1855 by an S Roper, 
states "There is no longer any difficulty in supplying the 286 
Victoria Carbines requested by 2nd Dragoons", this was nine 
months after the original order was placed. . 5. 
From this episode it is probably fair to conclude that it was 
Enfield who. had responsibility for manufacturing this modest 
amount of arms, as it was probable that such a small contract 
would not have been worth putting out to tender. Had this been 
done, then the delay in suppling the weapons would no doubt have 
been longer. The competitive nature of the contract system would 
have required "Ordnance" to distribute and vet the various 
incoming bids from the private sector and this would have taken 
time to study and process. Interestingly, this episode also 
provides a clue to the time required for a factory to adapt to 
the manufacture of a weapon which was not part of the current 
production programme. Given the urgency of war, and remembering 
the weapon was not new and had previously been in production, I: he 
incident serves as a general indication of the length of time and 
the difficulties involved in organising men, mechanisms and 
material. The introduction of a totally new pattern would no 
doubt take considerably longer to organise and reach full scale 
production capacity. New jigs and gauges would have to be made 
and, of course, machine operators and other personnel would take 
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time to become fully proficient and familiar with the work. 
The complaint relating to poor quality swords was investigated by 
RW Gunner, the Inspector of Small Arms at the Birmingham 
"Ordnance" office. He reported, "Soon after the introduction of 
this Pattern in the year 1822 it was found after a careful course 
of experimental trials that any of the tests beyond those above 
described was attended with excessive and unnecessary loss either 
from breakage or failure in elasticity in the fabrication of the 
blades". . 6. Gunner went on to say that the "New Pattern" swords 
are subject to more stringent tests (Fig. 22), the implication 
being that it was known the military were equipped with inferior 
weapons and nothing had been done in the forty years of relative 
peace to rectify the situation. The incident and other reports of 
poor quality provoked the Master General of Ordnance, Viscount 
Hardinge, to set up a Committee of Cavalry Officers to look at 
the current stocks of swords in store and those in the process of 
manufacture both at Enfield and Birmingham. In addition to the 
standard tests, Gunner requested the Committee to test the 
weapons more severely, this they did by "proving. the cutting on a 
bar of iron and the point against a brick wall, without injury in 
any case to the'Swords". After taking evidence-from the Inspector 
of Small Arms and the "Superintendents of the Royal Manufactory",, 
the Committee reported, in January 1855, that, in their opinion, 
the whole of these weapons are made of the best possible 
material8 and they consider them excellent Swords and fit for any 
service". . 7. This statement was made after four of the Enfield 
swords and one from Birmingham (over two percent of those 
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examined), failed the test. The Committee concluded that in "each 
instance the fracture was not caused by flaw or softness of 
metalf but rather from being too highly tempered". . 8. While 
technically the analysis may have been correct, it would be hard 
to imagine that soldiers in the heat of combat would be 
interested in the precise nature of the fault. Weapon failure for 
any reason would have been unacceptable; what soldiers required 
was reliable weapons in which they could have confidence. 
Perhaps, at the time, "Ordnance" officers had not appreciated the 
fact that battles are often won on the factory floor through the 
quality and quantity of weapons supplied to the troops. The 
"Ordnance" Committee, detached from the horrors of war, declared 
on completion of their investigation that the present swords were 
"fit for any service". 
From researching the considerable correspondence on the Crimea, 
it is clear that soldiers had been sent to the front ill equipped 
for combat with old issue arms, tragically discovering the 
inadequacy of their weapons in battle. The failure of the swords 
in action might indicate that one hundred percent testing and 
inspection was not being carried out or perhaps some had escaped 
the view either deliberately or by accident. 
SuPPlv and weapon problems 
From our discussion it can be seen that there was a whole 
catalogue of poor organisation, mis-management and incompetence 
surrounding the procurement and supply of small arms to soldiers 
on active service. Furthermore, it would appear that there was a 
complete lack of understanding by members of the Board of 
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ordnance relating to the necessary time-scales required by the 
small arms industry to prepare and schedule the production of new 
weapons. Apart from senior "Ordnance" personnel in the business 
of arms procurement having little understanding of how a 
manufacturing facility operated, it was also apparent that there 
was a failure to grasp the simple logistics of supplying the 
troops at the front. The Army in the Crimea had wanted weapons of 
standard calibre to ease problems in the ammunition supply chain. 
This would have eliminated the confusion brought about through 
the issue of more than one size of ammunition. It can readily be 
deduced from the correspondence between "Ordnance" and the 
different regiments that at least three types of weapon were in 
service with the front line troops, all having different calibre 
bores. . 9. Such a mix of weapons of incompatible calibre had 
introduced severe supply difficulties for the Army. The 
authorities had tried to resolve these problems on a makeshift 
basis by keeping batches of the 1851 Minie and Enfield pattern 
1853 muskets separate. These were then issued to different 
regiments. By knowing where the various weapon types were, it was 
hoped that this would avoid mistakes of wrong ammunition being 
delivered to the regiments. 
With the issue of the new smaller calibre (0.577in. ) pattern 
1853 it would appear that some of the former strategic 
advantages of warfare had been lost. For example, Major EGB 
Reynolds has argued that "It was considered an advantage to have 
a bore larger than certain Continental armies because, whereas 
captured ammunition could be fired from English muskets, English 
leaden balls could not be fired out of theirs". . 10. 
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The 1851 Minie was not the ideal choice of weapon for troops in 
combat. This can be seen from the many regimental reports which 
originated from trials carried out in August 1854. Here it was 
concluded that the barrel of this weapon was too hot to hold 
after firing between thirty to fifty rounds. Twelve to thirteen 
minutes had to be allowed for the weapon to cool sufficiently, 
raising fears that the powder might prematurely explode in the 
barrel causing inj . ury. Furthermore, the Minie was over one pound 
heavier than the Enfield pattern 1853, making it less than ideal 
to carry and handle. . 11. 
With the many logistical problems confronting the Army, ranging 
from the supply of equipment to suitability of weapons and 
ammunitiont it would not seem unreasonable to question the 
competence of the Board of Ordnance and the military 
authorities. If they were unable to accomplish those tasks which 
were more suited to their military backgrounds, then it would be 
difficult to see how they could cope with technical matters 
concerning the design, manufacturing, and scheduling of weapons. 
Shipments of replacement arms from England were slow to arrive at 
the Crimea, this was primarily due to the problems already 
highlighted-in this thesis, ranging from the contract system and 
the strictness of view to the failure of "Ordnance" to supply an 
adequate number of patterns and tools to the private gun trade. 
By 3rd January 1855, research has shown, there were contracts 
(not all signed) outstanding for up to 160,000 weapons, mainly 
the Enfield pattern 1853. Although figures relating to the 
individual suppliers of weapons are not entirely clear, it can be 
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deduced from the correspondence that orders for 100,000 guns had 
been placed with Birmingham contractors, 40,000 with Liege, 1,500 
with London, and 1000 with Enfield. "Ordnance" had promised that 
10,000 of these arms would be delivered to Balaklava by the end 
of January, with a continuing schedule of 4,000 per month until 
May and each rifle was to be supplied with 500 cartridges. . 12. 
The grand plan was to have, by August or September, the Army in 
the Crimeaj, "entirely armed with rifles of one pattern - that of 
the 1853". . 13. 
After all the complaints by "Ordnance" against the private gun 
trade, the above figures clearly show that they were the only 
sector of the arms industry capable of supplying reasonable 
quantities of weapons to the soldiers at the front, albeit behind 
schedule on occasion, and still by mainly labour intensive 
methods of manufacture. However, as already pointed out, the 
delays were not entirely the fault of the private sector. 
Therefore, the establishment of the ". Ordnance" factory at Enfield 
at the beginning of the century to secure adequate supplies of 
arms for the military without recourse to the private sector and 
the necessity of placing orders abroad, had clearly not achieved 
its goal. The successful lobbying of Parliament by the private 
gun trade had ensured that Enfield remained incapable of 
manufacturing large quantities of weapons. This had inadvertently 
brought foreign imports from Leige into the country when demand 
for arms increased. Here it might be argued that due to a failure 
by politicians to fully appreciate the technological requirements 
of a country with an Empire to policer British interests abroad 
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had been rendered vulnerable by the lack of a strategic weapon 
manufacturing policy. 
Initially, it will be recalled, Government had sought to develop 
a small arms strategy by setting up Enfield in 1816 but had bowed 
under political pressure from the private sector. Howeverr we 
have seen that "Ordnance" had failed to heed George Lovell when 
he suggested a sensible method of working with the gun trade. No 
doubt a co-ordinated weapons manufacturing and development 
programme could have been advantageously cultivated between the 
private and public sectors based upon Lovell's recommendations. 
Failure of Government to develop such a scheme in the relatively 
peaceful period after the Napoleonic conflict left Britain once 
again vulnerable when war loomed. 
Failure of Government to learn from experience 
When the British Government decided to send a Commission to 
America in 1854 to investigate the possible purchase of suitable 
arms making machinery, the timing almost exactly coincided with 
Britain's entry into the Crimean War. Even after the Commission 
had left England, Parliament was still arguing over the amounts 
of money to be spent on re-equipping the Enfield factory. In fact 
the initial sum was reduced from E30,000 to the absurd amount of 
E10,000 but was later reinstated, the Commission being allowed an 
almost open cheque facility to purchase the necessary machine 
tools. . 14. No doubt the outbreak of the Crimean conflict had 
persuaded Parliament to release its grip on the purse strings. By 
the lack of written evidence to the contrary, it would seem 
reasonable to conclude that "Ordnance" was not working toward a 
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cohesive strategic plan for the British small arms industry with 
a view to securing future weapon supplies. Therefore, without the 
pressure created by the Crimean campaign it is unlikely that 
Enfield would have had the opportunity to become one of the 
world's leading small arms producers by the middle of the 
century. The episode would tend to reinforce the notion that the 
British Government and its advisers lacked a fundamental 
knowledge of manufacturing matters, particularly an understanding 
of the planning processes and the time-scales involved in 
preparing and equipping a small arms production plant. Although 
it has been shown in earlier chapters that the private gun 
trade's influence upon Parliament had been exceedingly powerful, 
by which the trade had successfully resisted "Ordnance" intrusion 
into their industry, there is no evidence to suggest that 
Government had the political will or commitment to become 
involved in full scale small arms manufacture on its own account. 
Of course it might be argued that the long period of relative 
peace following the end of the Napoleonic Wars had lulled the 
British Government into a false sense of security. If this was 
the case, then it would appear naive in the extreme, particularly 
if one remembers the vastness of the British Empire and the 
unpredictability of outbreaks of unrest. Under-such circumstances 
one would have expected Britain to have been vigilant at all 
times, needing to be positioned to react quickly to restore law 
and order in any of her overseas possessions. Given such 
conditidns, it would seem rational that Britain would require a 
plentiful supply of reliable arms to be called upon should such 
an emergency arise. 
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Evidence of "Ordnance" ignorance 
At a time when there was a desperate need to supply the Army at 
the Crimea with weapons of standard calibre and type, research at 
the Public Record Office has uncovered a substantial amount of 
correspondence between Captain Manly Dixon, Superintendent of 
the Enfield manufactory and a number of defence agencies 
relating to mounting pressure to introduce new weapon types. An 
undated letter from Dixon to "Ordnance" circa 30th May 1855, 
asked "whether it would be advisable to purchase 1,000 or 1,500 
Sharpe's breech loading Carbines instead of issuing contracts 
for making the Victoria Carbine, a weapon which is all but 
useless". Dixon went on to suggest that the Sharpe's breech 
loader is "much superior to anything that has yet been invented" 
and he further pointed out that the Victoria Carbine "would take 
6-7 months to manufacture". This figure would seem rather . 
generous, as it will be recalled that just over a year before it 
had 'taken nine months to organise the production of only 286 of 
these weapons. In a reply from "Ordnance" to Dixon dated 5th 
June it was stated that Viscount Hardinge has inspected a 
Sharpe's breech loader and "considers a Carbine invented by Mr 
Prince to be superior". He also went on to suggest that "some of 
Prince's pattern be made and distributed for test to the 
Regiments with the Sharpe's". In the mean-time,, Dixon received 
an order for 4,000 Victoria Carbines to be delivered to General 
Beatson for the Irregular Turkish Cavalry. Dixon's reply exudes 
frustration when he states "there are no contracts for material 
for these arms, at present existing and there are no materials 
in store". Later in his letter he forcefully concluded "The 
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question now is whether a contract shall issue for an arm for 
Cavalry purposes which hardly shoots straight at 100 yards, is 
cumbrous, and difficult to load on horseback and requires a 
different ammunition to any other arm in the British Army". . 15. 
This is a damming report by any account and is further evidence 
of how critical the arms supply situation had become. Not only 
is it an indication of the plight of the front line troops, but 
it illustrates the failure of "Ordnance" to recognise or 
understand the basic requirements of the small arms industry and 
the time-scales involved in implementing a new manufacturing 
programme. This latter point should have appeared particularly 
pertinent to Hardinge, particularly after Dixon had already 
explained in previous correspondence that the Victoria Carbine, 
a weapon which had already been in production "would take 6-7 
months to manufacture". For Hardinge to propose that an entirely 
new weapon be manufactured and "distributed for test to the 
Regiments" would suggest not only that Dixon's former point had 
been missed or ignored but also that he was prepared to carry out 
experiments with an untried arm in time of war. This latter fact 
seems quite extraordinary and almost beyond belief, again 
emphasising that the military side of "Ordnance" had little idea 
of time-scales and were seemingly prepared to risk soldier's 
lives while they were trying to find an improved weapon. 
In a further communication between "Ordnance" and Dixon it is 
suggested that "Viscount Hardinge is now of the opinion that Mr 
Leitch breech loading Carbine be examined". From the 
correspondence it would appear that this weapon was being 
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Leitch, stating "The results showed that in our opinion the arm 
is less adapted for Cavalry purposes than any other which has 
been submitted". These views were also supported by Captain 
Warlow, an experienced "Ordnance" officer and one of the members 
of the 1854 Commission to America. Warlow found up to six areas 
of complaint with the weapon. These and Dixon's opinions 
received the support and backing of James Gunner, Storekeeper at 
Enfield. A communication to Dixon from "Ordnance" dated 15th 
August informed him that Hardinge: - 
... recommends that instructions be immediately given for the 
preparation of 15,000 of Leitch's breech loading rifled 
carbines in order that a sufficient reserve at hand to meet 
casualties. His Lordship would be glad to learn how soon any, 
and what proportion of these weapons may be expected to be 
ready in order that the Regiments serving in the Crimea may be 
supplied at the earliest possible period. . 16. 
As the date of Hardinge's instruction coincided with that of 
Dixon's report on the Leitch rifle, is not obvious from the 
correspondence whether the former communication arrived at 
Enfield before or after the technical assessment took place. If 
it came before, this would indicate that the Board had already 
made up its mind and was therefore not prepared to receive a 
serious evaluation of the weapon by Enfield personnel. Had it 
come after, it would imply a large measure of arrogance on behalf 
of the Board, particularly as the technical advice had come from 
three of the country's leading experts on military small arms. 
Had Enfield not possessed men of the calibre of Dixon and his 
colleagues who understood not only the intricacies of production 
and procurement time-scales but military requirements as well, 
and were also prepared to stand their ground and argue their case 
with high ranking "Ordnance" officers, it is difficult to 
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recommended for use with the British Cavalry. Dixon therefore 
suggests as an expedient that Colt's revolvers should be issued 
to the Cavalry in lieu of the Victoria Carbine. It will be 
recalled that Dixon had been highly critical of this latter 
weapon and, apart from it being an old design, there were no 
stocks available. 
In a letter to Dixon from the War Department dated Ilth July 
1855 it was stated that Hardinge had now "re-considered his 
opinion and understands that the breech loader would be for the 
Cavalry only". Dixon was also informed that Hardinge did not 
want the Sharpe's or Colt's weapons purchased from America and 
he was given the news that a Leitch breech loader was being sent 
to him for evaluation after the weapon had already been examined 
by a Board of Cavalry Officers who apparently found it 
"excellent practice at 300 yards". This communication was 
followed by another letter dated 8th August, informing Dixon 
that Hardinge had "decided the best fire arm for the Cavalry is 
Leitch's breech loading rifle". The message went on to say "this 
improved arm will of course do away with the necessity of any 
more Victoria Carbines being procured". By 15th August Dixon was 
replying in very strong terms in relation to his findings on the 
Leitch rifle. Dixon explained that Mr Leitch had been given the 
opportunity to fire his weapon at Enfield, "a model which he 
(Leitch] stated had been shewn to the Board of Cavalry Officers 
and approved by them and subsequently approved and inspected by 
Viscount Hardinge". The opportunity was taken by Dixon to report 
on how the rifle performed in the demonstration given by Mr 
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contemplate what fate might have eventually befallen the British 
soldier. However, the whole episode and particularly the action 
of ordering Dixon to produce 15jOOO Leitch breech loaders, 
illustrates the Master General's lack of manufacturing knowledge. 
This clearly demonstrates that Hardinge had no idea of how long 
it would take to tool-up and prepare for manufacture. 
Explanations for "Ordnance" incompetence emergg__ 
It should be recognized that the dialogue between Captain Dixon 
and in particular Viscount Henry Hardinge has been truncated for 
brevity. However, analysing the correspondence and noting the 
critical period during which the exchange took place has provided 
a fresh insight into behind the scenes actions of senior military 
and Board of Ordnance personnel. The investigation has helped 
uncover what is sometimes perceived as the mysteries surrounding 
certain aspects of military decision making, the results of which 
are often viewed with incredulity. Those outside the process who 
question the reasons, which on occasion appear irrational, can 
begin to understand why certain actions were or were not taken. 
Historians researching the transfer of the "American system of 
manufactures" to Britain have failed to fully explore the Board 
of Ordnance comprehension of military supply chain requirements, 
particularly at the time of the Crimean War. Now, by opening this 
line of enquiry it has been possible to demonstrate that certain 
military and Board of Ordnance officers, with responsibility for 
supplying small arms to front line troops, lacked a fundamental 
understanding of the weapon manufacturing process and 
consequently the ability to appreciate development and delivery 
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time-scales. The correspondence has shown quite clearly that 
there was considerable antagonism between the technical experts 
at Enfield, the military and "Ordnance" bureaucrats, further 
demonstrating that this latter group were not versed in a basic 
understanding of the problems caused by re-scheduling or 
re-planning production. Neither had the importance of maintaining 
long term manufacturing stability through continuity of product 
design been grasped. It would also appear that the Board had 
little comprehension of the limitations of the gauges, tools and 
machinery which had been ordered from America to equip the 
Enfield factory. This equipment had been specifically designed to 
support large scale manufacture of one particular weapon, the 
pattern 1853 rifle, and could not be expected to support any 
other pattern of arm. Perhaps the problems of a 19th century 
manufacturing ignorant Government bureaucracy are best summed by 
GR Searle when he wrote: - 
. the most important administrative appointments soon became ýýe 
preserve of "gentlemen" who had benefited from a "liberal" 
university education, but who possessed neither practical 
experience nor knowledge relevant to their work. Yet partly 
because of the assumption that specialists were spendthrifts 
who needed tight curbing, public officials with technical 
qualification and attainments usually found themselves 
subordinated at all points to these "general administrators". 
. 17. 
of course, the lack of understanding by the Board and other 
military personnel may have been a question of poor communication 
by engineers but this argument can generally be discounted on the 
grounds that there had been almost forty years of peace f6r good 
I 
liaisons to have developed had there been the will. Views of 
engineers had been expressed and recorded, some by famous and 
high profile men like Whitworth, Nasmyth and Anderson, when they 
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drew up reports for Government agencies and gave evidence before 
the various Select Committees, so it was not as if information 
concerning engineering and manufacturing matters was unknown in 
high places. The lack of "Ordnance" understanding can again be 
seen after the adoption of the Enfield pattern 1853 rifle as the 
standard arm for the forces in the Crimea. It was hoped that the 
delivery of this weapon in quantity to the front line troops 
would overcome the potentially disastrous situation of having 
more than one type of ammunition in circulation. As pointed out 
earlier, problems had already been caused for the Army with the 
issue of a least three different calibre weapons to the front. 
However, from the correspondence between Dixon and Hardinge it 
can be seen that the Board and influential military officers were 
changing their minds almost'daily, encouraging Enfield to 
introduce new weapon types, some of which, if accepted, would 
require additional designs of ammunition and training of the men, 
hardly a situation to be contemplated when war was raging. While 
these distracting communications between "Ordnance" and Enfield 
were taking place, it should be remembered that substantial 
contracts had been placed with the private sector for the pattern 
1853 and shipments of the weapon to the Army were already 
underway. 
Investigating the correspondence between "Ordnance" and Enfield 
has helped to clarify the reasons governing the timing of the 
British Government's intervention into the traditional small arms 
manufacturing business of the private sector, bringing about for 
the first time the entry of "Ordnance" into large scale military 
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weapon manufacture. In fact it is the clarification of the timing 
issue which has provided important information, showing how 
Enfield was catapulted into adopting revolutionary methods of 
mass production with new imported machine tools, rather than 
having a more sedate and evolutionary approach to large scale 
arms manufacture. Had the Crimean conflict not come about, then 
Enfield may well have retained its original role as a small scale 
manufacturing unit with responsibilities for weapon repair, 
research and development. 
Playing a dangerous game? 
Early in 1855 work on the new buildings began at Enfield to house 
the machinery on order from America, the task of construction 
being undertaken by the Royal Engineers under the command of 
Major General Collinson. . 18. While preparation for the site's 
expansion was taking place a decision to alter dramatically the 
terms and conditions of the workforce was implemented. A 
memorandum dated 4th July 1855 explained that the current terms 
and conditions of workmen employed by the "Ordnance" 
establishment at Enfield would be suspended as of the 21st "when 
they will be considered as ceasing to belong to the factory - as 
it is hoped that many will be willing to re-engage under the new 
system". The new arrangements required "... old hands to be 
pensioned", and it was proposed that workmen "... such as receive 
it [pension] for long and faithful services shall be recommended 
for a gratuity". Furthermore,, an abstract of the rules was to be 
hung in the factory telling the work-force that they would have 
to apply to the Superintendent before the 17th July to be 
re-engaged. The working hours were to be brought in to line with 
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other private factories in Britain, 10.5 hours per day for the 
first five days and 7 hours on the sixth, bringing the total 
working week to 59.5 hours. Even senior craftsmen did not escape 
the changes. All Superintendent Armourers were informed that, on 
the 23rd of July, they would receive their instructions from the 
Tower "under the immediate superintendence of Mr Phillcox but 
subject to the order and charge of Mr Turner". Time keeping was 
to be formally structured, gates to be opened at 5.45am, work 
commencing at 6am., workmen arriving 5 minutes late would be 
deducted 15 minutes pay, arrival after 6.15am would see 30 
minutes pay. deducted. Gates were to be closed at 6.30am, workmen 
arriving after this time would have to wait until the breakfast 
break at 9am, to be allowed in. There was to be a time book which. 
would show the punctuality or lateness of the employees and this 
would reflect the amount of wages received by individuals. Wages 
would be paid before the Saturday dinner break. . 19. 
From the timing of the new working practices it would seem that 
management had taken a terrible risk. The act of introducing 
these fresh terms and conditions could have easily provoked a 
serious strike. With Britain deeply involved in the Crimean war, 
further problems with the supply of arms would seem to have-been 
the last thing Government wanted. It was probable, however, that 
"Ordnance" felt confident in taking this action, perhaps banking 
on the knowledge that memories of the 1852 "great lock out" were 
still fresh in workers minds. The risk of industrial action may 
also have appeared slight, because, as the Enfield factory was 
a Government establishment, the workers enjoyed better 
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terms and conditions than their private sector counterparts. 
From the rapidly rising output of the Enfield factory after 
January 1857, it would seem fair to conclude that the changes 
went through relatively smoothly. 
Birth of the Union 
With the organizational changes taking place, it is probably no 
coincidence that on the Sth November 1855 the Amalgamated 
Society of Engineers (ASE) formed the Enfield Lock Branch. The 
inaugural meeting was attended by the Union's General Secretary, 
William Allan, who formally declared the Branch open. 
Unfortunately the Union minute books for this important period 
in the birth of the Branch are incomplete and the early entries 
are erratic. For example, the second entry does not occur until 
24th February 1857, the business being conducted is of a general 
administrative nature and sadly does not refer to the 
introduction of the new American machine tools at the Enfield 
factory. 
From an examination of later entries in the minute books, it can 
clearly be established that the Branch was catering strictly for 
skilled craftsmen only. This applied not only to members serving 
the necessary time appropriate to their trade but also to 
discrimination against men with physical disabilities. 
Membership of able bodied men was actively encouraged as this 
was thought necessary to maintaining high standards of 
craftsmanship. At the time, skilled worker's jobs were under 
threat from the increasing number of machine tools being 
introduced into the Enfield factory. The following examples 
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taken from the minutes give a clear indication of the measure of 
strictness being operated by the Branch in an effort to preserve 
and maintain a skilled membership: - 
October 26th 1872 - That the sympathy of this Branch be 
conveyed to Mr Tuckey on his being disqualified to becoming a 
member of this Society through his loss of two fingers on one 
hand. 
January 17th 1874 - That Thomas Tanner be admitted a member of 
this Society. He having undergone an examination by Doctor J 
Hutchinson of the Ophthalmic Hospital, London, who certifies 
that his left eye is perfect, and that the right eye suffers 
from a congenital defect and that it will not be detrimental 
to his following his employment. 
January 31st 1874 - That our Secretary be instructed to write 
to the Council to know whether we are justified in admitting a 
member suffering from a rupture to the sick benefit of our 
Society. 
October 10th 1874 - That our Secretary be requested to write 
to Newcastle informing the Secretary that James Trigg was not 
working at this Factory as a mechanic he being employed while 
working here on the component parts of the gun. . 20. 
on reading these extracts one is left with the impression that a 
type of craft elitism was being operated. This may have 
accounted for the relatively small number of men belonging to 
the Branch. In 1855 the Branch membership was only forty four, 
rising to one hundred and twenty two by 1880. . 21. The work-force 
estimates of the RSAF Superintendent and historian GH Roberts, 
suggest that in 1858 "... about 1,000 unskilled or semi-skilled 
and 250 men were employed, a considerable number of whom had come 
from Col. S. 'Colt's Factory at Pimlico". . 22. Therefore, during 
the early years of the Branch, membership as a proportion of 
workers employed at the factory was less than 4%. 
A climate of mixed views-and uncertaintv 
After almost forty years of only partial manufacturing 
involvement, Government had been forced by war to accept 
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responsibility for the full scale production of military small 
arms. However, the plan to expand Enfield was not shared by all 
politicians, some taking the view that a Government owned armoury 
was not essential, believing that the private gun trade could 
provide all of Britain's military requirements without placing an 
undue burden on the Exchequer. Research has shown that, if 
"Ordnance" had sought to establish sensible long term contracts 
with the private sector and taken the trouble to foster good 
relationships with the gun makers, supplying them with reasonable 
quantities of patterns and gauges, a reliable source of military 
weapons could have been developed with minimum reliance upon 
public expenditure. 
The report 'of the Select Committee on Small Arms 1854 was able to 
present an objective analysis of the problems befalling the gun 
trade in the supply and manufacture of military weapons. In 
drawing up their report the Committee reached the following 
conclusions: - 
While Your Committee recommended the system of contracting for 
the supply of Small Arms should not be discontinued, they are, 
nevertheless, of opinion that a manufactory of Small Arms 
under the Board of Ordnance should be tried to a limited 
extent. This manufactory would serve as an experiment of the 
advantages to be derived from the more extensive application 
of machinery, as a check upon the price of contractors, and as 
a resource in times of emergency, and it should be arranged 
with a view to its economical working. . 23. 
While it is clear that the Committee wanted to retain the 
contract system and had not wished to give Enfield sole 
responsibility for the production of all military small arms, 
their recommendation had nevertheless allowed "Ordnance" the 
opportunity to keep their feet firmly in the manufacturing door. 
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When Britain joined the conflict in the Crimea, followed by the 
purchase of machine tools from America, the chance for "Ordnance" 
to push the door fully open finally came. 
It would seem unreasonable to assume that politicians were 
unaware of the high levels of expenditure required to fund a 
fully mechanised modern small arms factory on a continuous basis. 
Apart from the financial information coming before the various 
Select Committees, there was also the examples of factories 
directly under "Ordnance" control, like Woolwich Arsenal and 
Waltham Abbey Gunpowder Mills. Furthermore, from the haphazard 
and intermittent working of the contract system, it should have 
been obvious to politicians that there were no individual 
manufacturers outside of Government who were big enough to have 
the confidence, let alone the finances, to risk investment in a 
large scale manufacturing plant. Many private companies had yet 
to be convinced of the superiority of the "American system of 
manufactures" over the traditional labour intensive methods of 
gun production. This latter system had generally served them well 
over the years, allowing the private sector the flexibility to 
exploit different markets at minimum capital outlay. 
Politics slow engineering influence 
It was not only politicians who had appeared to lack the 
imagination and understanding of the needs of their armed forces 
at a time of a rapidly changing technology, after all many were 
under pressure from their gun making constituents. The collective 
responsibility of the Board of Ordnance was also found wanting. 
They had allowed the British Army to embark for the Crimea with 
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inadequate and out of date weapons. Moreover, as research has 
shown, even the Master General was prepared to continue a time 
consuming and unhelpful dialogue with the technical and 
manufacturing experts over the introduction and trial of new 
weapons. This not only demonstrates a lack of understanding of 
the planning required in the manufacturing process but also an 
ignorance of the problems which would have undoubtedly been 
caused by issuing unfamiliar weapons to soldiers at the front 
(or perhaps it was naivety). Placing untried battlefield weapons 
in the hands of men in action, who had not been give the 
opportunity to train with them, would have no doubt resulted in 
disastrous consequences, not to mention confusion if new types of 
ammunition had to be issued as well. 
The lack of "Ordnance" understanding of manufacturing issues 
would suggest that by the middle of the nineteenth century the 
voices of the engineers and technicians, although beginning to 
gain respect, had yet to be allowed to influence the decision 
making proce'ss. Perhaps Viscount Hardinge was still stirred by 
his earlier experiences of the former Inspector of Small Arms, 
George Lovell, as he had expressed the view, although possibly 
unfairlyj, that "The Inspector has an undue confidence in his own 
authority to act independent of the Board or of my own authority 
... ". 24. 
The timing of the expansion and equipping of the Enfield factory 
when the Crimean War was in progress demonstrates clearly how 
unprepared the Board of Ordnance were for major conflict. In fact 
the situation is even worse than it appears on the surface. A 
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report, called for by John Anderson, Inspector of Machinery and 
published in 1857t suggests that the new factory to house the 
machinery from America was originally planned for Woolwich. It 
was not until 2nd February 1855 (after Anderson's return from the 
United States) that the Board of Ordnance gave the order to 
commence building on the Enfield site. naturally this caused 
further delays as plans had to be redrawn and the work put out to 
tender. The building was completed in 1856 but not before more 
costly delays were encountered due to 11 ... the ground being a bog 
of peat... ". . 25. 
As it has been shown, the whole episode surrounding Government 
small arms production in the early to mid 1850s is one of general 
indecision, confusion and "Ordnance" incompetence. This would 
seem to be an extremely serious state of affairs for the British 
nation to be placed in, particularly when considering the 
developing international scene. It was not as if politicians had 
suddenly realised that if Russia was to occupy Turkey, then 
India, the jewel in the British crown, would suddenly become 
exceedingly vulnerable. Russia had been expanding her Empire for 
years and there was more than enough intelligence information 
from British agents to have caused politicians considerable 
anxiety. . 26. More than ever, the British Government needed an 
arms manufacturing strategy which would introduce stability to 
the supply of weapons to her troops. Would the incoming "American 
system", developed by engineers, based on new production and 
assembly principles, achieve this? 
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Time for change 
The arrival of the "American system of manufactures" (as it later 
became known) in Britain was to show, by the early 1860s, that 
Enfield was in a position to influence dramatically and change 
totally the method of British small arms production. At the time 
it was probably not fully appreciated how this new system of 
manufacture might affect other industries in Britain. The change 
appears to have been influential on at least two levels. First, 
the publicity given to Enfield had made the factory highly 
visible. This had set other industrialists thinking and they 
began considering the installation of new plant and equipment. 
Secondly, the new factory processes had imposed different 
standards on contractors which by the 1860s meant external 
supplies of military arms would only be accepted by "Ordnance" if 
made with interchangeable parts. This caused suppliers like the 
London Gun Company and the amalgamation of Birmingham gun makers 
(by 1861 called BSA) to implement machine intensive production. 
Although not referring directly to Enfield, Clive Treblicock 
wrote in relation to his "spin-off" theory, "The intricacy of the 
new weapons, the excellence of the manufacturing equipment, the 
heavy commitment to research - as well as the advocacy of the 
trade journal - would strongly suggest that by the 1880s the 
British armament industry had reached a level of technical 
achievement from which it could profitably influence "civilian" 
industries". . 27. Free of pressure from the private gun trade and 
without the need to play political games with the contractors, 
Enfield's role had changed from a small volume repair shop to 
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that of a major international small arms manufacturer. By 1860 
the annual production figure for rifles alone had reached 90,707 
- 1744 per week. . 28. 
Enfield's growing fame 
A visible consequence of the Enfield factory, after full-scale 
production commenced in January 1857 with the imported American 
machine tools, was the vast amount of attention it attracted, 
particularly from the national press. Articles appeared in 
newspapers and learned journals proclaiming admiration for the 
manufacturing system and extolling the "beauty" of the machinery 
installed at the plant. The reporting in some instances exuded 
such national pride that the reader might be forgiven for 
believing mistakenly that the factory and its equipment was a 
marvellous piece-of solely British ingenuity. Being cynical, it 
could be argued that this was the Government encouraging 
publicity for the factory as a way of justifying to the public 
the large amount of capital expenditure, rather than simply being 
a piece of Victorian pride. 
In the period immediately following the cessation of hostilities 
in the Crimea much publicity was given to the new factory 
highlighting its modern production techniques and machine tools. 
Although several articles paid tribute to American machine 
manufacturers Robbins & Lawrence and the Ames Company, the 
references were often glossed over as in the case of The 
Mechanic's Magazine of 23rd August 1861. The machinery designers 
are referred to as "our American cousins", implying that the 
writer was trying to claim credit for Britain through a family 
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connection. . 29. The fame of the Enfield factory was not short 
lived, neither were the admirers confined to the world of adults. 
No doubt wishing to encourage the younger generation and perhaps 
to secure the craftsmen of the future, the Boys Own Magazine 
ran an article in 1860 entitled "Manly Exercises, Rifles and 
Rifle Shooting" which gave an account of weapon manufacture at 
Enfield. The writer, obviously overwhelmed by the experience of 
his visit to the factory, described the large machine room in the 
following florid terms: - 
Let our readers imagine, if they can, a single room more than 
an acre in extent, lofty, and well lit, in which some thousand 
men and boys are increasingly employed in superintending 
machinery. The ear is pained by the hum of fly-wheels, which 
revolve in thousands till the eye is giddy with their whirl. 
Miles of shafting are spinning round mistily, with a 
monotonous hum; the room is almost darkened, and the view 
completely obscured, by some 50,000-or 60,000 feet of broad, 
flapping lathe-bands, which are driving no less than 600 
distinct machines, all going together, on their own allotted 
tasks, with a tremulous rapidity and ease that seems to 
swallow up the work like magic, and the first sight of which 
is inexpressibly astonishing to the spectator. It takes some 
minutes before the visitor can subdue the over-whelming 
feeling of surprise which this scene of activity always 
excites, no matter how often entered on. . 30. 
John Anderson, -the engineer from Woolwich Arsenal who had been a 
member of the 1854 three man Commission to America, gave lectures 
to the Institute of Mechanical Engineers. In 1858 he read a paper 
in Newcastle on the applications of the "Copying or Transfer 
Principle in the Production of Wooden Articles" in which he 
described the sequenced operation of the new gun stock forming 
machinery at Enfield. A further paper in 1862 on the "Copying 
Principle in the Manufacture and Rifling of Guns" was given in 
Birmingham. Here Anderson described the levels of precision 
attained in machining and measurement at the Government ordnance 
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factories at Woolwich and Enfield. At the end of the lecture the 
chairman remarked that members would have an opportunity to visit 
the works at Woolwich and seeing the whole of the processes 
described in the paper in the manufacture and rifling of guns; 
and also of visiting the Small Arms Factory at Enfield, where the 
same principles had been carried out by Mr. Anderson, and the 
same accuracy of workmanship attained". . 31. While Enfield was 
enjoying the attention and prestige of a modern state of the art 
factory, there were remarks from members of Anderson's audience 
which suggested that Britain's manufacturing industries were 
suffering from under-investment. A Mr. Richardson, who had 
previously visited the Woolwich factory,, commented , It would be a 
great advantage if the engineering workshops throughout the 
country would endeavour to approach to the same amount of 
perfection, by employing a better class of machinery and tools, 
which would produce an important advance in mechanical 
engineering". . 32. 
The increased productivity brought about by the introduction of 
the new machine tools coupled with the technology of 
interchangeability, gave Enfield a reputation as a centre of 
excellence. This point was emphasised by Howard Blackmore when 
he quoted William Greener the respected quality gun-maker, a man 
apparently not given to generous comment, although he said of 
the factory "Enfield, the seat of the Government manufacture of 
small arms, will become a celebrated place in future history; 
I 
its productions being now one of the wonders of the present 
age". . 33. Greener's view supports the notion that Enfield was 
seen more in terms of making a contribution towards production 
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technology rather than having a role as a small arms design 
centre (aspects concerning weapon design will be discussed in 
Chapter Ten). Here it will be shown that a system of open 
competition, where private inventors were invited to submit their 
designs, was being operated by "Ordnance". The role of Enfield 
was more of a trial judge and weapon modifier rather than a 
design house. 
The message spreads to the private sector 
With the repeated enthusiastic coverage given to the Enfield 
factory by journalists and others, and the influencing of 
engineers and entrepreneurs through lectures within learned 
societies, the conditions were building up for a watershed within 
the British gun trade. Continually suffering shortages of skilled 
labour, yet encouraged by the sudden demand for arms brought 
about by the outbreak of war in the Crimea and later by the 
American Civil War in 1861, it had become clear to the private 
gun trade that if it wished to secure future orders for military 
weapons, manufacturing methods within its industry would have to 
change dramatically. No longer could the private sector expect to 
enjoy the same monopolistic conditions which prevailed prior to 
1854 and which had effectively denied "Ordnance" the ability to 
compete for military small arms contracts. Now the private gun 
trade would have to compeýe with the much publicised and highly 
visible Government factory at Enfield which was now able to 
dictate even stricter terms on which "Ordnance" would accept 
weapons and parts. In future, weapons would only be-accepted if 
they conformed to a precise standard and were manufactured with - 
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interchangeable parts. . 34. For generations the private 
gunsmiths had operated within a system of small shops employing 
mainly hand skills. If the private industry was to survive late 
into the nineteenth century and beyond, it would need to 
alter dramatically its method of production. The gauntlet had 
been thrown down by Enfield and the private gun trade was about 
to pick it up and accept the challenge by altering its method of 
manufacturing military weapons. 
In 1861, four years after the RSAF commenced full scale 
production with the imported machinery using the techniques of 
interchangeability, a group of midland firms came together to 
erect a new small arms factory at Small Heath in Birmingham. The 
plant was similar to the installation at Enfield and purpose 
built, modelling itself on the "American system" using the 
techniques of interchangeable production. Over the coming years, 
the conglomerate known as the Birmingham Small Arms Company 
(BSA) would demonstrate how the lessons learned from the 
manufacture of standardised weapons. pould be transferred to the 
mass production of consumer products such as the bicycle. 
Perhaps the most significant change for the private sector came 
from a complete reversal of Government policy which moved from a 
position of obstruction and arms length dealing to one of close 
cooperation. Instead of withholding patterns and gauges as they 
had in the past, Enfield was actively encouraged to assist BSA in 
making weapons which were compatible with their own production 
and therefore interchangeable between factories. The following 
statement by a gratqful Birmingham Small Arms Company shows just 
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how far "Ordnance" had moved from its earlier position: - 
Every assistance has been rendered to the directors by the War 
Dept. of H. M. Government. The experience of Enfield has been 
freely placed at their disposal; free access has been granted 
to the Royal Manufactory with permission to make drawings of 
machinery. Models and gauges have been supplied which have 
effected for the company an incalculable saving. . 35. 
This was a far cry from the denial of the means of measurement 
which had occurred during Lovell's time as Inspector of Small 
Arms. 
Government encourages industrial investment 
Although it is true that BSA took delivery of specialist gun 
s. tocking machines from the Ames Manufacturing Company of 
Chicopee,, Massachusetts similar to those supplied to Enfield, the 
pattern of machine tool acquisition was beginning to change. 
Roger Lumley has concluded from his research that claims 
suggesting the majority of the early machinery installed at BSA 
had come from the United States of America were false. During the 
1860s, out of a total of 430 machine tools purchased, only 65 
came from the U. S. A., the original order for American equipment 
being cancelled at the outbreak of the Civil War of 1861. Of the 
2,324 machines purchased by BSA in the 19th century, less than 7% 
came from abroad. . 36. The Leeds based company Greenwood and 
Batley, which was only founded in 1856, were rapidly becoming 
recognized both at home and abroad as a quality producer of 
machine tools for the manufacture of small arms. Prior to 
supplying BSA this manufacturer had already equipped the London 
Armoury Company, giving it an output capacity capable of reaching 
900 complete arms per week. . 37. So in a way the machine tool 
story relating to self acting mass production methods had come 
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full circle. The ideas transferring to America from Portsmouth 
and elsewhere at the beginning of the century, returning to 
Enfield by the middle at an advanced state of development to be 
taken up by British machine tool manufacturers, who spread the 
technology within Britain and abroad. Ironically and by default, 
the British Government, by its ability to place large orders for 
small arms, had broken the mould of the private sector's small 
workshop culture, forcing investment in capital equipment through 
the formation of larger manufacturing units. Looking from the 
position of the 20th century, it can be seen that the act of 
importing specialised machine tools from America was an extremely 
influential component in a cocktail of many ingredients which 
helped to shape British light engineering. Although the 
introduction of the machine tool into the small arms industry 
influenced the spread of mass production technology in Britain 
which eventually transferred to other industries and encouraged 
greater size, it also had the effect of reducing the ability of 
industry to be flexible, thereby limiting the individuality of 
the product. Therefore, standardisation of parts became to mean 
standardisation of product. 
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THE QUEST TO EQUIP ENFIELD AND INTERCHANGEABILITY RE-EXAMINED 
The debate surrounding the technology of interchangeable parts 
has occupied the minds of engineers for over two hundred years. 
Latterly research has been undertaken by historians concerned 
with both the economic and technological evolution of the 
subject. According to Joseph Wickham Roe the system of 
interchangeability originated in France in the eighteenth 
century. . 1. Howard Blackmore has produced evidence to suggest 
that a crude form of producing carbines or fusils in England to 
conform in "every way as good as ye Patterne" originated in the 
seventeenth"century. . 2. Whatever the truth of 
its origins, it is 
probably. fair to say that the "American system of manufactures", 
as the process was to become known, developed from the ideas of 
many individuals and was improved and enhanced by later 
generations of technicians and engineers. The story of how the 
system came to Britain from America (perhaps arguably returned to 
Britain) in the middle of the nineteenth century helps to 
illuminate aspects of early machine tool development. 
Investigation of this particular branch of technology will allow 
a picture to emerge of the relationship between government, 
private industry and the individual weapon and machine tool 
designers. The study will show that these relationships exhibited 
quite different characteristics within the military small arms 
sector on either side of the Atlantic. Discovering how these 
associations functioned can help further our knowledge of why the 
British small arms industry developed in the way it did. 
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Fact finding in America 
As we have discovered in the last chapter there had been growing 
reports circulating within 19th century Britain that high levels 
of mechanisation were being employed by American manufacturers. 
First hand evidence of this had been gathered by Joseph 
Whitworth, the eminent engineer, when he visited the Vew York 
Industrial Exhibition of 1853 and subsequently the Government 
arms factory at Springfield, Massachusetts. Whitworth had been 
particularly impressed by the system employed in the manufacture 
of gun-stocks, reporting that "this operation Was performed 
entirely by. machinery, with the exception of some polishing with 
sand-paper, a labour which was performed by hand, but did not 
occupy more time than two minutes". . 3. 
Pressures were beginning to build for the Board of Ordnance and 
there was an increasing urgency to investigate the advantages of 
using higher levels of machinery within the small arms industry. 
In 1854 the Board responded with two initiatives. First, it 
created a Committee on the Machinery of the United States Of 
America to investigate new procedures and procure American 
equipment. Secondly, it initiated a Select Committee on Small 
Arms to investigate the more general aspects of the alleged 
failings of the gun trade and to study how best to procure a 
continued supply of reliable weapons. As British involvement in 
the Crimean War approached, this latter initiative was becoming 
more urgent by the day. 
In February, the Board of Ordnance produced a Minute which 
directed Lieutenant Colonel Burn,. Royal Artillery, Assistant 
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Inspector of Artillery, Woolwich "to proceed to the United States 
of America on the 18th instant, for the purpose of inspecting 
different gun factories in that country, and purchasing such 
machinery and models as may be necessary for the proposed gun 
factory at Enfield". The Board's Minute also directed Lieut. Col. 
Burn to "put himself in communication with Mr Whitworth, and 
ascertain from him the name and residence of the principal makers 
of machinery in the United States, and the gun factories, whether 
in the hands of the Government. or of private individuals". The 
communication was sent by the Secretary of Ordnance on the 13th 
of February (the same date as' the Minute) on behalf of the Board 
and Master General, giving Burn instructions to travel to the 
United States of America "and act as therein directed". The 
Secretary further informed Burn that "I am to add that Lieut. 
Warlow R. A. and Mr Anderson [Ordnance Inspector of Machinery] 
have been instructed to proceed thither on the 4th March and to 
place themselves under your direction, and I request that you 
give them such instructions previous to departure as you may 
consider necessary". Before leaving England, Burn took the 
opportunity to seek the advice of Colonel Colt, the prominent 
American small arms manufacturer, who had set up a pistol factory 
in London after the Great Exhibition of 1851. . 4. 
On 25th February Burn left for America, arrived in Boston on 10th 
March and proceeded to Washington to gain permission to visit the 
various armouries and arsenals. His tour, however, was delayed 
for several weeks as he awaited his colleagues, Warlow and 
Anderson, who did not arrive until 26th April, being held back to 
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participate in the Board's second initiative that Spring. The 
three took the following day to decide their route which was to 
include some fifteen towns and cities, taking in almost sixty 
different places of interest and sites of manufacture. These 
included such diverse product areas as felt hat making, biscuit 
manufacture, stone cutting, india-rubber shoe making and many 
different arsenalst along with a collection of gun makers and 
machinery manufacturers. . 5. It is clear, from the list of places 
visited, that the Committee wanted not only to see how machinery 
was employed in America in the production of small arms but also 
wished to obtain an understanding of how extensively machines - 
were used in other branches of industry. 
The Committee's-task frustrated 
Initially, the Treasury had approved the sum of E30,000 to allow 
the Committee to buy the machinery which they considered best to 
equip the Enfield factory. When the "Ordnance" estimates were 
brought before the House of Commons by Mr Monsell, M. P., Clerk 
of the "Ordnance", the motion calling for E150,000 to build a 
Small Arms Factory was opposed on the gr ounds that the London 
and Birmingham gun trade were perfectly capable of supplying 
"Ordnance" with all their needs at a lower price than a 
government manufactory. The decision not to grant the capital 
sum probably suggests that the continuing lobbying of Parliament 
by the private gun trade was still powerful and effective. 
Warlow and Anderson had been deliberately held back from their 
visit to America, primarily to allow the Select Committee on 
Small Arms to have the benefit of their knowledge and expertise. 
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When they eventually embarked for the United States on the 15th 
of April, it was in the knowledge that the sum they could spend 
on machinery and equipment had been drastically cut from E30,000 
to E10,000. . 6. There is no doubt that this reduction had 
considerably complicated the Committee's task of placing orders 
for sufficient quantities of tools and machinery to equip the 
Enfield factory. For example, on 17th May the Committee had 
agreed to accept a tender from James T Ames for 30,860 dollars to 
supply gun stocking machinery. . 7. on 25th May, while in New ' 
York, the Committee received a quotation of 22,665 dollars from 
Robbins & Lawrence to supply machinery to produce the lock, heel 
plate and trigger guard for the Enfield pattern 1853 musket. Due 
to the limitations on expenditure, the quotation was reduced to 
17,515 dollars by leaving out a number of essential tools. Burn 
was then forced to write to the Master General of Ordnance on 
25th May, requesting that the amount of expenditure be increased 
to E12,500. With the larger sum, he argued: - 
0 .. they could not only accept the tender of Messrs. Robbins 
and Lawrence for the whole plant of machines, but also, by 
getting duplicates of two, and triplicate of one of the 
sixteen stocking machines (making in the whole twenty), the 
produce would be trebled, on account of the difference of time 
taken by the different machines in completing their portion of 
the work, so that instead of sixteen machines producing, say, 
fifty stocks per diem, the addition of only four would 
increase the number turned out to 150 daily. -. 8. 
According to the official report from the Committee, as listed in 
their "Report of the Committee On The Machinery of the United 
States of America", while in Washington Burn received a reply 
from J Wood the Secretary to "Ordnance" dated 14th June 1854. 
Wood's letter contained the following information; "Having 
submitted to the Board your letter of the 25th ultimo, requesting 
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authority for the provision of Small-Arms Machinery in the United 
States, I have their commands to inform you that you are 
authorized to make any purchases you may consider to be 
desirable". . 9. However, research at the Public Record Office, 
Kew has. shown that prior to receiving Burn's letter the decision 
had already been taken in England to allow the Committee greater 
flexibility to purchase machinery. In a letter dated 26th May, Mr 
Monsell M. P. sent Colonel Burn a note from Sir C Trevelyan of the 
Treasury. Trevelyan's notej, suggested Monsell, "contains the true 
principle" and made the task of the Committee quite clear, even 
emphasizing it with underlining: - 
I think that the instruction to Mr Anderson and his colleagues 
should be to bring back with them a specimen or model of every 
machine used in America in making musguets the introduction of 
which into this countrv is likelv to be attained with 
advantagLe - Nothing short of this would meet the case. . 10. 
A further letter was sent to Colonel Burn from the Office of 
"Ordnance" on 31st May giving him authorization to engage Mr 
James Burton (late of Harper's Ferry Armoury) as Superintendent 
Assistant Engineer, to supervise the installation of machinery 
purchased in the United States. . 11. 
While the two aforementioned letters were obviously good news, at 
first glance it seems incredible that in the mid-1850s, almost 
half a century after the case was first made to establish Enfield 
as the catalyst for improving the capabilities of the British gun 
trade in order to produce adequate quantities of small arms to 
equip its army and navy, the arguments were still raging at 
Government level over the need for the industry to modernise and 
the amount of money to be spent. Furthermore, it would appear 
particularly curious if one takeg into account the fact that, in 
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March 1854, England and France had entered the war in the Crimea 
which had already been raging for almost six months. One might be 
forgiven for adopting the view that the British Government had 
not learned from its previous mistakes but the incident would 
seem to be an indication of the continuing strength of the lobby 
by the private gun trade upon Parliament. So history was to 
repeat itself once more,, as "Ordnance" was forced to rely on 
foreign imports of small arms from both Europe and America to 
supplement supplies from the British private sector in order to 
equip its hard pressed front line troops. 
Impressive machine tools and scarce designers? 
There is no doubt the Committee were suitably impressed with the 
machinery they had seen in use for the manufacture of small arms 
during their months in the United States. They were highly 
complimentary of the Sharpe's Rifle Company at Hartfordr a 
subsidiary of the machine manufacturers Robbins & Lawrence. At 
the National Armoury at Springfield, they became most 
enthusiastic with regard to the sequenced operation of the Ames 
wood-working machinery used in the production of gun stocks. To 
test the machinery to the full, the Committee arranged with 
Colonel Ripley, Superintendent at the armoury, to have some 
English walnut stocks, which were harder than their American 
black walnut counterparts, put through the shaping process. 
Although the stocks were not completely dry owing to moisture 
absorbed during the sea crossing from England, Burn and his 
associates-were delighted with the results. As a further example 
of the Committee's thoroughness, it is interesting to read in 
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their report that they did not immediately approach the Ames 
company for a quotation but spent some days at the factory 
observing the wood-working machines in operation and examining 
other processes. 
When the Committee finally requested a quotation from the Ames 
company', they were informed by Mr Ames that unless he "could be 
assured of the co-operation and assistance of Mr Buckland, 
Engineer to the United States Armoury, in designing the 
"stocking" machines he could not undertake to make them at all". 
Colonel Ripley sanctioned his engineer's involvement and the 
C'0mmittee arranged that Mr Buckland would receive one thousand 
dollars for his services upon successful completion and delivery 
of the machinery. . 12. This arrangement had several remarkable 
aspects. That the American national Armoury was prepared to be so 
co-operative and that the engineer concerned was to receive a-fee 
for his services while still working for the United States 
Government not only raises questions about the relationship 
between government and private industry but suggests an opposite 
approach to that which was currently in operation in England. 
Research has shown that under the "Ordnance" contract system, 
there is little evidence which would indicate a good working 
relationship between the public and private sectors (these issues 
have already been debated in Chapter's Five and Six of this 
thesis). It will be recalled that the Board of Ordnance had 
operated a strict arms length policy with its contractors and had 
warned its former Inspector of Small Arms, George Lovell, not to 
get involved when he tried to improve the working relationship 
between "Ordnance" and the private sector in the 1840s. 
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Questions regarding the possible scarcity of skilled engineers 
are also raised by the refusal of the Ames company to tender for 
the machines without the services of Cyrus Buckland, an employee 
of the U. S. Government. This might suggest that machine tool 
design engineering skills were rarer than commonly believed in 
America during the middle of the nineteenth century and it could 
also indicate that machine manufacturing companies did not 
generally wish to carry the cost of employing full time design 
engineers. This reluctance would explain why such a talented 
engineer as Buckland was working for the Government National 
Armoury, rather than a private machine tool manufacturer, where, 
it would seem, his particular skills would have been more 
appropriate. Could it be that American machine tool manufacturers 
had not yet begun to convince the indigenous manufacturing 
community of the necessity to mechanise their production? In his 
report of 1882, Charles H Fitch suggests that this may, indeed, 
have been the case. "Apart from all consideration of the earliest 
usage of specific machines,, " he reports, , it must be said that 
their introduction did not make itself felt as a, great industrial 
agency until within twenty-five years past... ". According to 
Fitch, the great increase in mechanisation in the United States 
did not occur until around 1857, some three years after the visit 
of the British Committee on Machinery. . 13. 
Of course, Buckland's reasons for working at Springfield may have 
been a simple matter of being able to obtain better terms and 
conditions at a government establishment. However, at this stage 
one can only speculate on Buckland's reasons, as extensive 
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enquiries in America has established that these particular areas 
are under-researched. Given the possibility that American machine 
tool designers were thin on the ground, at this stage in the 
thesis it is worth pausing for a moment to discover what 
engineers in the-United States had actually achieved and what 
Burn and his Committee had actually seen. 
Interchangeability and a reRort re-examined 
Writers concerned with the history of the "American system of 
manufactures", such as the late KR Gilbert and Nathan Rosenberg, 
when discussing the question of interchangeable parts, usually 
quote from the "Report of the Committee on the Machinery of the 
United States of America", published in 1855. Over the years the 
main focus of attention has been on the section which relates to 
the Committee's experience at the Springfield National Armoury 
when arrangements were made for ten muskets manufactured between 
1844 and 1853 to be dismantled, their separate components jumbled 
up, and then re-assembled without any problems of fitting being 
apparent. This much quoted part of the report has appeared in 
many standard texts and is used to illustrate how far American 
engineers were ahead in the areas of interchangeability and 
machine tool development in comparison to their British 
counterparts. However, it is not clear from reading this 
particular section of the report that the muskets scrutinised by 
the Committee during the exercise were stripped down to their 
very last detail and little knowledge is gained of what might 
have been considered an acceptable standard of tolerance. Closer 
examination of the wording may lead the researcher to interpret 
the information in a different way. For example, the report 
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states: - 
With regard to the interchange of parts between the machine 
made muskets of the United States' Government, which has 
caused so much discussion, the Committee particularly 
interested themselves; and, with the view of testing this as 
fully as possible, selected with Colonel Ripley's permission 
ten muskets, each made in a different year, viz., 1844 to 1853 
inclusive, from the principal arsenal at Springfield, which 
they caused to be taken to pieces in their presence, and the 
parts placed in a row of boxes, mixed up together. Then they 
requested the workman, whose duty it is to "assemble" the 
arms, to put them together, which he did the Committee 
handing him the parts, taken at hazard, with the use of a 
turnscrew only, and as quickly as though they had been English 
muskets, whose parts had been carefully been kept separate. 
. 14. 
Addressing this section of the report in isolation can lead to 
the wrong conclusions being drawn. If one continues through the 
next sentence it is possible that the researcher may reach a 
different opinion or at least keep an open mind, as the report 
goes on to say: - 
The only parts of the musket bearing any mark being the barrel 
and lock, which are stamped with the year in which they were 
made, and all these tried being of different years, the 
Committee took care that no barrel and lock bearing the same 
date, should come together again, and they were put together 
as follows, viz: - 
The barrel of 1847 with the lock of 1849 
1844 of 1852 
1846 if 1848 
1845 of 1844 
1851 01 1850 
1848 of 1853 
1849 if 1845 
1852 it 1847 
1850 to 1851 
1853 of 1846 
The other parts, having no distinguishing mark, were handed 
out at hazard. . 15. 
It is the reference to the Comnittee ensuring that "no barrel and 
lock bearing the same date shotld come together", with the list 
of how the experiment was arranged, which provides an important 
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clue. This suggests that the complete lock was interchanged as a 
sub-assembly, rather than the individual component parts of the 
mechanism (typically twelve) being assembled separately. Another 
clue comes to light in the reference to both the barrel and the 
lock being "stamped with the year". This would suggest that the 
report writer was referring to a fully assembled lock, as it was 
the lock plate rather than the lock in total which was date 
stamped. At the time this was fairly common practice in the gun 
trade, as the lock plate along with the barrel, were the only 
major metal parts of the musket physically large enough to allow 
this. One further piece of evidence from the Committee's report 
which indicates that the locks were changed as complete 
assemblies comes from the following passage (although it does 
suggest that a small quantity of individual lock parts were 
interchanged separately): - "The experiment of interchanging was 
also tried on three locks with the most perfect successr the 
parts fitting as closely, and working as freely as before the 
interchange had taken place". . 16. 
Although the Committee gave the opinion after the interchanging 
exercise "that all the parts were as close, and the muskets as 
efficient, as they were before the interchange took place",, they 
were honest enough to-admit that they were "... diffident in 
expressing any opinion as to the comparative fit of these and the 
English rifle muskets,, as none of them being viewers, they have 
no experience in examining muskets so minutely ... " . 17. This is 
an important piece of information as it conveys to the reader 
that certain parts could readily interchange between weapons. 
Howeverr the report does not inform us if there were any 
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individual variations in component tolerance, and, if there were; 
what was considered acceptable. From the report it is clear that 
the Committee did not subject any of the parts which interchanged 
to a gauge test (they declared themselves inexperienced as 
viewers). Therefore, an important question regarding the degree 
of standardisation which was being achieved remains unanswered. 
Had British "Ordnance" viewers applied the strict standards of 
gauge tests to these parts as they had to those of the private 
contractors prior to the demise of George Lovell, one might ask 
whether the parts would have been accepted. Naturally one can 
only speculate as to the possible outcome but the question does 
once again draw attention to the sev6rity of British viewing 
methods and also calls for'a way of defining interchangeability 
so that the researcher is able to understand with confidence what 
levels of precision mid 19th century machine tools were able to 
achieve. 
It would have been highly unlikely not to have found tolerance 
spreads in parts taken at random from a group of weapons 
manufactured over a period of ten years, particularly those which 
had been made prior to the middle of the century. The Committee's 
report tells us nothing of what might have been the maximum upper 
and lower limits of acceptance. Neither have we learned, 
particularly in the case of the individual lock parts, if 
tolerance standards were critical in every case. For example, if 
the lock was fitted as a sub-assembly then it would be important 
to get the size of the lock plate right to mate with the cut-out 
in the stock. on the other hand, it is quite possible that the 
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dimension of certain internal lock parts would not be known if 
the lock was fitted as a sub-assembly. By bringing these 
relatively significant observations to the fore, it is hoped to 
focus attention upon the level of interchangeability achieved 
through machine manufacture in America at the middle of the 
century. Also it is important to discover if manual adjustments 
to machine made parts were still required. To do this it will be 
necessary to examine the 20th century work of Robert Gordon, as 
there are few clues in the Committee's report which allow us to 
judge the closeness of machine finishing. 
Examining artifacts for evidence of machine finish 
Robert B Gordon, by studying in great detail the material 
evidence of 19th century gun lock parts, and in particular the 
tumbler, has argued that American artificer skills had, with the 
introduction of interchangeability, increased rather than 
decreased. Gordon has found evidence to suggest that bringing 
lock parts to gauge by skillful hand filing continued in the 
national and the better. private armouries at least until 1884. He 
further argues that "the tool marks and dimension measurements 
show that by 1850 artificers using hand files had learned to 
bring rough forged and machine parts of complex shape to final 
dimensions specified by gages to an accuracy of a few thousandths 
of an inch in routine production". By analysing tables and labour 
records at Springfield National Armoury, Gordon has calculated 
that "eighteen operations and seven types of power-driven 
machinery were used in making a tumbler, but one operation, hand 
filing by "first class mechanics", accounts for more than half 
the man-hours required",, (54.5%). -This was in 1864,, ten years 
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after the visit by the British Committee. . 18. Gordon has further 
suggested that as the accuracies of machine made lock parts 
increased, so did the skills of the artificers, who by the 1870s 
could judge by feel and fit when gauging measurements to better 
than 0.001 inch. . 19. 
If Gordon, a professor of geophysics and applied mechanics, is 
correct in his laboratory assessment of the tumblers (his 
findings have not been challenged), then the mental picture 
conveyed by successive commentators over the interpretation of 
the Committee's report, particularly with regard to metal 
components, has brought about a somewhat exaggerated impression 
of what level of precision the machine tools of the day could 
achieve. Also it would appear that the skill of the artisan has 
been omitted from the interchangeability debate. 
A question of misinterpretation? 
Examining in some detail what the Committee had actually 
witnessed and reported with regard to the interchangeability of 
the ten weapons will, hopefully, alert future researchers not 
to always accept the written word until an examination of the 
artifact has taken place. The fact that many writers and 
historians have not fully explored or thought deeply about what 
the Committee had actually reported has left a gap in our 
knowledge. In consequence, the conclusions drawn, although 
seemingly correct, were based on a misinterpretation of the 
documentary evidence. As these conclusions have persisted and 
have remained unchallenged for some time, the opportunity has 
been taken to carry out a physical examination of the assembly 
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procedures of a number of lock mechanisms similar in age and 
pattern to those in the Committee's report. Using the 
information gathered from this present-day experiment, and 
focussing the investigation upon the physical aspects of the 
tests devised by the Committee to determine the claims of 
interchangeability betwixt the ten weapons manufactured between 
1844 and 1853, a clearer picture emerges of what was actually 
witnessed. 
Research has indicated that the most likely weapon the Committee 
would have seen manufactured during their visit to Springfield 
was either the 0.54" U. S. Army rifle model 1841 or the 0.61" 
model 1842 musket. Both of these small arms employ a lock 
mechanism similar to those commonly in use at the time in Europe. 
Armed with this knowledge, the objective was to investigate the 
validity of the statement that assembly of a Springfield small 
arm (assuming that the lock mechanism was broken down to its 
individual component parts) could be achieved "with the use of a 
turnscrew (screwdriver] only". 
The lock mechanisms in question employ a main spring which can 
only be fitted (or removed) under tension. To accomplish this a 
special tool known as a spring cramp (Figs. 23-27) (mainspring 
vise in America), is used to compress the spring. . 20. When 
dismantling a lock it is normal practice to place the spring in 
the cramp and tighten the device to the required tension, 
thereby compressing it. The spring can then be removed and left 
gripped in the jaws of the cramp until the lock is re-assembled. 
As the Committee's report makes no mention of such an operation 
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taking place, it would seem safe to assume, from the statement 
"with the use of a turnscrew only" that the Committee had 
witnessed the assembly of weapons with locks which had not been 
broken down into their twelve individual component parts. 
Therefore, what the Committee had seen was most likely a weapon 
being assembled with a pre-constructed lock as a sub-assembly. As 
the majority of commentators have repeatedly used this section of 
the Committee's report to indicate the advanced level of 
interchangeability reached by American engineers by the middle of 
the century, it seemed appropriate to re-visit the experiment on 
which this information was based, not only to put the record 
straight, but to help clarify aspects of the mental picture of 
machine tool accuracy already created. 
It should be remembered that the Committee when visiting 
Springfield saw two types of material being worked, wood and 
metal. Like Whitworth before them, the Committee were highly 
complementary about the novelty and accuracy of the sequence of 
wood-working machines for producing gun stocks. This aspect of 
the visit, as pointed out in the last chapter, allowed an 
engineer like Anderson to further communicate his enthusiasm 
for the novelty of the system through lectures-to learned 
societies on his return to Britain. However, what seems to have 
been forgotten is that wood is easier to machine than metal and 
the whole debate over the standard of accuracy achieved by mid 
19th century machine tools generally had become confused, until 
Gordon took a scientific look at some metal artifacts. 
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A recognition of American talent 
It should be clearly understood that the detailed examination of 
the above section of the Committee's report, containing the 
experiments between muskets of different vintage, does not 
detract in any way from the considerable contribution towards 
interchangeability made by American engineers like Whitney, 
North, Blanchard and Hall, to name but a few. These men had 
helped perfect precision engineering over a period of many years 
by evolutionary experimentation and accurate gauging, with minute 
attention to detail. Perhaps the most significant contribution 
which gave rise to the level of precision required for 
interchangeability came from the design, development, and 
introduction of good quality machinery into the manufacturing 
process. Of the many great American engineers, John H Hall (1781 
-1841) stands out not only as a man of considerable inventive 
genius but also as a man of vision and determination. Although 
under great pressure to fulfil a government contract for one 
thousand of his breech loading rifles, signed in March 1819, Hall 
persevered with constructing and designing the production tools 
and machinery which he required to manufacture these weapons with 
his "New System" of interchangeable parts. As a result the 
contract was not completed until December 1824. . 21. 
Hall appears to have clearly grasped the concept that to have a 
manufacturing system which produced parts consistently to a 
repeatable standard required not only machinery designed with 
solid and stable frames but also balanced drive pulleys and 
shafting. He also sought to reduce the incidence of human error 
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by advocating precision methods of measurement, where 
calculations were derived from a single point on the work piece. 
. 22. In many ways the achievements of American engineers are 
quite remarkable as they endeavoured to solve problems of 
precision and standardisation before the science of the most 
crucial piece of the metal machining process, the carbon steel 
cutting toolf was understood. According to Tom Roltj "The world's 
first improved tool steel was produced in 1868 in a little iron 
works near Coleford in the heart of GloucestershirelsýForest of 
Dean. Its inventor was Robert Forrester Mushet (1811-1891), the 
son of a pioneer Scottish ironmaster,, David Mushet ... 11 . 23. 
Therefore, for American engineers to have reached the level of 
standardisation they had by the time the 1854 Committee visited 
Springfield suggests they were encouraged rather than obstructed. 
The motivation would seem to stem from the initiative of the 
American Government, who, as early as 1815, had specified that 
parts should not only interchange between individual weapons 
within a contract but also with all similar small arms produced 
at the other national armouries. . 24. 
The placing of machinery contracts 
In placing contracts with the various machinery manufacturers the 
Committee had taken a long term view of their responsibilities, 
arriving at a number of logical conclusions in the choice of 
suppliers. For example, they gave the following reasons for 
choosing certain companies which would not necessarily be the 
fastest to deliver: - 
In making contracts the Committee have endeavoured to secure 
against confusion by having dealings with as few' firms as 
possible, and those of highest character; and they trust that 
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though the machinery ordered will not be completed so soon as 
they could have desired, when it is delivered and set to work 
it will prove good and efficient, and by superseding 
hand-labour, be, the saving of large sums to the British 
Government, and, at the same time, add to the uniformity and 
stability of the articles manufactured by its assistance. 
. 25. 
Apart from their prime objective of equipping Enfield, the '&V 
Committee had also to purchase suitable machinery for the Royal 
Laboratory and Carriage Department at Woolwich. This amounted to 
17,200.28 dollars for card cutting, wood cutting, tension & 
torsion, tin working and percussion cap machines. The Committee 
took the view when selecting machines for Woolwich that they were 
not "guided by finish or solid construction". They were more 
interested in machines that were "most ingenious", reasoning 
"should it be necessary, more stable machines can be 
constructed". It would seem from the evidence that the Committee 
had based its decision upon the observation that "all the 
machines used for wood work in the United States are roughly 
constructed, and would not bear comparison in stability and 
appearance with the highly-finished iron machinery of England". 
. 26. While these might seem to be perfectly reasonable and 
justifiable motives for adopting this stance, it did, however, 
give the Committee the advantage of securing machinery which had 
already gone through the expensive research and development. 
process. This would, no doubt, allow scope for cost effective 
modifications and improvements at a later date in Britain. 
The deliberate policy of selecting the "most ingenious" 
machinery, even if it proved to be mechanically flimsy, suggests 
that there was nothing comparable operating in the British gun 
trade at the time. If, indeed, there was, it would certainly have 
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been known to Anderson, who in March 1853 had made an extensive 
tour of British manufacturing industries and drew up a report of 
his findings for "Ordnance". The tour had clearly made a lasting 
impression on Anderson who repeated his findings a year later 
when he stated that the military bayonet and musket manufacturing 
industries were "... in a low mechanical state,, and at least 50 
years behind most of the other branches of manufacturing industry 
which we have been examining". However,, he went on to say that 
11 ... the tool makers of Leeds and Manchester, steel pen and wood 
screw making of Birmingham. Those we were very much pleased 
with". Interestingly Lieutenant (later Captain) Warlow R. A. a 
member of the three man Committee to the United States of 
America, had accompanied Anderson on his tour of the British 
manufacturing industries. It is therefore likely that Warlow's 
presence would have increased the'Committee's overall knowledge 
of the shortcomings of machine tool usage in Britain and 
strengthened considerably their position when deciding the most 
suitable equipment to purchase. . 27. 
Given the fact that the Committee had eventually been allowed an 
almost free hand by the Board of Ordnance to purchase appropriate 
machinery, they may have formed the opinion that they were in a 
controlling position to provide fast-track solutions to 
engineering problems at home. To achieve this, and to remove the 
need for lengthy and costly specialist machine tool development 
programmes, the British Government, through the expertise of the 
Committee, could take a short cut and bring its ordnance 
factories up to date by buying equipment off the shelf or having 
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it made to order. The Committee's decision to purchase machinery 
which was ingenious although flimsy in construction allowed them 
further opportunities to present British engineers with physical 
examples of machine tools. This had the distinct advantage of 
eliminating problems which can easily occur after a fact finding 
visit, through misunderstandings, inadequate descriptions and 
incorrectly taken dimensions. Having actual physical examples of 
machine tools to examine could also provide a less costly way of 
encouraging British firms to carry out improvements and 
modifications. This would have been particularly necessary if 
"Ordnance" for any reason lacked the ability or capacity to 
complete such work in-house. Examples such as this provide hard 
evidence of technological diffusion, demonstrating one of the 
many ways which allowed technical transfer to take place between 
countries through the purchase and movement of machinery and the 
evolutionary process of adapting tried and tested ideas. 
What the Committee had seen gave them confidence to sign 
contracts for a considerable quantity of machine tools. Four 
tenders were accepted from the Ames company, mainly for stocking 
machines and gauges, the total cost being 46,844.62 dollars. The 
first of these tenders was for a sequence of fifteen stocking 
machines, as opposed to the sixteen used in the process at the 
Springfield Armoury. Buckland who had been requested to design 
the machines within the terms of the contract to accommodate the 
Enfield pattern 1853 musket stock, was of the opinion that one 
operation could be left out. However, when studying the third 
tender for evidence of machines to supplement and increase the 
daily output of the fifteen, it appears that a further two 
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different types were 
from the construction 
left off on the third 
Enfield was to have a 
The total quantity of 
gauges and a piece of 
twenty-two. 
introduced. Unfortunately it is not clear 
of the tenders (machine numbers having been 
and wording being ambiguous) whether 
sequence of sixteen or seventeen machines. 
machines purchased from Amest not counting 
equipment for testing power, amounted to 
It is interesting to observe, from the text of the Committee's 
report, that clues are beginning to emerge which couple the 
design of the rifle to the economy of production. For example, 
the Committee, when submitting the pattern 1853 to the armoury at 
Springfield, "deem of sufficient importance to mention" the 
"criticism of the officers and others" concerning three areas of 
design, one of which related directly to ease of manufacture. It 
was pointed out that the design of the trigger-plate and 
trigger-guard on the American musket was 11 ... preferable to that 
of the English one, both as a part of the arm, and as an article 
to be manufactured by machinery". . 28. This, therefore, implies 
that, if the arms designer and the engineers responsible for the 
design of machinery and the factory lay-out could come together 
prior to commencing the development of a new weapon, it would be 
perfectly feasible to save considerable sums of money on capital 
equipment and costly production operations or processes. 
However, as has already been highlighted in the thesis (and as 
will be'discussed in greater detail in the following chapter), 
there is little evidence to suggest that these particular aspects 
of weapon design relating to ease of manufacture were ever 
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seriously pursued, either by the Board of Ordnance or its 
successor, the War Department, during the remainder of the 19th 
century. 
Three contracts were signed with Robbins & Lawrence for a 
quantity of 129 machines to carry out the different milling, 
drilling and cutting operations required in the production of the 
Enfield pattern musket. The total cost of this machinery which 
included some specialist tools came to 41,334.60 dollars. 
Curiously it was the Ames company, rather than Robbins & 
Lawrence, who tendered and obtained the contract for a complete 
set of 115 jigs and gauges to measure every aspect of the Enfield 
muskett not just the stock as might be implied from Ames's 
construction of the wood-working machinery. This might indicate 
that the Ames company, after securing the services of Cyrus 
Buckland, may have been able to allow some of their craftsmen 
with higher skills to concentrate more fully on the very 
demanding and time consuming task of gauge making. On the other 
hand it may simply have been the case that Ames had greater 
capacity to accomplish the work within the required time-scale of 
twelve months. Robbins & Lawrence had contracted to supply the 
bulk of their orders within nine and fifteen months respectively. 
This might suggest that they had sufficient work in hand and did 
not wish to take on the added expense of extra skilled staff for 
a relatively short period. 
Before leaving America towards the end of August, the Committee 
received a further tender of 38,784.37 dollars from'Robbins 
Lawrence to supply a barrel making plant for the Enfield musketý 
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As the Committee considered this to be a "considerable sum of 
money" they resolved to leave the offer open until they had the 
opportunity to discuss the matter with the Board of Ordnance upon 
their return to England. Neverthelessf the Committee took the 
opportunity to venture the following opinion in their report: - 
"that it would be much safer to get such a plant of machines from 
Messrs. Robbins and Lawrence, who have studied and practised the 
manufacture of barrels, than from those who have less experience 
in this branch of the trade"... . 29. 
A new and different world? 
The Committee had spent almost five months in America viewing a 
wide cross-section of manufacturing establishments, their 
processes and production techniques. From the Committee's reportr 
it is evident that in most instances they were impressed with 
what they had seen. The contrast in the level of mechanisation 
between British manufacturers and the selected industries of 
their tour had caused them to write a futuristic warning: - 
The contriving and making of machinery has been so common in 
this country, and so many heads and hands are at work with 
extraordinary energy; that unless the example is followed at 
home, notwithstanding the difference of wages, it is to be 
feared that American manufacturers will before long become 
exporters not only to foreign countries, but even to England, 
who for want of energy in improving their machinery and 
applying it to special purposes. The advantages in a 
manufacturing point of view are all on the side of our 
countrymen, and there is nothing made in which they ought not 
to be able to undersell. . 30. 
Looking at what remains of British industry today, it would seem 
that the Committee's advance warning has not been heeded by 
industrialists or successive governments. Nevertheless, they had 
experienced a vision of industry (albeit a narrow selected 
sector) which by British standards must have appeared highly 
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advanced, particularly that which they had witnessed in the 
American national armouries. 
The Committee had been staggered by the'working conditions within 
many of the factories they had visited, leading them to remark 
"The care almost universally bestowed on the comfort of the 
workpeople, particularly attracted the notice of the Committee; 
clean places for washing being provided, presses to contain their 
change of clothes, and an abundant supply of good drinking water, 
in many cases cooled with ice". . 31. During their travels, the 
Committee had observed a feature of many of the public and 
private manu facturing plants they had visited which set them 
apart from their British counterparts. This was investment in a 
good working environment, indicating an air of confidence amongsý 
American industrialists who had seemingly taken a long term view 
and were planning for future expansion. The Committee's opinion 
would seem to confirm this notion as they suggested the improved 
working conditions were due to the "speculative character of the 
proprietors". A prime example of speculation and forward planning 
was observed when they visited Colonel Colt's new factory in 
Hartford, which, at the time, was under construction. The 
Committee reported that they were "astonished" by the magnitude 
of the buildings, particularly when they learned that it was 
planned for the factory to be the "largest and finest armoury in 
the world" when completed, being twice the size of the proposed 
Enfield plant. 
Of course one must be careful when analysing such reports as that 
of the 1854 Committee to America as it is possible to draw the 
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wrong conclusions. Their tour had been specifically planned to 
visit those manufacturers which had invested in novel types of 
machinery. Therefore, it is not possible to discover the general 
level of mechanisation employed throughout the industries of the 
United States. In fact Fitch had suggested in his 1882 Census 
(debated above) that the general level of mechanisation in 
American industry was not as great as popularly thought. 
Nevertheless, and in contrast to Britain, one can not escape the 
fact that, when reading relevant documentation of the period, 
there was in America a genuine air of enthusiasm and excitement 
for novel ideas. This had no doubt been encouraged by the 
pioneering work of the national armouries in their quest for 
standardisation. The situation is probably best summed up by the 
Committee when they were prompted to write "the avidity with 
which any new idea is laid hold of, and improved upon, a spirit 
occasionally carried to excess, but upon the whole productive of 
more good than evil". . 32. From the recording of such comments 
it 
it would seem that the Committee had been "intoxicated" by their 
visit. This no doubt had helped to further the notion in Britain 
(debated in the last chapter) that the machinery which was on 
order for Enfield was common-place in the United States. 
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WHAT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR DELAYING THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW METHODS 
OF WEAPON MANUFACTURE IN BRITAIN? 
To answer this question it will be necessary to examine the 
procedures employed by the Board of Ordnance in the design and 
development of new weapons. It will also be necessary to discover 
whether British engineers possessed the essential skills, vision 
and inventiveness to have developed a system for the mass 
production of small arms manufactured with interchangeable parts, 
prior to the British Government's purchase of machine tools from 
America. However, while ease of manufacture and assembly is the 
Holy Grail of every plant manager, it is not necessarily correct 
to imagine that the introduction of a product based on 
interchangeable parts is the ultimate in engineering design. The 
reasons for this seeming paradox will be investigated within the 
confines of this chapter through an examination of the "Ordnance" 
system of design and procurement of new weapons. 
Ease of manufacture and assemblv 
Research to date has not uncovered any evidence which would 
suggest that, in the first half of the 19th century, the Board of 
Ordnance had actively considered a change to the method by which 
new weapons were selected in order to ensure that designs 
included features improving ease of manufacturer assembly and 
repair. Furthermore, there appears to have been little or no 
thought given to a coordinated or collective approach to design 
which would have encouraged a more economical mode of 
manufacture. Engineers had been aware for some time. of the 
benefits of an integrated approach to product design and * 
manufacture. The respected "Ordnande" engineer John Anderson was 
247 
well aware that weapon parts could be made more cheaply without 
losing their efficiency if designed with ease of manufacture in 
mind. In evidence to the Select Committee of 1854, Anderson 
demonstrated his concern for economical production methods by 
giving a hypothetical example of being ordered to manufacture a 
gun by machinery to a certain pattern, stating "I would study to 
carry it out; but I should not be doing my duty if I did not say, 
"By this plan you may do it much cheaper". . 1. Moreover, it is 
known, from the results of research carried out and highlighted 
throughout this thesis, that there were many complex issues 
surrounding. the subject of economical weapon manufacture which 
had influenced the judgement of the Board of Ordnance. The 
political pressures placed upon Parliament by the private gun 
trade, and the long period of relative peace following the 
Napoleonic Wars were just two. As we have seen in Chapter. Eight, 
it was the Crimean conflict which finally acted as the trigger 
for a more efficient means of military weapon manufacture by 
machine methods. However, research-has indicated that these 
issues did not lead immediately to a system which deliberately 
set out to consider ease of manufacture at the point of product 
design. 
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities with Russia, the annual 
output of arms from the Enfield factory was relatively small and 
we have seen that the bulk of military weapon's in fact, were 
produced by manual methods by private sector contractors. Under 
such an arrangement, the majority of the overhead cost would have 
been shouldered by the private sector. Therefore, there would 
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have been little benefit for "Ordnance" to have pursued the 
preparation of new weapon designs which could be manufactured 
more efficiently and cheaply by machine methods. Conversely, 
there would have been little incentive for the private 
contractors to have recommended improvements in weapon design. 
For them, stability of product for as long as possible with 
minimum amount of change was all important. 
Given these circumstances it would seem reasonable to conclude 
that the maintenance of the "Ordnance" contract system of arms 
procurement helped delay not only the system of machine intensive 
production but also the introduction of weapon designs which were 
easy to manufacture. One might therefore argue, no machines, no 
need to modify the product. The corollary of this would seem to 
be to install new machines then redesign the product for ease of 
manufacture. But was this true in the case of the newly installed 
American machine tools at Enfield Lock, which had been 
specifically designed to manufacture a standard weapon with 
interchangeable parts. - 
New machines at Enfield 
The machine tools purchased from America by the three man 
Committee were installed in a new purpose built machine room at 
Enfield Lock between 1855 and 1856. Through their introduction 
it was hoped to secure continuity of small arms supplies for the 
armed forces by dramatically increasing the manufacturing 
capacity of the factory. Because the new process was based on a 
system of standardised interchangeable parts, the Board of 
Ordnance were also expecting to see a number of economic 
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benefits. These would range from improvements in weapon assembly 
times, reduced labour content per weapon, simplicity of part 
storage and improved stock control. There would also be benefits 
for the military once the new manufacturing system came into 
service. Small arms constructed'with interchangeable parts would 
have simplified battlefield repairs, allowing armourers with 
less skill and training than their predecessors to do the work. 
Before interchangeability, components requiring replacement at 
the front had to be individually made and fitted. This was 
costly and time consuming. 
The introduction of the new machine tools opened up further 
manufacturing opportunities. There was much to be achieved by 
ensuring the design of future weapons took into account the 
limitations of machines to follow awkward shapes. "Ordnance" 
were now placed to evaluate and alter the design of those parts 
of the arm which had evolved over many years prior to the machine 
tool era. Several of these items, as Anderson had already pointed 
out, had complex shapes which were not essential to the effective 
and efficient performance of the weapon. This latter aspect will 
be examined later to discover if "Ordnance" fully appreciated 
the economic benefits to be gained from a programme of 
integrated product design linked to ease of manufacture. 
New machinery, old style weapon 
The new machine tools installed at Enfield had been built to 
accommodate the existing pattern 1853, the design of which had 
evolved from earlier weapon types. In other words, the "American 
system" had been adapted as far as possible to fit a surviving 
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British weapon. The pattern 1853 had been developed as the result 
of an open competition in 1852 and it was not until 1854 that the 
British Commission to America placed orders for the new machine 
tools, clearly demonstrating the lack of connection between 
weapon design and the new manufacturing process. Looking at the 
weapon's historic and evolutionary developmentr parts of which 
can be traced back to 17th century France, further confirms that 
the approach to manufacturing lacked coordination with design. 
From an examination of a range of artefacts manufactured at 
Enfield it can readily be deduced that the shape and design of 
certain key components of the pattern 1853 had not been modified 
to favour more cost effective production. 
As the timing of the factory alterations and the installation of 
the new equipment. at Enfield coincided with the Crimean War, it 
might be argued that "Ordnance" did not wish to experiment with 
weapon design changes to facilitate further manufacturing 
improvements. Such a decision would have seemed rational at a 
time when the supply of weapons to the front was absolutely 
crucial. However, if this was the reason, one would have expected 
the emergence of a strategy aimed at weapon design improvements 
to assist manufacture and assembly to be pursued in the more 
relaxed atmosphere when hostilities ceased. Later in this chapter 
it will be suggested that this opportunity was never grasped. 
Typical methods of weapon improvement 
During the early period and until quite late into the 19th 
century, refinement of small arm's design usually came about 
through individuals suggesting improvements. In January 1885 the 
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Inspector General of Musketry, Colonel Harrison Trent of the 
School of Musketry, Hythe, Kent, wrote to the Under Secretary of 
State for War in support of James Aston, the Civil Master 
Armourer, who was claiming recompense for his inventions. Between 
1855 and 1882 Ashton had submitted some fifteen improvements and 
modifications to various small arms in service, several of which 
had been adopted by military. In fact, Aston had been paid E100 
for three improvements he had submitted between 1855 and 1856. 
These consisted of a new pattern ramrod with a jag head to allow 
easier removal from the stock, an improved pattern lock cramp. for 
removing the main spring and a snap-cap to fit over the nipple. 
All these improvements were for the Snider rifle, although the 
cramp could be used for the removal of similar main springs from 
other weapons which employed the same type of lock mechanism. . 2.. 
Post production modifications like the ones submitted by Aston 
arose from the practical experience of handling the weapon in the 
field and were normally designed for ease of use, not ease of 
manufacture. If the modification submitted could improve the 
weapon without both a significant on-cost and the creation of 
other difficulties, then its introduction would normally be given 
serious consideration by "Ordnance" or the War Office. 
It was not unusual for good ideas and designs to be taken from 
other manufacturers. Sometimes this came through advertisements 
for weapon selection by open competition or by inventors sending 
samples to "Ordnance" for evaluation. On occasion "Ordnance" 
would obtain the weapons directly for examination. In such 
circumstances "Ordnance" might negotiate a licensing or royalty 
agreement for incorporating these changes into their own 
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weapons. New ideas were not just limited to British inventors. 
In an endeavour to keep abreast of small arms development in 
Europe,, "Ordnance" dispatched George Lovell to Germany in 1849 
to examine recently introduced weapons. on his return to England 
he was ordered to prepare a number of muskets and rifles based 
on French and German patterns. Subsequently Lovell was again 
sent to Germany and instructed to bring back a sample of their 
latest breech loaders and also a French Minie rifle. . 3. However, 
there is no evidence to suggest from an examination of the 
available reports regarding weapon change and modification that 
the alterations made bore any relationship to ease of manufacture 
or assembly. They were primarily introduced to improve aspects 
of battlefield handling such as firepower, range and accuracy. 
Research has shown that many people were under the impression, 
and for that matter still are, that superiority of a particular 
weapon was due to the clever design and development of an 
individual armoury like Enfield. For example, in the House of 
Commons in June 1861 a leading article from the Times newspaper 
was quoted in debate. The article discussed the effectiveness of 
the Enfield pattern 1853 rifle during the Crimean War by saying 
it "Smote the Russians like the Hand of a bestroying Angel". . 4. 
While the prose may seem somewhat florid and patriotic, no doubt 
the report helped spread. the notion that the RSAF at Enfield had 
designed a superior weapon, which completely ignored the 
evolutionary process which had brought the pattern 1853 to its 
eventual state of development. A further aspect which seems to 
have been overlooked is that the vast majority of pattern 1853s 
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supplied to the front line during the conflict were not 
manufactured at Enfield at all. At the time when Britain entered 
the war in the Crimea in March 1854, the Commission to the United 
States of America had only just set out on its fact finding 
mission. Orders for machine tools to equip the Enfield factory 
were therefore not placed until later that year. The time then 
taken for the machines to be manufactured, shipped and installed 
meant that the plant did not come fully on-stream until January 
1857, some ten months after hostilities had ceased. 
Methods of weapon selection 
The second half of the 19th century in Britain saw a marked leap 
in the level of innovation in the evolutionary development of the 
small arm, resulting in a narrowing of focus towards an improved 
performance standard of military weaponry. This was accomplished 
by a method of selection through open competition between 
gun-smiths and inventors, rather than setting new design and 
performance criteria in the form of a specific research and 
development'project. The advantage. of the system of open 
competition was that the War Office incurred minimum development 
costs; the disadvantage was that little attention was paid to 
ease of manufacture and assembly. As has already been pointed 
out, the introduction of the "American system" at Enfield in the 
mid 1850s with sequenced machinery producing arms with 
interchangeable parts, had little effect in moving "Ordnance" 
towards a policy of integrating weapon design with ease of 
manufacture. To discover why the opportunity to produce weapons 
more simply and economically had seemingly been ignored, it will 
be necessary to examine in some detail the reports of the 
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ordnance Select Committee on Small Arms which took place as the 
second half of the century got under way. In so doing, we will 
gain a better understanding of the criteria used by "Ordnance" 
when selecting the next generation of weapons. 
At the time of the American Civil War there was considerable 
controversy among high ranking British officers and government 
officials over the effectiveness of the breech loading rifle in 
use with the Federal Troops. On 13th June 1864 the British 
Secretary of State for War, Lord de Grey, set up a committee to 
investigate the usefulness of equipping the infantry with breech 
loading arm s. Grey himself had considerable reservations about 
the breech loader as he was of the opinion that "troops thus 
armed might fire away their ammunition too rapidly, and thus 
increase the difficulty of supplying them with ammunition during 
action, and render necessary the employment of a larger amount of 
transport than would otherwise be required". . 5. 
The Committee met for the first time on Monday, 27th June 1864 
under the Presidency of Major General Russell C. B. to consider 
the evidence of a number of army officers and experts. Lieutenant 
Colonel Gallwey R. E. and Captain Alderson R. A. attended and 
informed the Committee that during their recent visit to America 
they had discovered different opinions among the military 
authorities as to the value of the breech loader. Unfortunately 
these officers were not able to give a personal account of the 
breech loading rifles in action as they explained, "the United 
States Secretary for War refused us permission to accompany the 
army on active service". Gallwey-and Alderson said that several 
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General and Staff Officers which they had interviewed "seemed to 
hold the opinion that breech-loading arms, in the hands of 
selected bodies of troops, would be productive of good results". 
. 6. A Brigadier General Seymour, a very experienced soldier by 
all accounts, who had acknowledged the usefulness of the Spencer 
breech loader at the battle of Oluslee,, was "averse to 
breech-loaders as a general weapon for infantry. He advocates the 
arming of flank companies or other picked bodies with special 
arms; but for the main body of. infantry he would prefer a simple 
smooth-bore musket". The reasons for this preference was thought 
to be due to "the general nature of the country, which being 
densely wooded, only admits of actions being fought at close 
quarters". . 7. On the other hand,, Brigadier General Terry 
reported that, when he was in command at Pocotaligo, his troops 
were suffering considerably from enemy fire. He therefore ordered 
a Colonel commanding a regiment whose flank companies were armed 
with Sharp's breech loaders to "push forward those companies into 
the best cover they could find, and open fire on the enemy". It 
was said that "The men knowing that this was done to test the 
value of their arms, answered with a cheer, and advanced in 
skirmishing order, covering themselves as best they could. In a 
short time the enemy's fire was subdued". . 8. 
The second meeting of the Committee took place on Thursday, 30th 
June 1864, when Brevet Colonel Dixon R. A., Superintendent of the 
Royal Small Arms Factory, Enfield was examined. It was reported 
that Dixon "Considers breech-loading practicably objectionable; 
the prime cardinal difficulty, however, being connected with the 
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ammunition". His main objection concerned the safe storage of 
certain types of breech loading ammunition which had its own 
"means of combustion". . 9. 
A Major Young R. A. was examined by the Committee and reported 
that during his foreign tour of 1861 he had been present at the 
the autumn manoeuvres of the Prussian troops on the Rhine when 
the breech loading needle gun was used. There he had been told 
by Austrian officers "that the arm had been discarded from their 
service; and the Prussians themselves would also discard it were 
they not so entirely committed to its use". He also voiced 
similar objections to those of the Secretary of State for War 
when he explained "breech-loaders are not adapted for general 
service, but only for trained men and for special occasions; and 
that they are a temptation to young soldiers to fire away all 
their ammunition". . 10. 
James Burton, the former Master Armourer at Harpers Ferry who had 
been brought from America to oversee the installation of the new 
gun making machinery at Enfield, told the Committee that breech 
loaders "are the favourite weapons of the Federal cavalry; and 
that the general impression in the United States is that the 
system will be universally adopted". This, incidentally, was also 
Burton's personal opinion. . 11. 
The Committee appear to have been extremely thorough in their 
investigation, even going as far as to read extracts from a 
report some fifteen years earlier (dated 19th October 1849) by 
the late Inspector of Small Arms, George Lovell. Here it was 
reported that Lovell had received assurances from the military 
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authorities of the effectiveness of the Prussian breech loading 
needle-gun when used during the war with Denmark. Lovell had 
reported in his evidence that the "... advantages claimed for it 
[needle-gun] being that it has little or no recoil, can be fired 
12 times a minute, and can be fired and loaded by a soldier even 
when lying down or presenting his bayonet to the enemy". . 12. 
Major General Hamilton C. B. late Military Attache to the 
British Embassy in Berlin and at the time Vice-President of the 
Council of Military Education, reported that he had received 
"most satisfactory accounts of the needle-gun ... the arm has 
been much improved there during its 16 years since introduction, 
and is now the only rifle used by the Prussian infantry". It is 
also interesting to note that Hamilton went on to suggest that 
he had "Never heard of any accident caused by the ammunition 
containing its own ignition, or of any escape of powder from the 
gun", this, had been a major fear expressed in evidence by 
Colonel Dixon. Hamilton also stated that he had "Never heard of 
any difficulty in keeping up supplies in the field". This was the 
basis of an earlier objection to the adoption of the breech 
loader by the Secretary of State for War, Lord de Grey. . 13. 
After completing four meetings between the 27th June and the 11th 
July 1864 and having listened carefully to the evidence of the 
various experts and military officers, the Committee "beg to 
report their opinion in favour of arming the Infantry wholly 
with breech loading arms". -. 
14. Although the Committee, which 
comprised of five Colonels under the Presidency of a Major 
General, took the collective decision to recommend that breech 
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loaders should be issued to'the infantry, it can clearly be seen, 
from the range of evidence given, that opinions were divided as 
to the usefulness of this weapon. While this particular debate 
highlights the necessity for training military personnel in the 
use of any new weapon and identifies potential logistic supply 
problems for the army, it also, in reality, demonstrates quite 
graphically the lack of any sort of planned weapons development 
programme. It would therefore appear that the Committee of 1853 
under John Anderson, Superintendent of the Ordnance Factories at 
Woolwich, who called the method of procuring small arms 
"heterogeneous in its character", might have used the same 
terminology had they been asked to investigate the then current 
method of designing and developing small arms for the British 
Army. 
An opportunity to change 
As we have seen earlier, under the "Ordnance" contract system of 
arms procurement which had operated throughout the first half of 
the century, Enfield had effectively been denied the ability to 
produce weapons on a large scale through political pressure 
exerted by the private sector on Parliament. It can also be seen 
from Lovell's evidence to the Select Committee of 1849 that he 
was opposed (at least on the surface) to the expansion of 
Enfield's manufacturing qapabilities. These measures had allowed 
the factory to concentrate on a policy of keeping a "check" upon 
the private gun trade in both Birmingham and London. However, as 
we have already discussed, with "Ordnance" in firm control of 
military small arms manufacture as the second half of the century 
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progressed, Enfield's annual output had increased dramatically. 
Between 1858 and 1864 the factory produced in excess of 505,000 
guns and pistols. Having the potential to produce such large 
volumes, it might seem curious that savings were not apparently 
being considered by making simple design changes to the weapont 
particularly those which Anderson had identified earlier. . 15. 
With the acceptance of the breech loader as the new weapon for 
the military, there was a clear opportunity to maximise the 
efficiency of the recently installed plant at Enfield. This could 
have been partly achieved by specifying a simple manufacturing 
and assembly clause in the open competition document which 
invited tenders for the modification of the pattern 1853 to a 
breech loader. Of course there is the possibility that the War 
Office, having taken responsibility for arms procurement, was 
intent on containing the conversion cost of the Enfield rifle in 
the short term by stipulating in the tender notice that the 
alteration was "not to exceed El per arm". . 16. 
As discussed above, from a rudimentary examination of the lock 
mechanism of the pattern 1853 Enfield rifle, the shape and design 
of this component had changed little from its origins in 17th 
century France. Carrying out the modification to a breech loader 
on the Snider principle would mean that the lock design would 
continue into the second half of the 19th century. Therefore, 
there can be little doubt that successive Master Generals of 
Ordnance and those in authority at the War Office had not 
considered ease of manufacture and assembly. Consequently, it is 
probably fair to speculate that, as most of these men came from 
military and political backgrounds, their interests lay-mainly in 
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a weapon's range, accuracy and fire-power, rather than the 
niceties of manufacturing efficiencies. For example, Viscount 
Henry Hardinge in 1852 had succeeded Henry William Paget Marquis 
of Anglesea as Master General of the. Ordnance. Both men had 
served with Wellington in the Peninsula Wars and both had 
interwoven their military careers with various political 
appointments. Wellington, in his long and distinguished military 
and political career, had himself been Master General from 1819 
to 1827 and Prime Minister from 1828 to 1830. . 17. 
IFrom 1683, the office of Master General had been filled by a 
senior member of the military holding a Cabinet seat. This 
practice continued until 1828.0 FG Hogg has said of the 
situation "The office (of MGO) therefore, came to be regarded as 
a prize for the most distinguished soldier of his time". . 18. It 
would therefore seem fair to conclude that these particular 
occupations were hardly the best qualifications for appreciating 
and understanding the intricacies of production engineering and 
the cost benefits to be gained from a weapon development 
programme which considered ease of manufacture and assembly. 
A different design and development philosophy 
In contrast to British "Ordnance", the American national 
armouries demonstrated a greater awareness of the need constantly 
to review and to develop methods of efficient arms production. 
Merritt Roe Smith, when discussing interchangeability, pays 
tribute to John H Hall who "stood foremost among those who 
combined inventiveness with entrepreneurial skill in blending 
men, machinery, and precision measurement methods into a workable 
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system of production". Although Roe Smith has recognised that 
Hall failed to "... achieve significant economies of scale" when 
he produced the first "... fully interchangeable weapons in the 
United States", he does however see him as a "... pivotal figure 
in the annals of American industry". . 19. An illuminating point 
concerning Hall's expertise came from a contemporary, Eli Whitney 
Blake, the nephew of Eli Whitney. Meant as a criticism, he stated 
that Hall "had purposely designed his rifle for interchangeable 
production",, suggesting that "whenever insurmountable technical 
difficulties arose, the inventor eliminated them by changing his 
model accordingly". . 20. Without apparently knowing it,, Blake had 
put his finger precisely on the point, that of altering the 
design of a product to accommodate the needs or inadequacies of a 
production system. Roe Smith has stated that there were eleven 
changes made by Hall to his rifle, between 1823 and 1841 which 
were generally not "aimed at circumventing technical production 
problems". This might seem somewhat ironic as Roe Smith implies 
that the changes, rather than simplifying machine operations, 
"... demanded even greater machining capacity". It is, however, 
conceivable that some of the early changes made by Hall were to 
accommodate variations from the pattern which occurred at the 
time when he was making certain parts by hand for the first 
contract guns which was prior to his machinery being completed. 
These alterations would probably have been necessary to even out 
spreads created by hand finishing, thereby setting a standard for 
the machines. This may have been the root of a number of contract 
difficulties, as it is known that not all the 19,680 weapons made 
under Hall at Harpers Ferry were completely interchangeable. Roe 
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Smith has pointed out that the "operating parts of the Hall rifle 
were more numerous and complex in design than those of the common 
military musket". This, he suggests, eventually provoked the War 
Department to cease production of Hall's weapon at Harpers Ferry 
in 1844. . 21. 
I 
The evidence produced by Roe Smith would seem to confirm that 
Hall played a "pivotal" role not only in the development of 
interchangeable part manufacture but also in the acceptance of 
the notion that product design could be changed to accommodate 
the then current production technology. This latter point must-be 
completely understood by any designer wishing to have his product 
made in a standardised way by mass production machinery. It is a 
fundamental principal that, if the technology of mass production 
is to work efficiently, product designers must have some 
knowledge of the mechanical capabilities of the machines on which 
their designs will be made. There is usually a strong requirement 
for good levels of understanding and cooperation between 
production engineers and designers at an early stage in the 
product development cycle. These concepts are certainly 
understood in engineering circles in the 20th century, although 
it would appear they had not been universally grasped in the 
19th. Furthermore, those in powerful administrative positions 
within British "Ordnance" were either ignorant of the concept of 
designing a weapon for ease of manufacture or were ignoring it. 
Unlike his British "Ordnance', counterpartst Hall was uniquely 
positioned to take advantage of being both a weapon and a machine 
tool designer and of having the good fortune to be given a 
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complete contract by the U. S. Government to develop his breech 
loader. In contrast, the method of arms procurement operated by 
British "Ordnance" had divided the manufacture of a weapon 
between several different firms. These establishments were 
generally small and manufactured individual pieces of the weapont 
having no responsibility for its design. Under such a system it 
was not possible to coordinate the skills of the product designer 
and the machine tool engineer. The luxury which Hall enjoyed 
simply did not exist in Britain. However, while it would appear 
that Hall had either consciously or unconsciously raised the 
awareness of his contemporaries to the fact that the product 
could be modified to assist ease of manufacture and assembly, 
there does not seem to be an overwhelming amount of evidence to 
suggest that this notion was immediately taken up by American 
arms makers. 
It has been suggested by Professor Tim Putnam, that " ... the model 
1842 U. S. army rifle unlike the P1853 Enfield, had been designed 
to make assembly easy". . 22. This would appear to be a somewhat 
curious statement to make, as the lock mechanism on this weapon 
is almost identical to the pattern 1853 Enfield (Fig. 28). 
However, a careful comparison of the shape of the hammer on these 
two weapons will reveal that the U. S. model 1842 has a much 
simpler profile for a machine to follow. This would make the part 
more economical to produce by reducing the manufacturing ýime- 
Therefore, could it be that Professor Putnam has inadvertently 
confused the terminology in suggesting that the model 1842 "had 
been designed to make assembly easy", when the operative word 
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should have been manufacture? 
It has been stated above that the "Ordnance" engineer John 
Anderson had suggested to the Select Committee of 1854 that parts 
of the pattern 1853 lock could be simplified to bring about cost 
effective improvements in manufacture. Studying the evidence 
within the report makes it clear that one of the parts Anderson 
was referring to was the hammer or cock. During the questioning 
of Anderson a most important piece of information is revealed 
which categorically confirms thatt by the middle of the century, 
engineers of his calibre were perfectly aware that there was 
considerable economic benefit to be gained from modifying the 
product to fit the machine. After much debate within the 
Committee on the subject, the question was put to Anderson.: - "You 
are to be allowed to alter the gun completely from the original 
pattern, to make it suit the machinery, and this is all founded 
upon your hopes and wishes? " Anderson replied "Nothing has been 
said to me about doing that; that has only been spoken about in 
this Committee-room. I stand by what I said on that matter". . 23. 
This implies that engineers, although aware of the advantages of 
designing product for ease of manufacture, had not been invited 
to do so by "Ordnance". What is perhaps more significant about 
this piece of evidence is that the debate had taken place before 
Anderson went to America with his two colleagues to investigate 
the use of machine tools in arms manufacture, showing that 
engineers in Britain were already aware of the economic benefits 
which accompanied an integrated design and manufacturing 
approach. 
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Design through competition 
In August 1864, following the recommendations of the Committee on 
Breech Loading Arms, the War Office issued an advertisement 
inviting gun-makers and inventors to submit plans to convert the 
Enfield pattern 1853 from a muzzle to a breech-loadert calling 
for two main criteria to be met. The first was that the cost was 
"not to exceed El per arm" and the second was that "The shooting 
of the converted arm not be inferior to the Enfield rifle" 
(un-modified muzzle loader). . 24. On completion of the 
modifications, the converted weapons were to be assessed for 
accuracy, penetration, initial velocity, recoil, rapidity of 
fire, liability to failure, simplicity of management, fouling and 
exposure. to weather. Interestingly, the Committee had made no 
references which might have suggested that ease of manufacture or 
assembly was to be considered. 
The advertisement attracted fifty different applicants for the 
conversion work. After careful examination of the submissions, 
the applicants were eventually whittled down to the following 
eight systems, these being "the most promising for the object in 
view: - 
1. Storm's 
2. Shepard's (b) 
3. Westley Richards' 
4. Wilson's 
5. Green' s 
6. Snider Is 
7. Joslyn's 
8. Shepard's (a)". 
266 
The first of the above five systems used the standard Enfield 
rifle cap and nipple method of igniting the charge, while the 
latter three had been adapted for cartridges carrying their own 
ignition. . 25. 
To make the trial absolutely fair, the Superintendent of the RSAF 
selected 48 rifles from stock and had them tested for "soundness 
and accuracy at 500 yards' range", before they were issued (six 
each) to the chosen competitors for conversion. Preceding the 
trial, all converted rifles were subject to the regulated proof 
to ensure the safety of the breech arrangement** Four rifles were 
selected from each individual six and assigned to experiments for 
range, accuracy, penetration, initial velocity and recoil. The 
remaining two rifles were reserved for further experiments 
concerning rapidity of fire, liability to failure, simplicity of 
management, fouling and exposure to weather. . 26. 
Over the coming months extensive trials were carried out. When it 
was reported that more-than 5,500 rounds were fired with only one 
miss-fire, this allowed the Committee to conclude that the 
converted weapons "... are therefore much superior in this respect 
[mis-firing] to the muzzle-loading Enfield". This gave the 
Committee members the confidence to state that "the Committee 
feel justified in recommending that, for the armament of the 
infantry, the conversion of the Enfield rifle to a breech-loader 
on Mr. Snider's system may now be proceeded with to any extent 
which the Secretary of State may deem advisable". . 27. 
The final report by the Ordnance Select Committee on the 21st 
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June 1866 had resulted from an exclusive trial of the Snider 
converted breech loader against the Enfield muzzle loader. Here 
the opportunity had been taken to test the latest pattern 
cartridge proposed by Colonel Boxer, Superintendent of the Royal 
Laboratories at Woolwich. For the final experiment, which was to 
prove the most severe, the Committee arranged for two of the 
converted rifles to be fired ten times each, then plunged into 
"... brackish water, wholly immersing them, and allowing the 
barrels to become filled with water, one with a cartridge case in 
the barrel and one without". The rifles were then removed from 
the water, the barrels emptied out and the weapons laid on grass 
exposed to the weather. This experiment was repeated over four 
days and on the fifth day the rifles were examined. It was then 
discovered that on both samples the sliding cover of the spring 
of the breech block pin had rusted to such an extent that it 
prevented the mechanism from operating easily. The breech block 
had to be pressed back with the foot and as a consequence the two 
sections. of the spring cover were forced together and the spring 
did not have the power to open them. In spite of this, it was 
reported that the rifles were still serviceable "and could be 
loaded with comparative ease". It was further reported that the 
accuracy of the rifles was affected during the firing of the 
first 25 rounds due to rust having formed within the barrels. 
However, after this short period of use the report notes that the 
rifles were "restored by firing to their original condition, the 
accuracy of the last six targets being equal to that with clean 
rifles". . 28. It will have been noted from the reports of the 
exceedingly harsh testing that the overwhelming emphasis of the 
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trial was to observe how well the weapon performed under extremes 
of battlefield conditions, not how easily it could be 
manufactured. 
Further rigorous testing followed. A rifle was selected and laid 
on the ground with its breech closed, whereupon sand and dirt was 
thrown over the mechanism. After the debris had been shaken off 
and removed by hand, the rifle was reported to be "... at once 
perfectly serviceable". The experiment was repeated, this time 
with the breech open when it was reported "There was some 
difficulty in clearing the breech entirely by the hand alone, but 
by means of-a small piece of stick picked off the ground the dirt 
was cleared out and the rifle was fired". After subjecting the 
rifle to further tests and carrying out a number of severe 
experiments with. the "Boxer" ammunition which involved placing 20 
cartridges prior to firing in a barrel of wet sawdust for periods 
of between 118 and 192 hours, the Committee came to the following 
conclusion: - 
... that a considerable increase of accuracy 
by this system of 
conversion at all ranges; yet, in the opinion of the 
Committee, the precision at ranges beyond 700 yards is not 
such as will meet all the requirements of the service in the 
field, looking to the number of skilled marksmen in the ranks 
of the Army; and therefore the recommendation ... that the 
Superintendent, Royal Laboratory, and Superintendent, 
Small-arms Factories, should investigate the subject of 
small-bore breech-loader, of 0.45 or 0.50 calibre, adapted for 
ammunition carrying its own ignition, should still be carried 
out. . 29. 
The Committee in the final paragraph of their report were of the 
opinion that the trials of the Snider breech loading rifle 
proved so satisfactory that it had "at length enabled them to 
recommend to the Secretary of State for War, the immediate 
armament of the British Army (if so desired), a breech-loading 
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weapon and an ammunition which in point of simplicity and 
general efficiency, they confidently believe will be found 
superior to any other with which any foreign army is provided". 
. 30. Apart from the converted Snider breech-loader (Fig. 7) being 
the first weapon of its type to be manufactured in quantity at 
Enfield, it was the first weapon in Britain to be produced with 
a steel barrel in place of the traditional iron component. 
Although the Committee recommended that the Snider breech-loader 
go into service with the British Army, they had already voiced 
certain reservations over the weapon's "precision at ranges 
above 700 yards" and went on to suggest that the Superintendent 
at Enfield investigate the merits of a "small-bore breech-loader, 
of 0.45 or 0.50 calibre". This is clear evidence that, while the 
Committee recognised the battlefield merits of the Snider, by 
recommending this weapon they were accepting a compromise 
solution. Under the system of selection by open competition, it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at anything 
better. It will be immediately recognised that the Committee's 
suggestion that Enfield should investigate the possibility of 
designing a weapon with a smaller calibre, -would, if successful, 
release another arm requiring a different type of ammunition 
creating serious problems for the Army. It will be recalled 
that the issue of at least three weapon calibres had serious 
consequences for the Army at the Crimea. 
By studying other reports issued by the Ordnance Select 
Committee there appears to be no evidence which would suggest 
that the War Office had ever considered laying down a detailed 
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specification for a new weapon, by creating a development 
programme from scratch. Apart from the obvious benefits of ease 
of manufacture which would have resulted, the problems of having 
different calibres of ammunition could have also been avoided by 
careful design. However, contained within the trials of the 
different breech loading systems there is a considerable amount 
of information relating to experiments for accuracy, rapidity of 
fire, initial velocity, fouling and exposure to weather. It 
would, therefore, seem that the thinking of "Ordnance,, was still 
heavily biassed towards battlefield needs and had yet to 
appreciate the savings to be made in production time, labour 
costs, material wastage and final product cost by integrating or 
linking the weapon design to the manufacturing process. 
As mentioned above, the Committee, in its deliberations, had 
referred to the report written by George Lovell some 15 years 
earlier, in 1849, on the subject of the Prussian breech loading 
needle gun. This is perhaps an indication of the state of the 
technical progress within "Ordnance". Surely it can not be argued 
that the method of weapon development by a process of 
evolutionary change, as had been adopted by the War Office, 
(which by 1856 had taken over the responsibility of weapon 
procurement from "Ordnance") would be either faster or more 
efficient than a properly integrated design and manufacturing 
programme. Therefore, it would appear, from the adopted method of 
new weapon selection, that the War Office were no better at 
appreciating the range of benefits to be gained from an 
integrated design and manufacturing programme than their 
"Ordnance" predecessors. The compromise results obtained through 
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weapon selection by open competition must surely have been 
predictable to the military, as at best, it only partially 
satisfied all the performance requirements of the small arm. On 
occasions there were disappointing outcomes to this method of 
selection when, after months of fatiguing trials, there was no 
weapon chosen at all. This would hardly seem the most efficient 
and cost effective way of equipping the armed forces with the 
latest in weapon technology. Clearly Government had yet to heed 
fully. the wisdom of John Anderson when he spoke of making the 
weapon fit the machine. If War office had understood the 
implications of Anderson's concepts, they would have appreciated 
that battles could often be won on the factory floor. 
A deliberate design POlicvr Rerhaps? 
One might speculate that "Ordnance", because of the Crimean War 
and the pressing need to supply small arms to the front line 
troops, had taken the quite deliberate decision to commit Enfield 
to producing the pattern 1853 rifle without concern for ease of 
manufacture. In fact, they would have had little choice, as the 
1854 contracts placed with the Ames Company and Robbins & 
Lawrence had clearly specified jigs, fixtures and gauges only for 
this particular arm. The Enfield pattern 1853 was the latest 
British weapon of the day; its introduction into military service 
had coincided almost exactly with the American machine tool 
contract. Because of this, "Ordnance" would have had little 
option but to produce the rifle on the new manufacturing system. 
The pressing needs of the Crimean War would not have permitted 
the necessary changes to the design to improve ease of 
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manufacture, even if this aspect had been fully appreciated. If 
design changes had taken place, there would have been a 
requirement to make subsequent alterations to the manufacturing 
processes. It would also have been necessary to alter or replace 
some of the jigs and gauges, resulting in unacceptable production 
delays. 
Historically, the pattern 1853 had evolved out of trials ordered 
by Lord Hardinge in 1852, when five leading gun makers were 
requested to submit suitable samples of their weapons for 
experiment, alongside the Minie and a rifle designed by George 
Lovell. 
. 31. It is clear from this method of weapon selection 
(a process of elimination by competition) that-ease of 
manufacture and assembly was not a priority; in fact it was not. 
part of the acceptance criteria. A decade after the introduction 
of the pattern 1853 it was agreed to proceed with a new 
generation of weapon, the Snider breech-loader. However, it 
should be recognised that this weapon was only a modified pattern 
1853. Ironically, the Enfield factory coming on stream with its, 
new system of mass production after cessation of hostilities in 
the Crimea had helped to increase dramatically the number of 
pattern 1853 rifles in circulation to over 800,000. Under the 
circumstances there would have been little likelihood of getting 
political agreement to lay down a programme for a new arm which 
could be manufactured more easily. Having 800,000 rifles with the 
potential of being converted to the next generation of arms 
technology at the unit cost of only one pound would no doubt have 
provided a powerful incentive to ignore the potential benefits of 
a system based on ease of manufacture. It was the success of the 
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"American system" at Enfield which greatly increased 
manufacturing output, coupled with the pressure placed upon the 
private sector to produce arms for the Crimea, which had boosted 
the number of the pattern 1853s in military possession at the end 
of the war. This had provided the most likely reason for 
delaying, or more accurately halting, progress towards a fully 
integrated weapon design and manufacturing programme. The weapon 
design policy, which was really no more than arms by selection, 
can therefore be viewed as having been forced upon the 
authorities by a chain of circumstances over which they had 
little control. This situation can be seen as resulting in the 
military being denied their ideal small arm for battlefield 
performance, as the outcome of such a scheme must inevitably lead 
to a compromise choice. 
The first glimmer of understanding 
One of the first indications that ease of weapon manufacture was 
about to be considered came when an invitation was posted in 
October 1866 for an open competition between small arms makers 
and designers. The "programme of experiments", as specified 
within the official War Office advertisement for weapon 
submissions, contained a list of the nine performance headings. 
Here accuracy was listed first and manufacture last. The word 
manufacture also appeared within the concluding report of the 
Special Sub-. Committee on Breech-Loading Arms, dated 12th 
February 1868, almost as an afterthought. Little can be learned 
from this document of precisely what the Committee had in mind 
with regard to manufacture. 
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The nine weapons under scrutiny had been passed to Colonel 
Dixon, -the Superintendent of the RSAF, who had estimated the cost 
of their separate manufacture. However, a most revealing piece 
of information of how manufacturing requirements were regarded 
comes to light when the Committee reported that it was unable 
to publish details of Dixon's costs as it was "not required by 
the terms of the War Office Advertisement". In spite of these 
reservations, it would appear that Dixon's advice had been 
somewhat influential, as there is the suggestion that ease of 
manufacture was about to be"taken seriously. The Committee in 
their assessment of the weapons were prepared to write: - 
... the Sub-Committee decided on placing the competitive 
rifles in the following order of merit, with regard to their 
facility of manufacture in quantity and uniform quality, those 
which are bracketed together being considered equal": - 
Burton, II 
Joslyn 
fHenry 
jAlbini and Braendlin 
fMartini 
Fosbery 
Peabody 
Remington 
Burton, I 
When the Sub-Committee came, in their conclusion, to place the 
weapons in merit order after completing the general trial 
experiments, their positions had changed to the following: - 
Henry 
Burton, II 
Albini and Braendlin 
Fosbery 
Burton, I 
Peabody 
Martini 
Remington 
Joslyn 
Unfortunately it is not possible to deduce from the report 
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whether "manufacture in quantity and uniform quality" had been 
taken into account in the final placing as there is no reference 
to the word manufacture under the heading "Conclusion", 
As none of the individual arms had met all the requirements lal 
down in the War Office advertisement, it was stated that "the 
Sub-Committee do not feel justified in recommending the Secretary 
of State for War to overlook the want of compliance with the 
qualifications and award the E1,000". The Sub-Committee then went 
on to suggest that disqualification from the E1,000 prize should 
not preclude eligibility for the E600 prize for breech 
mechanisms.. They believed that "the following rifles,, having 
attained a satisfactory degree of excellence in other, - 
particulars, are eligible for this prize, and place them in their 
respective order of merit": - 
Henry 
Burton, II 
Albini and Braendlin 
Burton, I 
The report finally ends with the conclusion that the 
"Sub-Committee cannot refrain from expressing their regret that 
no arm submitted to them should have shown sufficient merit to 
render its introduction into the service advisable". Although 
they did go on to say "the present service arm-performed well 
during several of the trials to which it was subjected, and 
proved itself in many respects an efficient military weapon". 
. 32. In effect, fifteen months had been spent, perhaps wasted, 
from thef time of posting the advertisement to the conclusion of 
the report, only to confirm that the Snider breech loader was "an 
efficient military weapon". 
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This report, which is not untypical of others dealing with weapon 
assessment, illustrates quite clearly the difficulties with the 
system of open competition. Once again it can be observed that 
different weapons, because of their individual characteristics, 
are apt to perform differently from each other in separate 
categories of test. Under such a system of selection it would be 
virtually impossible to get one type of weapon to be outstanding 
in every aspect of the experiment. The episode highlights a 
serious flaw in the weapon selection system, which is that, by 
its very nature, it can not guarantee that at the end of a trial 
the military will have an improved specification weapon. Even if 
a weapon is finally chosen after this long period of assessment, 
there could still be serious consequences for national security. 
The business of constructing jigs, tools and fixtures can not 
begin until the weapon is finally chosent adding considerably to 
the length of the overall development programme. 
A change in the selection procedure 
Throughout the remaining period of the 19th century the progress 
of military weapon development relied almost exclusively upon the 
designs of private companies and individuals. After much 
deliberation between the War Office Committee, arms experts and 
leading gun-makers, it was eventually decided to separate the 
evaluation of barrels from evaluation of breech mechanisms. 
Rifled barrels of Henry, Lancaster, Rigby, Westley-Richards, 
Whitworth and Enfield, judged previously as giving the best 
results, were selected for competition. Limits were'set for 
length, weight, barrel calibre and type of cartridge. After 
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extensive tests the Committee reported that they had selected a 
barrel from Alexander Henry of Edinburgh, Scotland and a breech 
mechanism designed in Switzerland by Frederich von Martini. These 
two components were to be incorporated into a single weapon by 
workmen at the RSAF., the arm becoming known as the Martini-Henry 
(Fig. 8). Here it was hoped that the initiative would create "a 
model long-range arm of precision". . 33. However, there was still 
no suggestion that the method of evaluating separate components 
of the rifle had been adopted to take into account ease of 
manufacture. From the documentary evidence it is clear that the 
main objective was still centred on improving the weapon's 
battlefield performance which had been achieved by marrying 
together the best breech and barrel. This new method of selection 
would seem to confirm that the War Office Committee had finally 
come to recognise that the inevitable performance compromise 
experienced in the past, through the choice of a single weapon by 
competition, could at least be ameliorated by selecting the best 
features of more than one gun. Also, there was the advantage that 
the tooling-up time for the "amalgamated weapon" could be less 
than the previous arm. The fact that the Martini-Henry was- 
constructed from "off the shelf" parts would have meant that 
patterns, jigs and gauges were already available for copying. 
Experiments to evaluate separate gun components were to become 
the norm, throughout the development of the magazine rifle with 
the introduction in 1891 of the bolt action Lee Metford 
Magazine Rifle Mark 1 (Fig. 9) followed in November 1895, by the 
now famous bolt action Lee Enfield Rifle Mark 1 (Fig-10). By the 
time the Lee Metford went into production, there was still no 
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evidence to suggest that ease or economy of manufacture was being 
seriously considered. For example, the weapon was constructed 
from 82 separate component parts including screws and pins which 
took 950 different machines to produce them. There weresome 
1,591 production processes and, with the inclusion of 
accessories, the figure increases by 17% to 1,863. . 34. The metal 
components of this weapon consisted mainly of steell with just 
two made from iron, while brass was used only for the heel plate 
screws and those to secure the regimental number plate. In a 
lecture given to the Institute of Civil Engineprs in November 
f892, the then Superintendent of the RSAF_Enfield, John Rigbyr 
listed the following material processes in the manufacture of the 
Lee Metford rifle: - 
steel-analysing, testing, forging, rolling, stamping, 
annealing, drilling, boring, tapping and screwing, millingr 
turning shaping, slotting, drifting, brazing, soldering, ' 
grinding, filing, polishing, hardening and tempering, bluing 
and browning; as to iron-forging, turning, filing, screwing 
and case hardening; as to brass-casting, rolling, drawing, 
filing, turning, punching, screw cutting-and polishing; as to 
wood-seasoning, turning, machining, boring, filing, oiling and 
polishing. . 35. 
Comparing the magazine Lee Metford to the earlier and simpler 
muzzle loading Enfield pattern 1853, it will be noted that the 
latter took approximately 680 machines and 719 different 
operations and processes to produce the 61 parts of this weapon. 
. 36. From the two sets of production figures it will readily be 
observed that the average number of machines required to produce 
a single part remains similar at just over 11. However, it will 
be noted that the average figure for processes per part has 
increased dramatically from 11.8 for the pattern 1853 to 19.4 
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for the Lee Metford, an increase of over 39%. This comparison 
suggests that, as the complexity of the weapon increased, there 
had not been any serious attempt to simplify or reduce the 
number of manufacturing operations. Given the improved level of 
manufacturing technology in existence as the 19th century drew 
to a close, compared to the labour intensive methods employed 
prior to the "American system" being installed at Enfield, it 
would seem, particularly with the benefit of 20th century 
hindsight, that the War Office policy of weapon selection by 
competition rather than through the issue of a design brief, 
meant that a golden opportunity to reduce the cost of plant, 
equipment, measurement and inspection had been missed. 
Examining a cocktail of complexities and probabilities 
In this chapter it has not been possible, through lack of 
substantive information, to look comprehensively through the eyes 
of 19th century "Ordnance" observers to analyse, from their 
perspective, how they saw the relationship between weapon design 
and ease of manufacture. To date, John Anderson has been the only 
credible "Ordnance" employee found who has firmly grasped these 
engineering concepts. Therefore, the opportunity will be taken to 
introduce some possible scenarios for "Ordnance", based upon 19th 
century evidence while relying on 20th century experience. 
To avoid future difficulties and to ensure maximum economic 
benefit as manufacturing methods advance and weapons become more 
complex in specification, it would have been necessary for any 
factory management to review the capabilities of their machinery, 
their production processes and work-force skills before a new 
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product was introduced. In the 20th century these problems would 
tend to be addressed by integrating product design with the 
manufacturing process. One way to achieve this would be to 
establish a post-development team of engineers at the 
manufacturing site to act in a liaison capacity between the 
shop-floor and the original design team. Experience has shown 
that, without a policy or a co-ordinated strategy which takes 
into account all the manufacturing and design aspects of a 
product, a factory will inevitably suffer from poor quality and 
delays. This will result in loss of manufacturing output and as a 
consequence a more expensive product. In the case of a private 
sector company in a competitive business environment, a loss of 
market share could result. 
One might speculate as to why the War office did not, as the 19th 
century progressed, introduce or consider a co-ordinated design, 
development and production programme for weapon manufacture. This 
might have saved the Exchequer a considerable amount of money. 
Was it because "Ordnance" procurement and manufacture was 
controlled by military bureaucrats who were only interested in 
how the weapon performed, not in how it was made? Perhaps it was 
due to the fact that the Enfield factory was effectively under 
Government control. Traditionally, such establishments have been 
hampered in their operations by the complexities of the decision 
making process which is linked to Parliament through committees 
and Civil Servants. This prevents speed of decision making and 
compromises flexibility, which in turn can reduce the expected 
benefits derived from an economy of scale. It is known that 
smaller, leaner companies are often more responsive to market 
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need, particularly if they have observed a large competitor go to 
the expense of pioneering a new product or process. One might 
cite the Birmingham Small Arms Company as a case in point. Unlike 
the RSAF at Enfield, they did not at first establish all 
manufacturing operations under one roof. In the early years of 
operation not only did they employ both machine and manual 
methods of gun manufacture they also put work out to local barrel 
makers. Presumably this was to help reduce initial set-up costs. 
The "spin off" effect from this would help to spread the load of 
the work in progress, thereby helping to cushion a rapid decline 
of skilled workmen within the area. . 37. In 1865, a correspondent 
writing in The Engineer said of BSA that it not only had the 
advantage of having 11 ... only to step into Staffordshire for its 
iron and it commands the best market for its stocks", but also 
that "... conducting its business through businessmen, who cannot 
afford to manufacture at a loss, it possesses one other advantage 
which Government does not". . 38. This 19th century notion of 
government manufacturing establishments not being particularly 
efficient and cost effective has been maintained either rightly 
or wrongly by many right up to the present day. 
The lack of an integrated design and manufacturing policy may 
also have been a hang-over from the days of the old contract 
system. Under this regime Government had to appease the private 
gun trade by allowing the bulk of the small arms work to go to 
them. However, in one respect this was a benefit for Government, 
as it allowed "Ordnance" to defray production costs by the 
arrangement of out-work, thereby keeping down expenditure on 
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capital equipment and labour. Having such a manufacturing system 
in existence would have lent itself more readily to military 
weapon selection by open competition, albeit that the performance 
of the weapon eventually chosen was a compromise. In the short 
term, this method of selection might have appeared attractive to 
those controlling the Government purse strings being less costly 
than employing an internal weapon design team. 
Government could be forgiven if it had taken the view that the 
technology of the standard soldier-s firearm was reaching its 
zenith by the final quarter of the century and development wast 
as a consequence, slowing down. Therefore, from a Government 
perspective it might have seemed that there was little benefit to 
be gained from the expense of establishing an in-house design 
team, had this particular 'aspect been recognised. The slowing 
down process can be identified most dramatically in the design of 
the Lee Enfield rifle. This weapon continued in British military 
service from the 1890s through over six decades which included 
two World Wars, with little alteration to the basic design. - 
It might be further argued that in the 19th century, only a 
private company free of bureaucratic control could-effectively 
achieve an integrated programme of product design linked to an 
efficient method of production. Ideally, such a company would 
require the capability to design, although not necessarily to 
construct, both the product and the machine tools to produce it. 
Such a company would have required the confidence and financial 
security of long term contracts and it was usually only 
government who could provide the necessary support in terms of 
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scale. From the evidence available, it would seem that the 
British Government would not have been prepared to invest in such 
a venture, as it was content to rely mainly upon its own in-house 
and contractor manufacturing, while allowing weapon development 
to evolve through the method of open competitiont trial and 
experiment. To date, research has only uncovered a small number 
of references in official documents to considerations of ease of 
manufacture. Occasionally a rejection is witnessed on grounds of 
expense and possible difficulties in producing the weapon. This 
happened in the case of the Owen Jones rifle during the initial 
technical evaluation trials in 1882 but remains a fairly isolated 
case. . 39 
John Anderson, the highly regarded "Ordnance" engineer, when 
giving evidence before the 1854 Select Committee on Small Arms, 
responded to the following question: - "You are of the opinion 
therefore that every part of a musket is so simple as to be 
capable of being produced by machinery? ", thus: - 
Yes. I should mention that there. are some of the present parts 
that have an irregular form, which have nothing to do with the 
musket, as a musket, neither with its accuracy or its quality, 
and that many of these, if I had anything to do with the 
getting up of the manufactory, I would prefer that they 
were altered in form; simplified and made more chaste in 
appearance, and not so crooked as some things are without any 
necessity. . 40 . 
The conclusions drawn by Anderson relating to weapon design for 
ease of manufacture, shortly before the installation of the 
American machine tools at Enfield would tend to support the 
theory that at least there was an early recognition in Britain of 
these issues by people with manufacturing backgrounds. At first 
this might suggest that Anderson's opinions had either been 
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forgotten, or deliberately ignored. However, it is more likely 
that his views were overridden by the many complex factorsf some 
historic, which existed just prior to the Crimean War, which led 
to expediency determining the outcome for "Ordnance". 
Had Anderson's views been implemented, this would have meant 
"Ordnance" committing resources to employing weapon designers. 
These men would have had to be proficient in understanding the 
requirements of the latest machine tools or, at leastr be 
engineers capable of writing detailed weapon specifications which 
were easy for manufacturers to comprehend and suited to contract 
by tender. With war looming and pressure on "Ordnance" to fully 
mechanise its manufacturing operation at Enfield, it was unlikely 
that options to improve weapon design to aid ease of manufacture 
would have been given high priority. As we have seen,, Britain's 
entry into the Crimean War late in March 1854 coincided almost 
exactly with the decision to equip Enfield with the latest 
American machine tools, although the decision came too late for 
the Army to benefit from the eventual increase in weapon 
production. Given the state of weapon supplies at the start of 
the Russian conflict, it would have been irresponsible of 
"Ordnance" to have tampered with the design of the pattern 1853. 
Design changes to the pattern 1853 would have meant new sets of 
gauges to accommodate the simplified part profiles envisaged by 
Anderson. This would have led in turn to changes in inspection 
procedures. not only would there have been serious consequences 
for future manufacturing output at Enfield had things gone wrong 
but "Ordnance" would also have risked causing delays to the 
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production of arms supplied by the private contractors (a major 
source), as it would-have taken time to prepare new jigs and 
gauges for the private sector. As a consequence the front line 
troops at the Crimea would have been seriously prejudiced. 
However, it is probably fair to conclude that the argument for 
leaving the design of the weapon unaltered, so as not to cause 
production or supply difficulties, was not generally understood 
by senior members of the Board of Ordnance. Chapter Eight 
provided a considerable amount. of evidence extracted from 
correspondence between Captain Dixon, -Superintendent of the RSAF 
and Viscount Hardinge (who during the Crimean conflict had been 
appointed General Commander in Chief of the Forces) over the 
latter's wish to introduce new types of arm regardless of the 
complexities of manufacturing and tooling-up time-scales. A 
further reason for the pattern 1853 remaining unaltered was that 
in 1852, Hardinge, then Master General of Ordnance, had been 
responsible for instituting a competition between small arms 
inventors which had led to the development of this weapon. Once 
this weapon had gone into production, it would have been unlikely 
that Hardinge would have risked a further period of 
experimentation with what had become the accepted service weapon. 
This would have been a particularly sensitive and unsettling time 
as the pattern 1853 had just succeeded the short lived Minie, 
introduced by his predecessor the Marquis of Anglesea. . 41. 
There was a further important ingredient which should not be 
overlooked as it would have provided a distinct disincentive to 
making the pattern 1853 easier to manufacture. After the death of 
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the Duke of Wellington in 1852, it was Hardinge's decision that 
was ultimately responsible, through the introduction of the 
pattern 1853, for reducing the calibre of the standard military 
weapon to 0.577 inch. This decision could have proved a potential 
strategic disaster for the Army. Previously British calibres 
tended to be in excess of 0.7 inch, as Wellington had advocated 
that "the English musket-ball should not be altered as a 
principle". He was of the opinion that the heavier calibre ball 
would break a horse's leg, while a lighter ball would only wound 
and not cripple the animal. -. 42. Wellington's view was probably a 
throw-back from earlier wars when the use of cavalry was quite- 
extensive. Bringing down a horse with its armed rider was an 
important and strategic part of warfare. As the sophistication of 
weapons improved, with increased range, rapidity of fire, and 
accuracy, the use of cavalry became less important and would 
eventually become obsolete. However, Hardinge could not have been 
absolutely sure, in the middle of the 19th century that the 
introduction of the smaller calibre would bring about the 
advantages envisaged and the decision on his part to accept the 
design was probably a calculated gamble. Even if he had 
understood the manufacturing advantages to be gained from design 
modifications to the arm, it is doubtful if he would have risked 
further changes. 
Anderson has a 20th century supporter 
It is interesting to observe that the earlier views of John 
Anderson regarding ease of weapon manufacture are supported 
almost eighty years later by the Superintendent of the RSAFf GH 
Roberts. When writing the history of the factory in the early 
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1930s,, Roberts, although fully acknowledging Anderson's self 
confessed lack of expertise concerning the ballistic science of 
small arms, is nevertheless sympathetic to his views on how a 
weapon might be designed to improve its ability to be 
manufactured, when he comments: - 
... as an Engineer and Mechanic he [Anderson] was of the 
opinion that the designs might be very much simplified so as 
to make them easier and cheaper for manufacture without in any 
way interfering with the efficiency of the weapon -a line of 
argument which has had to be again used by the present writer 
and his staff during the last few years. . 43. 
It would seem from the results of research presented above and 
also by the. general lack of documentary evidence concerning ease 
of manufacture, particularly at times when new weapons were being 
evaluated, that this feature was given a low priority on the 
"Ordnance" scale of desirability. From the comments expressed by 
Roberts, it would seem that this state of affairs persisted well 
into the first part of the 20th century. Further research would 
be required, which is beyond the scope of this thesis, to confirm 
how widespread the lack of integrated design and manufacturing 
really was. 
Because the Lee Enfield magazine rifle (in slightly modified 
form) stayed so long with the British Army, it'would be 
interesting to discover through a future project if small arms 
selection had been reduced to no more than refining the standard 
service weapon. If this proved to be the case, then 19th century 
selectidn methods would have indelibly stamped their mark on the 
future of military arms procurement. It would seem clear from the 
above evidence that the main objective for 19th century selectors 
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of British military arms was to ensure that the weapon chosen 
performed well in all aspects of battlefield conditions and was 
therefore capable of eliminating the enemy. Of course it was 
important for selectors to ensure unit costs of small arms were 
kept to a minimum but the predominant criteria for selection was 
how the weapon performed overall. If it could be manufactured 
easily and cheaply then this was a bonus. 
From the evidence before us, one must conclude that, influenced 
by the method of weapon selection, which had evolved in parallel 
with the contract system, it was military battlefield performance 
which took precedence over best engineering practice in weapon 
design and manufacture. These were the ingredients which were 
responsible for delaying advances in weapon design and 
manufacturing technology in'Britain. 
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19TH CENTURY TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION AND THE INITIATING FORCES 
The term diffusion or transmission "(employed interchangeably)" 
as broadly defined by David J Jeremy means "the spread of an 
innovation from its originating firm or economy to a host firm or 
economy". Technology is defined as "a spectrum, with ideas at one 
end and techniques and things at the other, with design as a 
middle term. " . 1. 
Research for this thesis has shown a number of ways in which 
technology was transferred, diffused, "borrowed" or deliberately 
stolen and sometimes sent or passed on by artisans and others. - 
These mechanisms were not just confined to the transfer of skills 
and know-how within and between companies in a limited area but 
also extended to transfer overseas. Often knowledge and 
techniques would be passed through a network of emigrating 
craftsmen to the new country, who by simply starting work 
elsewhere, without a thought for industrial espionage, had 
automatically transferred their skills and knowledge. In the new 
country it was possible for the emigrant's knowledge to be 
diffused throughout the host company, but prior to this taking 
place, the knowledge could be added to and enhanced by the 
indigenous workforce through artisans working together before 
being passed on. This particular phenomenon can be traced through 
similarities in the design of certain machine tools and other 
products which occurred in different parts of the world almost 
simultaneously, as if by magic. For example, the early 19th 
century machine tool development within the American National 
Armouries, which was linked to standardisation and - 
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interchangeable parts, can be traced to ideas which had 
originated in 18th century France. Here one suggested link was 
the American Ambassador to France, Thomas Jefferson, who was 
himself anýinventor. It was Jefferson who drew the'American 
Authoritie's attention of Honore Le Blances ideas for the 
precision manufacture of gun locks. Although the system was not 
taken up immediately by the U. S. Ordnance Departmentr Merrit Roe 
Smith has suggested that it was likely that Eli Whitney drew 
inspiration from Le Blanc's work when making a bid for his first 
Government arms contract. . 2. Eventually these ideas and 
techniques, which were encouraged and supported by the U. S. 
Government, evolved into the process of precision manufacturing 
which was to become widely known as the "American system of 
manufactures". 
While there is evidence to suggest that particular ideas were 
diffused in a reasonably precise and structured way, there is 
also the suggestion that a certain amount of diffusion occurred 
more haphazardly, in some instances by accident but more probably 
through natural causes by workers merely being together. Although 
it might be suggested that definitive evidence is lacking to 
support this latter premise, it would seem unreasonable to assume 
that certain artisans did not bring or take their particular 
skills and knowledge to other companies when transferring 
employment. Craftsmen are often needed urgently for their 
particular expertise and it would have been logical for friends 
and internal contacts in other companies who knew the individual 
skills of a workman to inform him that a job vacancy existed. 
This type of informal communication is quite prevalent among 
294 
groups of skilled and unskilled workers and can be identified 
today. The practice is often referred to as "networking" - 
Immigrants and the internal and external diffusion of skill 
When researching the documentation relating to the technological 
developments within the small arms industry on both sides of the 
Atlantic, one often discovers references to personnel either 
visiting or working within an equivalent establishment to that of 
their home country. It can not always be discovered whether these 
people were employed in exactly the same branch of their trader 
although it can usually be determined that they worked within a 
similar establishment. However, we are fortunate that George 
Lovell, when Storekeeper at Enfield Lock, recorded in his own 
hand a number of helpful comments. These are contained on fly 
sheets inter-dispersed within an anonymously written document, 
published in 1829, entitled "Observations on the Manufacture of 
Fire. ý-Arms". Here Lovell has been able to personally chronicle for 
us this early example of technological diffusion: - 
The following is a list of Artificers emigrated from this 
Country who were ascertained to be employed in the United 
States Government manufactories: - as copies from a Document 
forwarded to Sir H Hardinge on the 18 May 1826. 
At Springfield 
Samuel Collins Sen :1 Barrel Forgers. - There are upwards of 
Samuel Collins Junr: j 50 British Artificers at 
work in this establishment but their names are not 
ascertained. 
At Harpers Ferry 
John Chapman I 
Joseph Chapmanj 
James Russell I Barrel Forgers 
Thomas Russellj 
Mark Freeman 1 . 3. 
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This early evidence of the diffusion of skilled immigrant 
workers is confirmed by Charles Fitch in his 1882 census. When 
discussing the year 1819 he states: - 
The division of labor at the time was also very different. So 
far as machinery had been introduced, its construction was 
rude, and its use exceptional. Hand-shaving and chiseling 
[sic] for the stocks, and hand-forging, grinding, and 
hand-filing for the metal parts, constituted nearly all the 
work. The filers - skilled workmen - were then mostly 
foreigners, and consumption of files was enormous. A. 
It is quite likely that these early examples given by Lovell and 
Fitch were emigrants from Britain and Europe, forced to cross the 
Atlantic to seek work, probably due to the reduced need for arms 
in the relatively peaceful years after the Napoleonic wars. 
Although emigrants are not mentioned, Merrit Roe Smith'has 
identified the considerable cooperation between the armouries of 
Harpers Ferry and Springfield, encouraged by their respective 
Superintendents, Stubberfield and Lee. This no doubt helped to 
quicken the pace of technological diffusion within America. 
Between the years 1816 and 1829 (the period identified by Lovell 
as having emigrants in both armouries), Roe Smith suggests that 
"borrowing" and "lending" of workmen took place between the two 
establishments. . 5. This emphasises the likelihood of ideas, 
skills and know-how. being diffused and shared, showing that 
mechanisms were in place to make it possible for British and 
European knowledge to be passed on, even in the event of 
emigrants not physically transferring between the two armouries. 
The sharing of knowledge and ideas with their new work-mates, 
whether deliberate or by natural diffusion, would form part of 
the overall pattern of technology transfer which is sometimes 
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difficult to identify and separate from its origins. Through the 
movement of workers between plants, the transfer of knowledge 
can take place almost like the spreading of a virus. In such 
circumstances it is not always possible to identify the original 
carrier and the mode of transfer can become lost. 
Towards the middle of the century, after considerable research 
and development by American engineers into the technology of 
interchangeability, quite senior figures like James Henry Burton, 
the former Master Armourer at Harpers Ferry, crossed the Atlantic 
to assist with the installation and setting up of the new 
machinery supplied by Robbins & Lawrence and the Ames Company for 
the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield Lock. . 6. Interestingly, 
Burton had been interviewed for the job at the Springfield 
National Armoury in 1854 when the British Commission visited on 
their fact finding tour. . 7. This further supports the notion 
that technological diffusion within the United States was well 
established at the time and suggests that the American Government 
was less concerned than the British authorities about knowledge 
exchange. It was probably realised that, if you wished to export 
a complete production system based on new machine tools, it was 
inevitable that the know-how must be shipped as well. 
Ormel Clark from Springfield joined the RSAF Stocking Department 
in 1856 and a fellow countryman, Mr Caulnin, came to work in the 
Smithy. . 8. About the same time an English gauge maker, a Mr 
McGee, left Springfield to return to Enfield. An official*report 
concerning the manufacture of small arms published in 1887 refers 
to an interview with McGee and confirmed that "a year and a half 
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had been spent in the gun factories of America". . 9. "Ordnance" 
gained further skills and experience for the new Enfield machine 
room by recruiting workers from Colonel Colt's London pistol 
factory for supervisory and machine-setting jobs. . 10. 
Further evidence of immigrant involvement in the British small 
arms industry can be observed after the establishment of the 
Birmingham Small Arms Company (BSA), when Corey M McFarland was 
appointed chief engineer in January 1862. McFarland had 
previously worked for the Ames Manufacturing Company in 
Massachussetts before coming to England to work at the London 
Armoury Company. Probably acting on personal knowledger McFarland 
hired three experienced mechanics from America who joined BSA as 
supervisors. These men stayed at their posts for approximately 
three and a half years. In 1865 when BSA was unable to recruit 
skilled barrel setters locally, the company turned to Belgium for 
these workmen, thereby enhancing the transfer of international 
knowledge. . 11. 
Of course it was not only the immigrants who brought about 
diffusion of skills and knowledge. Sometimes indigenous workers 
were recruited or transferred naturally to other companies, 
dispersing their own expertise or authority within their new 
environment. BSA's first manager,, Mr B McKay, came from the 
famous engineering firm of Whitworth & Company. George Vernunt 
previously with the RSAF at Enfield, was engaged by BSA in 
February 1864 as machine shop foreman. In the same year James 
Smiles joined BSA from the London Armoury Company and was engaged 
as head viewer. The former Superintendent of the RSAF (1855-1871) 
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and managing director of the National Arms and Ammunition Company 
(1872-1874), Major General Manley Dixon, was appointed manager 
and company secretary to BSA in March 1875. In 1894 when BSA 
adopted the Enfield method of barrel browning, the RSAF's foreman 
browner was recruited. . 12. 
During the first part of the 19th century the Enfield factoryr 
under the control of the Board of Ordnance, had been able to 
transfer workers from the Tower of London and Lewisham when the 
demise of these establishments as arms producers came about. In 
the second half of the century Birmingham, being the recognized 
centre of the British gun trade, had a whole range of skilled 
metal-workers at its disposal from its diverse industrial base. 
These artisans were able to provide a potential pool of 
experienced labour for the new BSA factory when it was 
established in 1861. Workers possessing metalworking skills would 
have been a more attractive proposition for machine intensive 
work than those from a non industrial background. Evidence from 
Colonel Colt and James Nasmyth, debated in earlier chapters, 
suggested that almost any intelligent man could be taken off the 
street and turned into a competent machine operator but the 
opposite view is that time and money could be saved by employing 
experienced workmen. By adopting this policy there would be a 
reduced training requirement, thereby allowing a faster 
integration of workers into the production process. It is not 
difficult to understand why BSA had a different attitude towards 
the employment of skilled artisans when the backgrounds of the 
men who came together to form the Company are remembered. These 
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men have been classified by Roger Lumley as having "a craft 
mentality". . 13. Given the growing pressure for different types 
of machine skills, brought about by industrial change as the 
century progressed, it is not difficult to imagine how it was 
possible for technological diffusion to take place. In fact, the 
evidence suggests that it would have been almost impossible for 
technological diffusion not to have taken place. 
Diffusion through competition, cooperation and evolution 
The system of selection by open competition used by "Ordnance" in 
the development of new and improved types of weapons should not 
be overlooked in terms of technical diffusion. Apart from the 
contribution made by the many indigenous inventors and gun-smiths 
to this method of small arms improvement, much influence in 
weapon design came from overseas through such people as martini, 
Lee and Snider. A particularly good example, although strictly 
not to do with competition, can be seen in a letter dated 7th 
June 1866 to the British Under Secretary of State for War from 
Jacob Snider. Snider had requested the conversion of three 
Springfield rifles to the "Snider breech loading principle" by. 
Enfield, as samples for the Egyptian Government. In making the 
arrangement, Snider had stated that no royalty payments would be 
incurred provided Enfield followed his instructions and stuck 
strictly to his drawing. Snider also stated that he wished to 
approve the modifications himself when complete. However, Colonel 
Dixon, the Superintendent at Enfield Lock, had remarked in 
correspondence that it was not possible to make the changes 
ordered by Snider without additional alteration. In further 
correspondence to the Under Secretary of State for War, dated 
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30th June, Snider stated that he had 11 ... held consultations with 
Colonel Dixon". From this it can be deduced that Snider was 
reasonably satisfied with Dixon's recommendations, although he 
still stressed "When said arms are converted I shall expect them 
to be submitted for my inspection and approval before delivery to 
the Egyptian Government". Interestingly, Dixon had written on the 
back of the letter confirming that Snider seemed satisfied but' 
remarked in relation to the Springfield rifle conversions "as the 
question is one purely of manufacture, I did not ask for Mr 
Snider's assistance in that point". . 14. 
By examining this particular piece of correspondence, we are 
permitted to experience how far-reaching and interrelated 
technological diffusion could really be. Here we have Snider the 
American inventor of a particular method of breech loading, 
discussing with Dixon, a British "Ordnance" Superintendentr the 
specifications for converting a rifle designed at the Springfield 
American National Armoury for eventual modification and supply to 
the Egyptian Government. This quite significant illustration has 
demonstrated how it is possible for ideas to spread almost 
halfway around the world from a single project. However, in 
making such observations and taking into account the style of the 
lock on, several pattern 1853 Enfield conversions by Snider, a 
much earlier technical contribution had already been made. It 
will be recalled from our earlier discussions that the shape of 
the Springfield lock plate was similar to that of the pattern 
1853 Enfield and both of these components had been influenced by 
17th century French gun-lock designers. This particular aspect 
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should not be neglected as it demonstrates that technological 
diffusion has accompanied the development of small arms along a 
several hundred year evolutionary path. 
Famous people and famous companies 
On both sides of the Atlantic there have been several examples of 
skilled engineers and craftsmen leaving the employ of a company 
with a household name to set up in business on their own account, 
eventually becoming household names in their own right. The 
Reverend Forsyth, famous in 1807 for revolutionising the 
development of firearms with his patent for the ignition of 
gunpowder by. the application of fulminate, opened a gun shop at 
10, Piccadilly, London with James Brougham. James Vicars, who at 
the time was chief mechanic at the Tower of London, was recruited 
to take charge of the new venture and James Purdy was appointed 
as stocker and filer. Joseph Manton, who had a gun shop at 
314-315, Oxford Street, London had employed in his time the 
services of Charles Lancaster, Moore, Lang of Andover and Thomas 
Boss, all of them eventually leaving to set up on their own 
account. James Purdy (the company is still famous today for 
quality sporting guns) opened his first shop at 4, Princes 
Street, London, in 1814 and employed Thomas Boss between 1817 and 
1821. Boss who had previously worked for Joseph Manton, had_ 
learned his trade from his father. Upon leaving Purdy, Boss set 
up his new business at 31 Grosvenor Street, London. . 15. Just 
looking at this relatively small sample of famous London 
gun-makers clearly demonstrates how incestuous the trade really 
was and further helps explain how diffusion of skills and ideas 
took place. A cursory glance at the lists of 18th and 19th 
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century gun manufacturers and related trades in both the 
Birmingham and London districts will quickly establish the more 
than coincidental connections between and within several firms. 
Here, clear links can be observed between certain companies 
through similarities in family name, trading title and 
partnerships. These connections demonstrate the retention of 
traditional craft skills by individual gun making families which 
were diffused through the generations which followed. On 
occasion, these skills would be shared with privileged workmen 
or, once learned, could be transferred as the craftsman changed 
employment. 
Like the famous gun-makers, a similar pattern of 
cross-fertilization is evident among the engineers and machine 
tool inventors, developers and builders. Probably one of the most 
remarkable periods of eminent British engineering diffusion began 
with an invitation from Joseph Bramah to Henry Maudslay to join 
his lock manufacturing company in 1788. This was to help resolve 
problems of standardisation in production. Maudslay, who had 
previously been employed at the Woolwich dockyard, left Bramah 
after working with him for nine years. After his departure in 
1797, Maudslay set up on his own account, the company eventually 
becoming the firm of Maudslay, Sons & Field. Joshua Field who had 
come to work for Maudslay in 1804, had formally been employed as 
a draughtsman at the Portsmouth Dockyard. . 16. The diffusion 
knot 
had become firmly tied during the period when Samuel Bentham and 
Marc Brunel (father of Isambard Kingdom Brunel) were developing 
the Portsmouth block making machinery at the turn of the century. 
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It was Maudslay they approached to build the machines, an order 
being placed with his London firm in 1802. 
Some of Maudslay's employees (Richard Roberts, Joseph Whitworth 
and James Nasmyth) enjoyed exceptionally distinguished careers, 
becoming as famous in their own right as their mentor. . 17. With 
such eminent engineers coming from a common stable, it would seem 
unlikely that each would leave without somehow being influenced 
by'the other. In turn they would influence and be influenced by 
their own workmen and in a way. act as baton passers in the 
on7going technology diffusion relay. -- 
Private and public collaboration and international diffusion 
The particular example of technological diffusion which is about 
to be discussed will illustrate how it was possible for two 
fundamentally different organisations to cooperate. A 
collaborative project between the Colt's Patent Fire Arms 
Manufacturing Company of London in the private sector and the 
Royal Small Arms Factory at EnfieldLock in the public sector 
allowed the latter the opportunity to provide a service to an 
overseas third party, the Egyptian Government. 
In 1865, Colonel Esslatoun Bey of the Egyptian Service drew up an 
agreement with Colt's for the supply of 2,000 pistols and spare 
parts for the Egyptian Government. Bey, having the responsibility 
for negotiating the terms of the pistol contract, wrote "They are 
to be proved here in England in conformity with the existing laws 
of the Country". Enfield was appointed to carry out an 
independent inspection of the weapons. Between the 10th and 22nd 
November 1865 1F025 pistols were received at Enfield. The first 
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inspection certificate clearing the batch was signed by Lt. 
Colonel Dixon on 22nd November. Referring to the delivered 
quantity, Dixon stated "Of this number 1000 have been accepted 
and are marked, as passing the ordinary Government View". Dixon 
also signed the second certificate on 30th November which shows 
that 1,000 pistols passed the "view" out of a delivery of 1,036. 
Also cleared was a quantity of accessories which included 2,000 
nipple wrenches and 100 pairs of bullet moulds. The third 
certificate concerned spare parts delivered to Enfield for 
inspection between 13th and 22nd December. By listing these items 
in full and. by analysing the figures, it is possible to make a 
number of interesting observations which will add to our 
knowledge and understanding. This not only relates to diffusion 
through cooperation, but also allows knowledge of the standards 
of quality and finish which were being achieved at the time. 
Received Accepted 
Main Spring 1001 
Sear Spring 1004 
Cones 12023 
Bolts 400 
Hands 400 
Screws (counted) 5607 
Hammers 200 
Triggers 200 
Levers & Rammers 200 
Keys 200 
Cleaning Rods 2052 
1000 
1000 
12000 
400 
400 
5600 counted 
200 
200 
200 
200 
2000 
The above number of spare parts have been packed in 2 cases 
numbered respectively 42 and 43 sealed down and directed to 
the Minister of War Cairo, Egypt and taken away by the Carrier 
at the request and to the order of Colt's agent for 
transmission to Southampton on 5th January 1866. This 
certificate completes the order. . 18. 
The first striking aspect which can be deduced from the component 
list is that there are five classifications out of the eleven 
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which have been slightly over subscribed. From this, it would 
appear, that a prior decision had been taken to supply more 
components in certain categories than was necessary to ensure the 
required number successfully passed the view which implies a 
sharing of knowledge. Also a high level of confidence is shown by 
the manufacturer in the quality and finish of the majority of 
components supplied which is demonstrated by the delivery of the 
exact quantity of items. Almost 55% of the components examined 
had no defects (we can not be sure from the figures of the reject 
rate, if any, of the remaining 45%). Achieving this level of 
quality, would suggest that the Colt Company andýthe RSAF had 
reached a clear understanding of each other's requirements prior 
to the start of-the contract. To have-done this would have 
required quite precise communication between the two parties with 
frank information exchanges, almost certainly resulting in the 
diffusion of methods, techniques and practices to allow Colt's to 
quickly meet the viewing criteria set by the RSAF. A further 
deduction which can be made is that since substantial quantities 
of spare parts were dispatched, interchangeability had become the 
accepted norm at least by 1866. Knowledge of the benefits of what 
would now appear to be an established technology had reached the 
customer, in this case the Egyptian Government, through diffusion 
of information. 
When examining the correspondence contained in the Public Record 
Office file concerning Colt's and the Egyptian contract, one can 
not help but notice that the whole exercise appears to have been 
carried out in a most efficient and business-like way, from 
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supplier, through contractor to carrier. For a project to run so 
smoothly would tend to confirm that prior communication had taken 
place with an exchange of information to establish inspection 
requirements, shipping arrangements and deadlines. 
Dixon took on further work from Colonel Bey to view additional 
quantities of Colt's pistols. However, in a letter dated 27th 
February 1866 from Bey, Dixon was asked to inspect "Naval Rifles" 
from JD Goodman and "Seamans Cutlasses" from Mr Mole, both 
Birmingham contractors. . 19. Again this is an example of how 
standards of precision were diffused through organisations and 
different companies, who had either been requested, or perhaps 
had been forced under the terms of the contract to work together. 
It would also seem to confirm that, since the War Office 
(formerly "Ordnance") had become involved in the large scale 
manufacture of military weapons, a greater degree of cooperation 
had emerged between the public and private sectors. 
Notwithstanding these remarkable collaborative arrangementst 
greater opportunities for cooperation and diffusion lay ahead. 
On 12th April 1866 Bey wrote to General George at the War office 
stating that he had been "commanded" to purchase, on behalf the 
Egyptian Government, 12,100 muskets from the Colt's Arms 
Manufacturing Company of Hartford, Connecticut. He requested that 
Dixon be authorised to "send three Government Comptrollers of 
Arms to USA for the purpose of viewing the same", adding that the 
Egyptiafi Government would pay the expense. . 20. 
As the research will show, Enfield was about to play (although it 
was probably not realised at the time) a most significant role in 
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the field of international technological diffusion and the 
furtherance of acceptable standards of viewing criteria within 
the gun industry. On Thursday 21st June 1866 three Enfield 
viewers, Daniel Floyd, William Foster and James Jackson, arrived 
at the Hartford factory of Colonel Colt in America. Their task 
was to inspect a consignment of arms which was destined for the 
Egyptian Government. On arrival, the three viewers were met by 
General Franklin the plant Superintendent and Mr Lord the factory 
manager. Prior to leaving England, the men received the following 
viewing instructions from Dixon: - 
1. The barrel lock and breech pins to be taken out and 
replaced by the Contractors, for the view in detail. The 
barrel to be plugged with 580 plug, proved if necessary with 5 
drams powder proof and service bullet and examined for 
straightness and soundness. 
2. The lock examined for'soundness and the pull off regulated 
from 7-10lbs. 
3. The stock to be tested for soundness. 
4. The Bayonet neck tested and blade sprung 1.75 inches. 
5. The arms to be assembled by the contractor and handed up 
for final view. 
6. The implements and spare parts and where found necessary 
and practical marked: but this can not be done where they have 
been hardened. 
7. The arms will receive similar marks t. o those on the sealed 
patterns. 
8. The senior viewer will certify to the arms etc being packed 
properly and will seal each case in two places over the screw 
heads with a seal to be provided by Colonel Dixon for that 
purpose. 
9. The senior viewer will draw up weekly or monthly 
certificates. Certificates to be in triplicate. 
10. The senior viewer will keep a daily register'of the number 
of arms viewed and passed and will transmit a statement every 
fortnight to Colonel Dixon. 
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11. In order to satisfy Colonel Esslatoun that these arms are 
interchangeable the senior viewer will take 100 of them and 
have them stripped, viz the lock complete stripped, the barrel 
taken out of the stock and the furniture removed - They will 
then be reassembled, the parts being taken indiscriminately 
and a report will be made to Colonel Dixon of the result of 
the examination. 
Jackson: to view the barrels, bayonets and implements. 
Foster: to view the locks and weigh the pull off. 
Floyd: to view the stocks and finished arms complete. 
The contractors to pack the arms. 
Prior to the viewer's embarkation, the Colt Company had supplied 
three sample rifles to Enfield of the "American Government 
Pattern, with Bayonets and Appendages". These arms were firstly 
proved at the RSAF, marked and sealed with the factory seal. One 
sample was retained by Enfield, one was sent to the Colt Company 
and the other dispatched to Colonel Bey. 
Following the progress of the viewers and briefly sharing their 
experiences as they inspect the American weapons will allow a 
unique insight into mid 19th century trans-Atlantic quality 
standards. From the first letter from Floyd to Dixon dated 2nd 
July it is learned that the initial'inspection of 100 rifles for 
interchangeability could not be completed for over a, week as the 
viewer's tools, sent on ahead, had been detained by U. S. Customs 
in New York. Also the American sealed pattern rifle sent 
beforehand from Enfield had not arrived. This had caused Floyd to 
make the following highly revealing remark, "The pattern gun is a 
thing they seem to have no idea of". . 22. If it was not usual 
practice for American armouries to refer to the sealed pattern as 
a reference standard, then clearly both parties had learned 
something of each other's manufacturing methods. This provides 
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another example of technology diffusion. 
Although the sealed pattern had not arrived, it was decided to 
view the 100 rifles and check them for interchangeability as 
directed in Dixon's instruction. Jackson proved the barrels, 
doing all the loading and firing himself. Four were rejected "for 
greys inside". The locks were "all stripped and thrown into a 
heap and assembled again they interchange well. The extra parts 
interchange into the locks without alteration 100 viewed, 70 
marked, 30 returned for soft springs and bad bents". Of the 
stocks, 80 were marked and 20 rejected, "the greater part for 
worm holes, then galls". The three viewers diligently proceeded 
with their work until they had satisfactorily completed the 
inspection of 12,100 weapons and accessories, the last of which 
was crated on Friday 14th September, almost three months after 
their arrival. . 23. 
By analysing. the correspondence it can be seen that the viewers 
were able to demonstrate to their American counterparts different 
standards and methods of inspection. This would seem particularly 
relevant in relation to the sealed pattern, an item not 
apparently used at the time by the Colt Company. The influence of 
the Enfield viewers had extended beyond the factory walls, 
reaching at least one of Colt's suppliers. Referring to problems 
experienced towards the end of the Egyptian contract, Floyd 
wrote, "The view of the last 400 was rather slow owing to some 
stocks the Colt's Co. got made at Windsor Vm. being small and 
roughly machined. I picked out the best and rejected the rest 
wholesale, these were the stocks they intended to supply as the 
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extra". . 24. 
By following the work of the Enfield viewers through an American 
company, it can be seen that the Egyptian contract had given them 
considerable power. This had allowed them to imposer through an 
inspection procedure devised in England, strict standards of 
quality which had influenced not only internal factory processes 
but those of external suppliers as well. One can only speculate 
as to the probable standard of product quality which might have 
left the Colt factory for Egypt. had the RSAF Enfield viewers not 
been appointed to the task of inspection. 
It would be difficult to believe that the British viewers had not 
in some way been influenced by the experience of being exposed to 
almost three months of an American factory environment. This 
particular example would seem to provide further evidence of 
two-way technological diffusion which, in this instance, occurred 
more via the spread of ideas, methods and acceptable quality 
standards rather than by the actual transfer of technology 
through manufacture and design. 
The market as the "engine" of diffusion 
It has already been emphasised that the quest to manufacture 
product by a system of machine tools turning out standard 
interchangeable parts was not the vision of the small arms 
industry alone. As consumer demand for various goods increased, 
ways had to be found to satisfy market needs. This in turn 
prompted engineers to investigate, more vigorously, technologies 
such as standardisation as a means of increasing output to meet 
demand and control costs. The late 18th century endeavours of 
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Joseph Bramah, assisted by Henry Maudslay, in standardising lock 
manufacture and the early 19th century success of Samuel Bentham 
and Marc Brunel in achieving mass production of ship's pulley 
blocks is evidence of the need to fulfil this criterion. 
According to Samuel Smiles, before Maudslay was called in to help 
Bramah in 1789, "Bramah was still unable to produce his locks to 
the required degree of accuracy sufficiently fast to satisfy 
market demand, particularly at a reasonable price". The urgency 
of achieving these goals had been provoked by a growing awareness 
and an increased fear of crime by the public. . 25. Britain's war 
with France had fuelled the Royal Navy's requirement for ship's 
pulley blocks and the shortage had created a market demand. 
Persuaded by Samuel Bentham, who in 1796 had been appointed 
Inspector General of Naval Works, the Government undertook the 
responsibility of block manufacture at the Portsmouth Dockyard by 
placing orders for a sequence of wood-working machines. The 
design of the machinery has been mainly attributed to Marc 
Brunel, the manufacture and construction being completed by Henry 
Maudslay. . 26. Carolyn Cooper has succinctly described the epoch 
thus: - 
The emergency acted as a focusing device to pinpoint 
inefficiencies in the old mode of blockmaking by contractor. 
Once Brunel and Bentham focused on the problem thus posed, the 
public funds deployed by the navy provided capital for putting 
into effect their joint solution to the problem. . 27. 
The shortage of blocks and the measures taken to overcome them 
has demonstrated that the market helped create the climate for 
cost effective production, placing the Admiralty in the position 
of a major consumer. In terms of technological diffusion, it can 
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be seen that the market had provided the "engine" to drive up 
product demand, provoking the development of the machine tool 
industry to support it. These conditions acted as the catalyst to 
reduce overhead costs allowing goods to be produced more cheaply, 
this being largely achieved through the introduction of 
increasing amounts of machinery, which in turn created division 
of labour. The overall effect was a reduction in the reliance 
upon the talents of highly skilled workmen who had in the past 
provided the pulley blocks through the contract system. So it can 
be seen that while machinery de-skilled some a need had been 
created for unskilled people to, join industry as machine 
operators and minders to service a market led demand. This in a 
way caused the machine technology to be transferred to a wider 
and increasing workforce, making many semi-skilled. 
As the century progressed, examples of mass production involving 
machine tools would become increasingly prolific as consumerism 
began to take hold. Roderick Floud supports this notion when he 
suggested that: - 
The increasing specialisation and differentiation of the 
engineering industry was a response to the development of many 
new products and techniques of manufacture in the second half 
of the nineteenth century. The development for example of the 
electrical industries, of cycles, typewriters, sewing 
machines, automobiles and boot and shoe machinery, of improved 
steels and alloys, and of methods of power transmission and 
generation, all called for new manufacturing industries and 
techniques. . 28. 
Floud makes a further important point, which gets to the heart of 
the diffusion debate, when he refers to the necessity of the 
machine tool industry to be in 11 ... constant readiness to respond 
to new opportunities ... " He sees the development of machine tool 
technology in the second half of the century as being "a process 
313 
of constant accretion to knowledge, not a series of discreet 
inventions". . 29. 
Perhaps one of the most illustrative charts to 19th century 
technological diffusion is Joseph Wickham Roe's "Genealogy of the 
Robbins & Lawrence Shop" (Fig. 29). . 30. Here one is able to 
observe not just the diffusion through movement and the creation 
of new companies but also, as the century progresses, expansion 
of the product base from guns and their production machinery, 
through sewing machines to gear shaping. Although much of the 
diffusion has occurred through company acquisition and the 
formation of new partnerships, one can witness and understand the 
natural relationships which produced a product "spin-off" effect, 
having market demand as its creator. Therefore, in these 
particular circumstances, the market has been the dominant force 
which created the climate allowing diffusion to take place. 
Deliberate diffusion 
While some technological diffusion occurred naturally through 
workers moving between different companies and countries, there 
was a more'formalised and deliberate way of transferring 
knowledge. For example, the 1854 Commission. to America was sent 
specifically to gain information for the British Government on 
the manufacture of small arms by machinery and, if satisfied with 
what they saw, to place orders for machine tools. The report of 
the visit shows a high degree of openness and willingness on 
behalf of the American National Armouries and private companies 
to share information with the British Commissioners. There 
appears to be no obvious fear of industrial espionage by their 
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hosts. While in the United States the Commission took the 
opportunity to visit a number of manufacturing establishments 
(not just those concerned with small arms) to study the processes 
and check the commitment to mechanisation and the amount of 
machinery employed. Again the-Commissioners were afforded the 
same opennessr apparently without hindrance. . 31. 
As discussed earlier, the Commission placed substantial orders 
for gun making machinery with Robbins & Lawrence and the Ames 
Manufacturing Company and engaged James Henry Burton, a highly 
experienced engineer who had worked in the Government armouries 
of America,, to supervise its installation at Enfield. Here we 
have seen the calculated and deliberate diffusion of machine tool 
technology and know-how from America to Britain. One might, 
therefore speculate that in this particular instance, the 
overriding factor for allowing such a major transfer of 
technology was the growing need for the U. S. Government to export 
revenue generating products. If this was the case it would seem 
fair to assume that the probable risks had been calculated 
beforehand. This being so, it would tend to indicate that the 
necessity for protectionism and the need to maintain long term 
technological supremacy had been outweighed by a growing exigency 
within the United States to become an exporting power. Over the 
years, experience has shown that inventors and developers of 
leading edge technologies can only stay ahead of market 
competition for a short time. Therefore it is not unusual for 
manufacturers of new products, processes and services to make a 
committed decision. to sell their technology at a premium in the 
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short term, before copying or counterfeiting by competitors 
forces profit margins down. 
If a product is perceived to be designed well and functions 
efficiently, it is not unusual for designers from a competitor to 
copy certain features. Slight changes might be made to prevent 
patent infringement but considerable sums of money can be saved 
by effectively reducing market introduction times and shortening 
the product's normal design and development phase, and, of 
course, if the original product is in demand, then the market 
opportunity has already been created for the counterfeit. As 
t hese practices are not uncommon today, one might suspect the 
need to capitalise on a product before it is copied is not new. 
Merrit Roe Smith has pointed out that a deliberate policy of 
knowledge sharing and cooperation was encouraged between the 
American national armouries of Springfield and Harpers Ferry. He 
particularly suggests that an "enduring collaborative effort came 
after the War of 1812". Describing the mechanisms for this, Roe 
Smith explains: - 
Initiated by the Ordnance Department, pursued by Roswell Lee, 
and countenanced by James Stubblefield, both armouries not 
only shared general administrative information but exchanged 
men, machinery, and raw materials as well. While everyone 
profited from the experience, the opening of these channels 
particularly favoured Harpers Ferry because new technical 
knowledge tended to flow from Massachusetts to Virginia. . 32. 
It was not just the American Wational Armouries who cooperated 
with each other. There was also considerable activity with 
manufacturers and suppliers from the private sector, as Roe 
Smith's research shows: - 
Springfield, situated in a region that abounded with 
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foundries, machine shops, and mills of all sorts, provides an 
instructive case in point. Under Roswell Lee the national 
armoury adopted a Worcester firm's method of welding gun 
barrels with triphammers, purchased castings and engine lathes 
from David Wilkinson of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, lent tools 
and machine patterns to private business companies, and 
readily shared information with Eli Whitney, Lemuel Pomeroyr 
and many other arms contractors. . 33. 
Of course the deliberate sharing of information with suppliers 
and contractors on a need to know basis often makes good 
commercial and engineering sense, ensuring a project's speedy 
conclusion. Normally this can be achieved through trusting 
business relationships built up over many years. However there is 
always the risk of industrial espionage and sometimes there is a 
need to protect confidentially of technical products and 
processes by legally binding agreements signed by the 
participating parties. 
The registration of patents is A further method of protection, 
although there can be certain disadvantages with this procedure. 
By registering a patent the invention or idea normally goes into 
the public domain, thereby allowing others to share the 
innovation. It is then possible for a struggling designer to 
seize from the patent a new concept and by altering it slightly 
incorporate it into his own development, thereby solving a 
particular problem. This can also be done in the knowledge that 
the original patentee may not wish a long and costly challenge 
through the courts. The act of registering a patent is, in fact 
another method of carrying forward technological diffusion. While 
confidentially agreements and registration of patents have their 
commercial risk, the hazards of information sharing would no 
doubt have been carefully weighed up by the various parties 
317 
before decisions were taken either to cooperate in a joint 
venture or to make public an idea. 
Other examples of diffusion have come about through a more 
unusual route, with a deliberate policy by the perpetrator to 
defraud and cheat. Such a case was reported in evidence to the 
1854 Select Committee on Small Arms, when John Barnett, a London 
gunmaker, made the following submission in relation to certain 
Belgium gun manufacturers: - 
ooo I will just state my own experience as regards the Liege 
gun-makers. I have been injured exceedingly by their conduct 
for the last three or four years, and I am now engaged in-a 
law-suit with several of the Liege manufacturers. for 
counterfeiting my name. My arms go into competition with 
theirs in various foreign parts, and they have adopted a 
system of forgery, on taking my name, address, and trade 
marks, and-putting them on their-own spurious imitations to a 
very large extent. . 34. 
This example illustrates the fact that once a product has been 
launched into the market place the manufacturer is at the mercy 
of any unscrupulous individual. of course counterfeiting, a well 
known and established product is more likely to be commercially 
viable. The situation is not dissimilar to the sale of fake Rolex 
watches today. Nevertheless, the mechanism for these fraudulent 
enterprises can still be regarded as technological diffusion, as 
the deceiver and his accomplices still require the skills to 
gather, understand and interpret the technology to be able to 
replicate it. Therefore, it can be recognized that, even in a 
product that perhaps does not strictly conform in every way to 
the original, technology transfer has taken place. 
Diffusion through other formal routes 
The Great Exhibition of 1851 in London's Hyde Park gave 
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entrepreneurs and manufacturers the opportunity to display and 
demonstrate a range of products, processes and technologies on an 
-international scale. Apart from providing a platform for the 
exchange of views and ideas by industrialists, scientists, 
engineers and those involved with manufacture, the exhibition 
enabled a much wider audience to be inspired by a vision of what 
was possible and achievable. It is therefore conceivable that 
this in turn would have the effect of raising individual 
expectations, irrespective of class barriers, and fuelling the 
"engine" of consumer demand. 
Johann Conrad Fischer, a Swiss inventor, entrepreneur and 
industrialist who exhibited his steel making process at the Great 
Exhibition, also took the opportunity to record some of the types 
of visitor in his diary. We in the 20th century can experience 
some of the atmosphere of the occasion through part of Fischer's 
entry for 30th June 1851: - 
The example of the Queen in sending her sailors to the 
Exhibition has been followed by others for the benefit of 
those who cannot normally get to the Crystal Palace because of 
the nature of their work, because they live too far from 
London, or because they have not enough money. Orphans and 
schoolboys, for example, have been taken to the Exhibition. 
As I was sitting at breakfast I saw on two occasions parties 
passing in five coaches. The members of one party were 
standing in so called "vans" while others were in coaches 
provided with seats. All coaches were decorated with flags and 
boughs of trees. Each was drawn by four horses. Over 300 
persons-they were workers from two factories-were accommodated 
in each group of five coaches. For good will many others must 
be coming to the Exhibition in the same way ... . 35. 
The excitement of ordinary people going to the Exhibition'is 
I 
conveyed through Fischer's writings. Their imaginations fired by 
what they had seen and the breadth of ingenuity and technology 
surrounding the exhibits, would no doubt be discussed and 
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communicated to others. In this way many people would glimpse 
the future and share in the expectation of what technology might 
bring. Diffusion of the possible had been taken from the inventor 
and passed through the product to the consumer. Demand would 
surely follow. 
Further ways of deliberate diffusion can be observed when 
examining the journals and proceedings of the many learned 
societies. Information disseminated through papers presented to 
bodies like the Institute of. Mechanical Engineers show more than 
a one way flow. During the debates which tended to follow the 
conclusion of a lecture, ideas and opinions freely flowed in both 
directions between the floor and the rostrum. To ensure the 
maximum spread of knowledge, it was usual for Societies to 
arrange lectures for their membership in different parts of the 
country. In a lecture given to the Birmingham section of the 
Institute of Mechanical Engineers in 1862, entitled,, "On the 
Application of the Copying Principle in the Manufacture and 
Rifling of Guns", John Anderson,, the chief engineer at Woolwich 
Arsenal commenced thus: - 
At the Vewcastle meeting of this Institution in 1858 the 
writer gave a paper on some applications of the Copying or 
Transfer principle in the production of wooden articles. The 
object of the present paper is to give a continuation of the 
same subject with reference to productions in metal, more 
especially in connection with the manufacture of rifled guns 
or similar structures. . 36. 
This example not only shows the dissemination of technical 
information around the country to different groups of engineers 
but also demonstrates that the presenter has deliberately chosen 
to ensure that there is "continuation" of his theme in another 
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material. Anderson, who worked for "Ordnance", was a Government 
employee. Therefore it is significant that he was freely 
transferring technical information, through his lectures, to the 
private sector. In fact, the exercise can be seen as going much 
further as, at the end of the meeting, the Chairman moved a vote 
of thanks to Anderson and in his following announcement 
observed: - 
... that the members would have an opportunity of visiting the 
works at Woolwich and seeing the whole of the processes 
described in the paper in the manufacture and rifling of the 
guns; and also of visiting the Small Arms Factory at Enfield, 
where the same principles have been carried out by Mr 
Anderson, and the same accuracy of workmanship attained. . 37. 
Research has been able to uncover many more instances of 
technological diffusion within the 19th century which support the 
findings recorded in this chapter but to include them here would 
probably add little to the debate. The examples chosen have been 
included specifically to illustrate some of the more subtle ways 
in which the transfer of technology occurred. Although many of 
the examples given are deliberate acts of technological 
diffusion, others may not always appear obvious to the casual 
observer. 
Tracing technological diffusion from the latter half of the 18th 
century to the middle of the 19th century shows a gradual change 
from a position of industrial secrecy to one of considerable 
knowledge sharing. When discussing the latter part of the 18th 
century, David Jeremy has pointed out: - 
Secrecy was preserved in several ways. Factories assumed the 
defensive features of a medieval castle: main shops built 
around a quadrangle yard, small windows and narrow gateways, 
as in Benjamin Gott's Bean Ing Mills at Leeds. Workers were 
sworn to secrecy. Robert Pilkington, who claimed to have 
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invented the spiral application of fillet or garter card 
silver, told Arkwright in 1775 that he and his partner 
"proposed swearing the hands we employed that they should 
keep a secret. " . 38. 
From these extreme examples highlighted by Jeremyr it has been 
shown through earlier illustrations in this chapter that 
technological diffusion had evolved to almost a completely 
opposite position by the middle of the 19th century on both sides 
of the Atlantic. The migration of skilled workers, - the passing of 
skills down through family businesses, lectures to learned 
societies, articles in respected journals, international and 
national trade, exhibitions, factory visits and. even 
counterfeiting, all contributed to the transfer of knowledge and 
the gaining of expertise by others. While it is difficult to 
explain comprehensively the rapid speed towards technological 
openness in purely simplistic terms, one is, however, able to 
appreciate that the maintenance of secrecy would have 
considerably jeopardised technical progress resulting in loss of 
market share to the participants, eventually leading to 
technological stagnation. The problem for leading manufacturers 
of innovative machinery and products even today is how to 
stay in business profitably and keep ahead of the market. once 
the new product has been launched, manufacturers are in front of 
their competitors only by the amount of time it takes to 
introduce the next more advanced piece of merchandise. If 
manufacturers are capable both technically and financially of 
sustaining new product launches on a regular basis with a view to 
increasing or maintaining market superiority and share, then it 
would seem reasonable to assume that the market is dictating the 
pace of technological change as well as the rate of diffusion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The subject of this thesis has been the development of the Royal 
Small arms Factory (Enfield Lock) and its influence upon mass 
production technology and product design. As the research 
progressed it was found that the subject under investigation was 
highly complex, having many influencing strands which it would 
also be necessary to study. For example, several leading 
historians have claimed that during the first half of the 19th 
century the British small arms industry was technologically 
backward in terms of military weapon manufacture, in comparison 
to its American counterpart, after first leading the world in the 
18th century. This led the thesis to a broader study of the 
environment within which Enfield developed and grew. 
While it can be argued that the British gun trade failed at an 
early stage to take full advantage of the wealth of inventive 
engineering skills of men like Bramah, Maudslay, Nasmyth and 
Whitworth, it has clearly been shown that there was no lack of 
technological expertise on this side of the Atlantic. Working 
from the basis that such a paradox existed, it was possible to 
discover a number of powerful reasons which had caused the 
British small arms industry to pause technologically and fail to 
maintain the rate of change which had continued in other areas of 
manufacture since the industrial revolution. We noted that, apart 
from seeking individual reasons to explain this phenomenon, many 
scholars had opted to investigate why America had embraced and 
developed small arms manufacturing technology, rather than 
concentrate upon the question of what had held Britain back or, ' 
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perhaps more correctly, of why manual production methods had 
remained for so long in England. 
Early investigation highlighted a number of separate influences 
upon the development of the British gun trade, particularly with 
regard to the private sector. Therefore, subsequent research was 
directed towards these themes to test their respective strengths. 
While it might appear that these individual influences are 
distinct and separate, we have argued that it was a combination 
of events rather than a single issue which impeded the 
technological growth of British military small arms 
manufacturing, restricting the progress of production towards a 
system of interchangeable manufacture by machine intensive 
methods. This conclusion might help explain why the debate on 
Britain's seeming technological backwardness has remained alive 
for so long, as scholars have tended to examine individual 
economic and technical issues and have-not, for example, linked 
the politics of the "Ordnance" procurement system to the, 
equation. 
We have found no evidence to suggest that, within relevant 
technical understanding and knowledge, American engineers and 
entrepreneurs were technically in advance of their British_ 
counterparts. However, it is known that the American Government 
practised within its National Armouries a policy of encouragement 
to selected entrepreneurs and designers of weapons and machine 
tools which set them apart from British "Ordnance". Through this 
policy the United States armouries were able to take advantager 
perhaps not consciously, of European innovation which had not 
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been actively embraced by the Board of Ordnance and applied to 
methods of small arms production in Britain. It has been shown 
that many of the ideas for self acting machine tools purchased by 
the British Government from America in the developed state, for 
use at Enfield were either "borrowed" or transferred to the 
United States at an earlier stage through a variety of routes and 
sources. Some of the ideas were carried to America by emigrating 
artisans, others were derived from freely available technical 
literature and, of course, there was the opportunity to copy from 
exported products. . 1. 
Irrespective. of where the constituent ideas originated, American 
engineers and entrepreneurs, greatly encouraged by the United 
States Government, had exploited a range of machine tool design 
concepts and developed them into a system for supporting the 
manufacture of weapons with interchangeable parts. From this, -the 
production of other goods followed, leading to the explosion in 
consumerism which has touched the lives of everyone in the modern 
world. The establishment of the "American system" occurred mainly 
in the period between the Napoleonic and Crimean Wars when the 
British Board of Ordnance were wrestling with a host of difficult 
problems, a major one being whether the public or the private 
sector should take control of the manufacture of military small 
arms. 
The Royal Small Arms Factory (as it was to become known) at 
Enfield Lock, although not having a major manufacturing role 
until 1857, had, since its inception in 1816, acted mainly as a 
research and development establishment and weapon repair shop. 
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During this period the private gun trade held the lion's share of 
military small arms manufacture, firstly through a system of 
favoured contractors and then, in the late 1840s, by open 
competition. However, the private sector was not able to move 
from a hand manufacturing culture to one employing machine 
intensive methods, as it had been effectively denied the 
incentive to invest in capital equipment. The problem arose out 
of the Board of Ordnance operating a policy of issuing only short 
term contracts. Further difficulties were placed in the way of 
the private gun trade through a strictly administered "Ordnance" 
inspection system which demanded high 1 evels of tolerance on 
parts and complete weapons. Subsequent examination of small arms 
artifacts with gauges has shown that "Ordnance" were on occasion 
requiring unreasonable levels of precision without considering 
the application of the part under scrutiny. Deliberately 
withholding the issue of patterns and gauges, against which these 
tight measurements had to be made, caused not only weapon supply 
problems for "Ordnance" but also affected the stability of the 
private sector, as skilled artisans left the industry to seek 
employment elsewhere. Many of these men were permanently lost to 
the gun trade. 
George Lovell, during his thirty eight years as Storekeeper at 
Enfield and later Inspector of Small Arms, had carried on a 
passionate crusade to equip the British soldier with the best 
possible weapons. In his drive for perfection he had imposed 
tighter standards of inspection on both weapons and parts. This 
action not only delayed his personal objective but seriously 
irritated the private sector, making him their enemy and target 
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of derision. Lovell in the early 1840s had tried to find ways of 
improving the manufacturing efficiency and quality of the private 
sector's product by proposing a fairer pricing structure and a 
longer contract period of up to three years. However, he was not 
supported in this initiative by the Board of Ordnance. 
Nevertheless, it has been shown that, in spite of the Board's 
refusal to back him he persevered with his proposal, not 
admitting to its implementation until some years later. No doubt 
Lovell's determined action did not go down well and it is clear 
that this had not endeared him to his superiors. 
On another occasion Lovell was able to get his way with his 
superiors and the incident demonstrates that he was a skillful 
and astute negotiator. While under pressure from the private gun 
trade's lobby of Parliament not to expand the "Ordnance" 
manufacturing facility at Enfield, he was able to construct a gun 
stock desiccating chamber on the site without serious 
repercussions. Once Lovell had satisfied himself that the curing 
of gun stocks-could be satisfactorily accomplished within weeks 
rather than years, he was eager to install the system. Even 
though the Board of Ordnance were not responding quickly to his 
recommendations to build the-plant, he was able to achieve his 
objective. He got his way by considerable stealth through a 
series of veiled threats and suggestions that he would have to 
get a substantial quantity of gun stocks cured privately, thereby 
demonstrating that it would be more costly to the Board not to 
install the desiccating chamber. It has also been revealed 
through an examination of Lovell's private and public opinions 
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that he was harbouring a hidden agenda to bring military gun 
making under "Ordnance" control. In the late 1820s Lovell had 
shown through his private writing that he was an avid believer in 
Government control of the means of all military manufacturer yet 
publicly when giving evidence before a Select Committee in the 
late 1840s he had advocated Enfield should remain a small 
manufacturing establishment. However, we have been able to 
discover later evidence that Lovell was being economical with the 
issuing of patterns and gauges to the contractors. By this action 
it would appear that he was trying to obstruct the contractors. 
complying with their contractual obligations, thereby provoking a 
situation which would force "Ordnance" to take control of small 
arms manufacture. While Lovell's methods might be questioned, 
there is little doubt that he 
ýýished 
to provide the British 
soldier with the best possible arms, being frustrated in his 
attempts to achieve this by an intransigent Board of Ordnance. A 
hidden agenda might have seemed the only likely option for Lovell 
to have achieved his ultimate objective of equipping the British 
soldier with the best possible weapon. 
Tim Putnam has suggested that "Lovell would have found a great 
deal in common with John Hall, who was supervising the 
manufacture of a breech-loading rifle of his own design at the 
Government Armory at Harpers Ferry". . 2. While it would appear 
appropriate to compare Lovell with Hall for his inventive skills, 
drive and determination, there the similarity would seem to end. 
In fact it is not possible to make a direct comparison between 
Lovell and any of his American contemporaries as he-possessed a 
range of skills which were quite unique for a man in charge of a 
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government armoury. For example, if one looks at Roswell Lee, the 
Superintendent of the Springfield National Armoury (the nearest 
equivalent of Lovell in the United States) it can be seen that 
both men held similar aims and objectives in the standardisation 
of small arms and both had a good grasp of production methods. 
. 3. Lee had experimented with simple 
inspection gauges as early 
as 1817, while in the early 1830s Lovell was exposing with the 
use of a new micrometer variations in gauges Used at Enfield for 
checking the calibre of musket barrels. . 4. Both men held 
supervisory positions but Lee, while working for the government, 
did not pursue, as Lovell did, a personal quest to improve the 
specification and design of small arms. . 5. In the 1820s, Lovell 
had experimented with percussion caps and showed their 
superiority over flint ignition. Later, while still Storekeeper 
at Enfield, he was responsible for the design of several new 
arms. These aspects of Lovell's expertise in particular set him 
apart from his ordnance counterparts. 
In summary, Lovell can be seen, throughout his career as 
Storekeeper and later as Inspector of Small Arms', as a man of 
many parts whose real intentions, that of providing-the British 
soldier with the best possible weapons, were not fully understood 
by his superiors. Although he promoted strict standards of 
inspection, which under the "Ordnance" contract system were 
almost impossible to achieve, this was his way of driving the gun 
trade towards standardisation within a system of government 
bureaucracy which had curtailed his ability to negotiate 
reasonable terms and conditions with the private contractors. 
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Unfortunately, Lovell paid the price of becoming extremely 
unpopular with the private sector contractors, souring the gun 
trade's relationship with "Ordnance". 
In contrast to the "Ordnance" arms procurement policy and the 
strict inspection standards imposed by Lovell, we have learned by 
examining the evidence of a representative sample of witnesses 
who came before the 1854 Select Committee on Small Arms how it 
was possible for the Eaýt India Company to obtain large 
quantities of weapons at reasonable prices from the private 
sector. This was achieved by the Company adopting a more liberal 
and practical approach to doing business with the contractors 
than that of her "Ordnance" counterpart. Interestingly, the East 
India Company was doing business with the same private sector 
contractors as "Ordnance" during the period in which these firms 
were accused by Government of supplying inferior products and 
failing to meet delivery schedules. The example helps explain the 
importance of having a good customer supplier relationship where 
problems can'be discussed and mutually resolved. This approach to 
arms procurement, although not exactly the same as the internal 
contractor arrangement operated by the American Government, 
reinforces the concept of cooperation with the suppliers of 
services and goods, rather than conflict, as the best way of 
working. 
Felicia Deyrup and Merrit Roe Smith have given several examples 
of how the internal contractor system operated within the 
American National Armouries to the long term advantage of weapon 
standardisation and. machine tool development. Deyrup has 
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suggested that by 1840 most of the. weapon and machine tool 
development had moved into the control of the private company and 
away from government. However, it is clear from the Report of the 
Committee of Machinery to the United States of America that 
cooperation with the private sector was still present as late as 
1854. Here, the action of the Springfield Armoury Superintendent 
to release'his most senior engineer to assist the Ames 
Manufacturing Company in designing machine tools for the Enfield 
contract illustrates how strong these links still were. This 
aspect of cooperation between the public and private sectors has 
been highlighted by historians as an important feature in the 
success of American industry in its drive towards standardisation 
and machine tool development. However, the deliberate lack of 
cooperation by "Ordnance" with the British gun trade has hitherýo 
not received the attention it deserves in helping to explain the 
longer reliance on labour intensive methods of production on this 
side of the Atlantic. Cooperation, or rather lack of it, was just 
another ingredient in the complex cocktail of events which helped 
create a pause in the technological progress of the British small 
arms industry. 
The war in the Crimea acted as the perfect excuse for "Ordnance" 
to take control of military small arms production but new 
evidence has been provided from the period to illustrate the 
incompetent nature of the Master General and the Board of 
Ordnance in matters pertaining to weapon manufacture and 
procurement. It has been found that successive Masters Generals 
had been promoted to the position after long and distinguished 
military and political careers, many being appointed late in 
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life. The backgrounds of these men, being steeped in military 
tactics and political diplomacy, rendered them totally unsuitable 
for being in charge of sophisticated weapon manufacturing and 
procurement programmes. This has been substantiated through the 
continuing correspondence between Viscount Hardinge and Captain 
Dixon, which showed that the former had proposed the manufacture 
of a range of different weapons at the time when the Crimean War 
was in progress. Clearly this has illustrated that Hardinge was 
ignorant of the quite detailed preparation and the time-scales 
required for setting up a new production line, with the necessity 
to plan the supply, storage and issue of new materials. It also 
shows that he was unaware of the ýime it took to design and 
manufacture gauges, jigs and fixtures when a new weapon pattern 
was being laid down. Much of this work could only be undertaken 
by highly skilled tool-room engineers and could take many months 
to complete. 
Furthermore, at the time when Hardinge was contemplating the 
manufacture of these new weapons, "Ordnance" were still heavily 
reliant upon contractors for the bulk of their arms supply. This 
would have meant a change or addition to the current weapon 
supply programme which would have had to be negotiated, causing 
further delays by taking time to organise. The other option. might 
have been for "Ordnance" to take the work in-house. In time of 
war both scenarios were clearly unacceptable propositions, as 
weapons would be urgently required by the front line troops. 
Furthermore, experience has shown that most new products go 
through an initial teething phase until the factory manufacturing 
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processes and personnel become used to the new methods of 
working. This would have caused further supply delays for the 
Army. 
Throughout the 19th century the military weapon development 
programme relied upon a Government operated system of open 
competition which called upon gunsmiths and inventors to submit 
their designs for evaluation. The system had little or no regard 
for the method of manufacture, the main criteria being how the 
weapon performed under battlefield conditions rather than how 
easy it was to produce and assemble. By pursuing such a strategy, 
the War Office had failed to appreciate the benefits of cost 
which could be achieved from a fully integrated weapon design and 
manufacturing programme. The rationale-for this somewhat 
short-sighted approach, which persisted throughout the second 
half of the 19th century, is not to be found in reasoned argument 
in any of the official documents so far discovered. This might 
therefore indicate that the military administration held a more 
influential position with Government than the engineering 
sector. 
When the War Office took over responsibility for arms procurement 
from the Board of Ordnance in the mid 1850s, there was still 
little attention paid, within the public sector, to ease of 
military weapon manufacture. This situation continued in Britain 
throughout the remainder of the century. There were of course 
"Ordnance" engineers like John Anderson who understood that 
weapons could be made more cost effectively by introducing 
designs with simple curves and angles, allowing faster cycle 
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times on the machine tools of the day. However, there is no 
documentary evidence to suggest that there was enthusiasm within 
Government departments for taking these ideas forward. Military 
weapons were selected on the basis of results obtained through 
competition which relied mainly on extensive performance trials. 
It has been demonstrated quite clearly that this policy resulted 
in the soldier ending up with a small arm of compromise 
specification. As the results of research have shownt there was 
always a rejected weapon which performed in at least one 
particular aspect better than the one which was finally selected. 
These problems were partially overcome in the 1870s by the 
introduction of the Martini Henry rifle, combining the best 
breech mechanism with the most accurate barrel. Nevertheless, 
there was still no consideiation given to ease of manufacture and 
assembly as part of design criteria. Weapons effectively evolved 
out of performance improvements over their predecessors. 
By taking the opportunity to examine, under an optical 
microscope, a small representative sample of the Enfield pattern 
1853 gun lock tumblers manufactured in three different periods 
(one before and two after the new machine tools were installed at 
Enfield) then enlisting the help of time-served engineers from 
the small arms industry, a greater understanding of a number of 
controversial issues has been brought about. For example, through 
a study of the machine and hand tool markings under 
magnification, it has been possible to establish that the* 
tumblers had been adjusted to niceties of operation by hand 
filing. From this exercise two further pieces of information have 
been revealed. Firstly, it was suggested by the engineers that 
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the amount of hand filing was slight, suggesting it was done only 
for adjustment of the part for ease of fit. Therefore, the amount 
of metal which would have been removed would not have equated to 
the figure of " ... more than half the man hours required... 11 for 
the manufacture of the American pattern 1864 tumbler as Robert 
Gordon suggests. . 6. Secondly, the high standard of finish, 
coupled with only a small amount of filing on the two later 
tumblers, might suggest that the newly installed American machine 
tools at Enfield were more advanced than their Springfield 
counterparts. If this was the case it would be unfair to make a 
direct comparison of the Enfield tumblers with Gordon's findings. 
However, as it is unlikely that artefactual evidence will surface 
relating to the machine tools which produced the American and 
British tumblers under discussion, one can only speculate on the 
possible improvements in accuracy achieved on the later Enfield 
machine tools. 
The use of hand filing to adjust the part to a finer level of 
accuracy or finish after it has come off the machine has raised 
the question as to what exactly we mean by interchangeability. 
Some commentators have implied that interchangeability means that 
the part requires no other form of adjustment once it has been 
machine produced. However, while this definition might apply to 
computer numerically controlled (CNC) machined parts produced 
with the latest 20th century technology, it can not be applied to 
mid 19th century machine manufacture. Gordon and others have 
produced evidence to show that hand finishing was still in use on 
both sides of the Atlantic during the second half of the century'. 
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Provided the part can fit the gauge accurately and the gauges in 
use are always referenced to a master set of instruments, then it 
must be accepted that the part is interchangeable, irrespective 
of it having been adjusted or finished by hand. Some of the 
recent discussions on interchangeability have arisen out of the 
Report of the Committee of Machinery to the United States of 
America visit to Springfield in 1854. It has been established 
that much contemporary interpretation of what the Committee had 
seen and reported, during a specially arranged demonstration of 
weapon parts interchangeability at the National Armoury, has been 
based on a false premise. Had commentators challenged the 
statement that a lock mechanism could be assembled with the use 
of a 11turnscrew only" by physically checking the artefactual 
evidence, then our perceptions of the level of interchangeability 
achieved by the mid 19th century may have been different. It has 
been shown that the Committee had witnessed a complete lock 
mechanism being swapped as a sub-assembly and it is therefore 
difficult to. judge how close to gauge the individual parts of the 
lock were. 
The new American machinery at Enfield in the mid 1850s was 
introduced primarily to increase manufacturing output and to 
provide higher levels of standardisation. There is no doubt that 
these objectives were achieved, the system quickly proving itself 
more efficient and faster than the old methods accomplished by 
manual labour. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
War Office had used this unique opportunity to give thought to 
the concept of implementing a weapon design strategy which would 
require arms to be manufactured more easily, with a view to 
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reducing material usage, improving assembly times and cutting 
production costs. This was because Enfield had been locked into a 
system of manufacturing an existing weapon design, the pattern 
1853 rifle. Nevertheless, we know from Anderson's evidence to the 
1854 Select Committee, that the existing pattern could have been 
produced more cost effectively by introducing some simple design 
-changes. So why had engineering advice apparently been ignored? 
Firstly, the tools and machinery had been ordered from America to 
manufacture the pattern as it stood in 1854 and it would have 
taken a brave man to interfere with the arrangements at such a 
late stage. Secondly, Enfield had the problem of dealing with 
large stocks of the pattern 1853 after the Crimean War. These 
weapons then became the basis of the next generation of arms when 
they were converted to the breech loader on the Snider principle. 
Given the large stocks of small arms and the knowledge that the 
pattern 1853 could be converted to a breech loader relatively 
easily, at the cost of under one pound, it would have been no 
doubt uneconomical to scrap the existing weapon and start with a 
new, simpler design. However, there is no evidence to suggest 
that a half-way measure was being considered along the lines of 
Anderson's suggestions when the new factory came fully on stream 
in 1857. This would not have meant scrapping the pattern 1853, 
just altering and simplifying some of the component shapes. Of 
course some (not all) new jigs and gauges would have had to be 
made if Anderson's ideas had been adopted but that would not have 
been a major cost penalty. 
By making a detailed examination of more that thirty pattern 1853 
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hammers from weapons dated between 1852 and 1885, manufactured in 
both the public and private sectors, it can be established that 
changes to some of the curved profiles of the Enfield mechanisms 
did not take place until 1860 (the private sector was much 
later). The most significant of these was a straightening of the 
rear underside of the hammer head. This was three years after the 
Enfield factory started volume production with the new machinery, 
confirming earlier evidence that there was a reluctance on behalf 
of the War Office to take the opportunity to make minor design 
changes to reduce unit manufacturing costs. From the examination 
of the artefacts it can be established that further changes to 
the hammer and lock plate followed. These removed the simple but 
decorative engraving, and allowed a curve on the outside shoulder 
of the hammer to be straight milled. . 7. What is interesting 
about these changes is that to date no written instructions or 
references have been found ordering them to be implemented. Of 
course it is conceivable that production engineers took the 
opportunity to introduce these change s gradually on the line, 
with or without official blessing from the military, there being 
no detrimental outcome regarding the weapon's performance. One 
might speculate that, because James Henry Burton had been brought 
from America on a five year contract to oversee the installation 
of the new machinery, he could have encouraged the Enfield 
management to consider simplifying the shape of the hammer. After 
all, he would have been well aware of the similarities between 
the pattern 1853 lock mechanism and that of the United States 
Army M. 1842 (Figs. 30 and 31). The hammer on this weapon was 
strictly functional, having limited curves and no decorative 
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engraving. 
Once the new machinery had been installed and was fully 
operational, Enfield was placed in a very powerful position, able 
to dictate terms which would immediately make it even more 
difficult for the private sector to obtain military contracts. 
Although it had been recommended by the 1854 Select Committee on 
Small Arms that the private gun trade should remain a supplier of 
military weapons, Enfield was again able to play the quality 
card. Now, and because of the new machinery, they were able to 
insist that, in future, all weapon parts would have to conform to 
the system of interchangeability. This had the effect of forcing 
fourteen of the larger Birmingham contractors to combine and form 
the Birmingham Small Arms Company (BSA) at Small Heath in 1861, 
giving them the collective financial power to purchase the 
necessary machinery which enabled them to tender for future 
military business. Being forced to invest in machinery to mass 
produce military weapons was probably an unappreciated blessing 
at the time but it helped prepare BSA for the future coming boom- 
in consumer products like bicycles. Being a private company, not 
bound by the controls placed upon a public sector establishment 
like Enfield by a Government bureaucracy, would have helped BSA 
to be more flexible in its manufacturing approach and product 
diversity in times of peace, when the need for arms declined. 
The thesis, in addressing the central questions surrounding the 
seeming slowness of the British small arms industry to relinquish 
the traditional methods of manual production and adopt a machine 
orientated culture, together with the influence of the Royal 
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Small Arms Factory upon mass production technology and product 
design, has clearly identified that many factors were at play. 
These were: - 
strictness of "Ordnance" inspections; 
withholding of patterns and gauges; 
short term contracts; 
ignorance of the Master General and the Board of Ordnance in 
manufacturing matters; 
an "Ordnance" arms length policy with the private sector; and 
forty years of peace. 
In an unplan ned and surprising way it was the existence of these 
factors coupled with the timing of the war in the Crimea which 
acted as the catalyst, provoking the start of a manufacturing 
technology which was to have far reaching consequences for 
British industry. Had such factors existed in the United States 
as they had in Britain over the same period, then one might 
speculate that our lifestyles today, and perhaps those of the 
American and other people, may have turned out quite differently. 
The engineering and manufacturing technologies left the Old World 
for the New World at the end of the 18th century, then in the 
middle of the 19th century they returned in a developed state, to 
be spread further afield into the 20th century with the 
assistance of the Royal Small Arms Factory, Enfield Lock. 
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NOTES 
. 1. Jeremy, David J, "Damming the Flood: British Government 
Efforts to Check the Outflow of Technicians and Machinery, 
1780-1843", Business History Review, Vol. 51, No. lr Spring 
1977. 
To stop the outward flow of technology, the British 
Government in the late 18th century tried to curb 
international trade by making the export of certain 
categories of machinery illegal. It was also illegal for 
skilled artisans or manufacturers to leave Britain or 
Ireland for the purpose of carrying on their trade. 
Nevertheless many found ways of circumventing this, 
spreading their knowledge and skills. 
. 2. Putnam, Tim & Weinbren, Dan, A Short History of the Royal 
Small Arms Factory Enfield, Centre for Applied Historical 
Studies, (Enfield 1992), p. 13 
. 3. Smith.. Merrit Roe, Harpers Ferry Armoury and the New 
Technol M, Cornell University Press, (London, 1977), 
P. 109 
. 4. Op. cit., Putnam & Weinbren, p15 
. 5. Op. cit., Smith, P-109-125 From his appointment in 1815, in his drive towards 
standardised weapons, Lee had actively sought to introduced 
many new and experimental machine tools to Springfield. 
These ranged from barrel turning and gun stocking lathes to 
a rolling mill for barrel iron. There is little doubt that 
Lee was bolstered in his quest for weapon standardisation 
by the fact that the American National Armouries actively 
encouraged the co-operation of private tool makers and 
inventors. This gave Springfield a considerable advantage 
over Enfield, which, apart from being small by comparison, 
had to accept the Board of Ordnance's arms-length policy 
when dealing with contractors. 
. 6. Gordon,, Robert B, "Who Turned The Mechanical Ideal into Mechanical Reality? "j, Technologv & Culture, Vol. 29, No. 4, 
October 1988, pp. 752-753 
. 7. Ministry of Defence Pattern Room, Nottingham, 7/5/96. By. examining a cross-section of pattern 1853 hammers made 
at Enfield and in the private sector it was discovered that 
the changes to those manufactured by the contractors came 
later-than the Enfield introductions. However the pattern 
of evidence is varied, some hammers having only one curve 
modified, some having at least two and some having 
combinations with or without decorative engraving. One 
possible reason for this might be that individual companies 
had stock-piles of hammers from former contracts. There is' 
also evidence that these varied changes did not always 
344 
comply with the sealed pattern. This might suggest that the 
War Office were adopting a more realistic and practical 
approach to arms production. The first example of change 
(straightening of underside of head only) was observed on a 
Tower sample of 1862. However a Hollis & Sheath Tower 
version hammer of 1875 had the engraving and all the curves 
in place, although there was no evidence of engraving on 
the lock plate. There were also other anomalies that were 
noticed on some Enfield manufactured weapons. For example, 
an Enfield converted (Snider) pattern 1B53 carbine for the 
Bengal Light Cavalry dated 1867 retained all curves to the 
hammer but no engraving of this mechanism or on the lock 
plate. 
Note. A Tower manufactured item was one which came from the 
private sector rather than the Government factory at 
Enfield. 
General note 
Although the writer has gone to great lengths to trace 19th 
century correspondence between the Board of ordnance and 
the private gun trade, the amount of surviving documentary 
evidence discovered which is relevant to the debate has 
been small. In an effort to redress this lack of primary 
source material concerning the public and private sectors, 
it has been necessary to study carefully the excellent 
Select Committee reports, some of which carry engrossed 
copies of correspondence between the Board of Ordnance and 
the private gun contractors. To ensure the accuracy of this 
Government published correspondence, which on occasion 
appears as an appendix to the Select Committee reports, a 
comparison has been made with the original surviving 
letters in the Public Record Office, Kew. On all occasions 
it has been found that there is complete consistency 
between the correspondence in the Public Record Office 
files 'and that which appears in the Government reports. 
Therefore the writer is confident that by a considered and 
sensitive treatment of the Government reports, while 
supporting the research with an examination of relevant 
artefacts, has allowed an effective study of the thesis 
objectives to have taken place. 
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Fig. 11. Gauges for the Enfield Rifle Pattern 1853. 
Fig. 12. Main Avenue of Crystal Palace Great Exhibition, 1851. Note uniformity of roof and gallery support structure. (From an etching by George Cruikshank) 
Fig. 13. Engraving f rom "The Expositor", December 1850, showing 
standardized roof sections which have been prefabricated 
waiting to be lifted into position. 
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I nattery-friMn (%feel firld 
r,, vn-co%cr) 
srfing for %feel and 
p-m-cover 
7 mainirring 
9 Tumbler 
9 Tiomblef-hridIc 
11) Sc., If-lcver 
II Scar--pring 
Fig. 14 - Typical 17th century French style 
flint-lock (The Encyclopedia of 
European Historical Weapons, 1993, 
Line Drawing - Petr Moudry') 
Fig. 15. U-S Musket Model 1842 percussion lock 
(U. S Military Firearms 1776-1956, Major James E Hicks) 
(Illustrated by Andre Jandot) 
Tin., Locic 
The limbs to be T)Rmed in the order in which they rtre remoTed,, viz. :- 
1. Main-spring. 
2. Sear-spring. 
3. Sear. 
4. Bridle. 
6. Ilimmer. 
6. Twubler. 
7. Swivel. 
8. lAnk-platc. 
9. Tumbler Pin. 
lo. Sear-spring Pin. 
11. Bear riu. 
12. Bridle rin. 
Fig-16* Enfield Pattern 1853 percussion lock (Musketry Instruction of the Army, 1864) 
"4.: 1) a- 
' 
'1 yi 
Fig. 17. Early Blanchard Lathe c. 1822 
(Fitch Census Report 1882) 
i-ia ! 
Fig-19-Cyrus Buckland's Improved Blanchard Lathe c. 1854 (Fitch Census Report 1882) 
Fig-18- Brunel's Machine for Makin 
Dead Eyes c. 1805 
(Reec's Cyclopedia 1819) 
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Fig-21* Davis & Syimington's Patent Process 
Gun Stock Seasoning Chamber c. 1848 
Fan Drive Mechanism from Mill Wheel 
(Public Record Office W044/644) 
Fig. 22 -Bayonet and Sword Testing - c-I&SO 
Fig. 23. U. S. 1855 Main Spring Cramp (Vise), for M1842 musket and 
conversion muskets. (Gun Tools: Their History and Identification) 
Fig. 24. Fig-25. Fig. 26. 
Main spring Main spring Lock mechanism showing 
cramp tightened. removed. main spring removed. 
(Gun Tools: Their History and Identification) 
1. Jýe,. uTn. 3. Stud. 4. Bend. 5. Spring. 6. CIas 
4 
Fig. 27. Enfield Pattern 1853 main spring 
(Musketry Instruction of the Army, 1864) 
ig. 28. 
U. S Musket Model 1842 percussion lock 
(U. S Military Firearms 1776-1956, Major James E flicks) 
(Illustrated by Andre Jandot) 
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Enfield Pattern 1853 percussion lock 
(Musketry Instruction of the Army, 1064) 
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Fig. 30. Enfield Pattern 1853 lock. Note the curve 
running down the back of the hammer head 
and extending below the head area as viewed 
from the rear of the mechanism. 
Fig. 31. United States Army M. 1842 lock. Note the 
straight line down the back of the hammer 
head. Also note the simple straight area 
below the 4ead compared to Fig. 30. 
